Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1972

AFRICA

Contending Revolutionaries
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Peking's Diplomacy
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East Germany Today
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THE SOVIET SYSTEM
Petrification or Pluralism?
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EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr.
MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House
ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami, Wayne Hall, David E. Albright
DESIGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith

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Cover photo: Angolan guerrilla fighters ambush Portuguese troops. From *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 5, May 1971.

We regretfully announce that Theodore Frankel, who assumed the editorship of *Problems of Communism* in April 1970, died on December 19, 1971. His successor is Paul A. Smith, Jr., BA (Georgetown University), MPA (Harvard University). Mr. Smith has served as an observer of Communist affairs with the US Department of State in Bucharest, Vienna, Trieste, Moscow, Paris, Munich, and Washington, DC.

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Contact in a Turbulent World

EDITOR'S NOTE: Theodore Frankel edited *Problems of Communism* for less than two years. In that brief time he did much to reassert and strengthen the journal's traditional role as an open forum for objective, incisive scholarship on Communist affairs. It is our intention to continue and foster that tradition.

Today's observer may find cause for hope in the quickened pace of high-level diplomacy. But his hopes will be tempered by awareness of the turbulence still prevalent in a depolarized world —a world living under the awesome shadow of nuclear weaponry. In this troubling atmosphere, we might do well to recall the words of Thomas Mann: "Speech is civilization itself. The word, even the most contradictory word, preserves contact—it is silence which isolates." Today's world has no place for isolation.

Problems of Communism is a journal devoted to helping dispel the misunderstanding and miscalculation which result from isolation. Its purpose—shaped by its former Editor, Abraham Brumberg—has remained steadfast for twenty years: to provide objective analysis and significant background information on various aspects of world communism. We see a continuing role for a journal devoted to that purpose.

Today, more than ever, there is a need for objectivity and high standards of scholarship in our study of Communist affairs. The Soviet Union has recently celebrated its 50th anniversary, the People's Republic of China is now in its third decade, and other Communist-governed states have acquired a certain patina of age despite elements of inherent instability. History and present realities demonstrate that there are many aspects of their outlook which will probably change. Such realities—"life itself" —have already worked some changes, and we expect there will be more in the years ahead. Our task at *Problems of Communism* will be to provide a forum through which scholars in the field can contribute to a clearer understanding of the sources, nature and direction of changes to come.

It is our hope that those who live in Communist states through circumstance or choice, and who are engaged in the study of their own societies, will find it possible to respond or to put forward their own perceptions of the human dilemma and of the Marxist response to it. If they speak as scholars, and wish to be heard in this forum, we will be glad to make room for their views. We do not regard analysis from Marxist premises as necessarily incompatible with objective scholarship, nor do we feel compelled to insist that all of our contributors match our own firm commitment to the practice of authentic republican government and to the lively principles of American liberal democracy.

Paul A. Smith, Jr.

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Africa's Contending Revolutionaries

By Colin Legum

The last decade may have brought Africa to a watershed in its history: to a transition from an essentially nonrevolutionary—even anti-revolutionary—continent to a revolutionary one. Non-ideological students of African affairs cannot pretend to be able to forecast the 1970's and beyond with anything like the complete assurance shown by Chou En-lai in his 1961 prophecy that "Africa is ripe for revolution." All one can do with any degree of confidence is, through analysis of contemporary developments, to identify the major trends on the continent. Of these, there appear to be three chief tendencies, all in conflict with each other.

The first of these tendencies is rejection of not only revolutionary but also radical ideas. Examples of this tendency would include the replacement of the Kwame Nkrumah regime in Ghana by an anti-leftist government, headed until recently by the liberal democrat Dr. Kofi Busia and now by elements of the armed forces; the displacement of the single-party system of the radical Modeibo Keita in Mali by a cautious and uncertain military regime; and General Joseph Mobotu's increasingly assertive nationalistic and bourgeois style of government in Zaire (formerly the Democratic Republic of the Congo—Kinshasa). The second tendency is the growth of radical nationalism. This has been distinctly noticeable within some ruling parties and military regimes—for instance, President Julius Nyerere's Tanzania African National Union in Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independent Party in Zambia, and General Yakubu Gowon's military-dominated government in Nigeria. The third tendency is a preoccupation with revolution. The outlooks of the present regimes in the Sudan, Libya, Guinea, and the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) afford good illustrations. Most African countries have within their individual political contexts a "mix" of these tendencies, with one or another at least temporarily dominant.

Which of the tendencies will hold the upper hand in the years immediately ahead will depend upon a variety of factors related to conditions in each particular country. In several states, for example, the political situation is at present largely frozen because of the dominating influence exercised by a single, aging, charismatic leader. President Jomo Kenyatta plays such a role in Kenya; Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia; President Felix Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast; President Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia; President Kamuzu Banda in Malawi; and President Leopold Senghor in Senegal. The disappearance of any one of them from the political scene could therefore drastically change the political direction of his nation. Since circumstances are not the same in every country, the factors will thus differ from one to another. Nonetheless, one can

Mr. Legum is Associate Editor of The Observer, *London, and Editor (with John Drysdale) of the* Africa Contemporary Record. *His published works include:* Pan-Africanism—A Brief Guide, *1965;* Africa Handbook, *1966;* South Africa: Crisis for the West *(with Margaret Legum), 1964; and* The Bitter Choice *(with Margaret Legum), 1968.*

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reasonably argue that Africa as a whole today suffers from the kind of instability and turbulence that does not favor democratic parliamentary systems of government.

Conducive Factors

This instability and turbulence stem from a number of interrelated causes. Within the confines of this discussion, we can examine each of them only briefly.

1. Most African countries have failed to achieve sufficient economic growth either to fulfill the high expectations that independence generated or to create enough jobs to employ the increasingly large numbers of new workers entering the labor market. The UN Economic Commission for Africa has estimated that the continent's real per capita product must rise at least three percent per year for African nations to satisfy, even modestly, the needs of their growing populations. Less than half the countries on the continent have managed to attain this level.

Preliminary estimates indicate that during the 1960's only 18 nations, accounting for but 20 percent of Africa's total population, achieved annual growths of three percent or more in real per capita gross domestic product. Of the remainder, five, containing 20 percent of the continental population, had annual growths of two to three percent; and the other 23, accounting for 60 percent of Africa's population, had annual growths of less than two percent. The figures also show that economic growth during the last half of the decade proceeded at a pace, if anything, slower than that in the first half. During 1965-70, the aggregate African real gross domestic product per capita increased by less than one percent annually compared with slightly better than two percent in 1960-65.

To make matters worse, almost all African countries have experienced great increases in unemployment. During the period of Ghana's First Seven-Year Plan (1955-61), for example, 847,000 Ghanaians reached the age of 15 and thus became potential workers. But the Plan contemplated the creation of only 500,000 new jobs and actually managed to generate only 350,000. In subsequent years, the national efforts proved equally inadequate. Nor is Ghana in any sense exceptional. Only a very few African countries as yet have a more encouraging story to tell about their endeavors to cope with the problem of the swelling ranks of their labor forces.

What makes the rising unemployment a particularly unsettling factor in Africa is that the unemployed are increasingly better educated and increasingly located in the continent's larger cities instead of in subsistence agriculture. In regard to education, let us again turn to Ghana for purposes of illustration. During the period of the First Seven-Year Plan, 164,500 young people left primary school alone and entered the country's work force, but many of them did not succeed in finding jobs. This situation is by no means untypical of Africa as a whole. As to the concentration of the unemployed, one must keep in mind that the average rate of urban growth in Africa is twice, and in many cases as much as 4-5 times, the rate of growth of the population at large. Moreover, with few exceptions (notably Morocco, South Africa, and Cameroun), the increase in urban population has been occurring chiefly in the capital cities.

2. Even those countries which have managed to bring about significant economic growth (*e.g.*, Zaire, Nigeria, Libya, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Kenya) have not effected a more equitable distribution of the national income. Most governments have tended to give higher priority to the modern sector of the economy, which is confined mainly to the urban areas, than to the rural sector, which embraces 80 percent of the people and where the bulk of new domestic capital originates. This policy not only deprives the agricultural sector of the investments required to make it more productive and to further the growth of local capital, but also encourages a flood of humanity out of the countryside. No worthwhile figures are available to show the extent of the inequity in the apportionment of budgets between different sectors, but the expanding gulf between the rural and urban sectors is becoming painfully obvious even to the various governments. Thus far, Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere is the only African leader who has gone very far toward trying to reverse the old set of priorities, but his ideas have made a considerable impact on younger Africans all over the continent.

3. Africa suffers from severe fragmentation or "balkanization." Its 330 million people are divided among 50 countries. Of this total, more than one-third are concentrated in three nations (Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia); another third are to be found in the next eight largest states (Zaire, South Africa, the Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, Tanzania, Kenya, and Ghana); and the remaining 100 million are distributed among 39 countries. Only 14 of these boast

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populations of 3-6 million; the rest all have less than a million inhabitants. This rough set of figures lays bare the inadequacies of the present political structure for the development of effective economic or security systems on the continent. None of the large collection of smaller countries contains more people than a single important city in any major industrial state; moreover, the inhabitants of many are spread over areas as large as several industrial nations put together. Such circumstances virtually guarantee poverty and insecurity. Yet it is also predictable, in light of local fears and animosities, that continental undertakings in the direction of regional economic development will produce new tensions among neighboring countries.

4. A massive breakdown of post-colonial institutions in most countries has given rise to inefficiency, corruption, loss of governmental authority, and greater reliance on coercion. After independence most new governments attempted to use or adapt previous colonial institutions for their purposes. Very often the only real change was to substitute black for white faces. But institutions suitable to the highly centralized, largely autocratic colonial regimes have proved inadequate for governments which, almost everywhere on the continent, must rely on a populist appeal. Today, a second generation of leaders is engaged in trying to reform the old institutions—sometimes (as in Tanzania, Zaire, Algeria, Libya, and the People's Republic of the Congo [Brazzaville], Guinea, and the Sudan) by making radical changes; however, the transformations are by no means yet fully accomplished.

5. All but a few African states have failed to produce constitutions capable of restraining the conflicts between competing tribal, regional, or racial groups, and between rival pressures groups within the modernizing elite system (the latter type of conflict being common to all the nations). Most countries have drawn up constitutions which accord with the desire of those in power to exercise control in a highly centralized, unitary fashion. In countries where separatist tendencies are rampant, this sort of constitution has obvious appeal to those in authority, but it also frequently results in rigidity and coercion on their part in the face of demands by groups inadequately represented at the center for a greater say in government or for a more equitable distribution of resources and jobs. Such clashes of interest have sometimes been a precipitating cause of rebellion and subsequent radicalization of political movements and their political thinking (as in the cases of the movements of the Southern Sudanese, the Eritreans, and the northerners in Chad) and have at least generated tensions in virtually every African state.

6. The unity of the parties that originally spearheaded the struggles for independence and emerged from these struggles in charge of the new national governments has collapsed. All the independence movements were essentially united fronts of disparate forces that shared the single objective of eradicating colonial rule; and once independence had been attained, the diverse tribal, regional, economic, social, and ideological interests and aspirations of the various elements clashed. Consequently, a struggle for power ensued. As this sharpened, the parties almost invariably split, with the new groupings often reflecting a sharper division between conservative and radical persuasions. Subsequent conflicts over a new balance of power in many instances resulted in loss of governmental authority and effectiveness and have generally led to the establishment of a single-party political system or military rule.

7. There is a strong Pan-Africanist and "black-consciousness" aspiration to complete Africa's "unfinished revolution"—that is, to free the African majorities of South Africa, South-West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau from white majority rule. The emotions aroused by the existence of white minority rule on a black continent cannot be ignored—to do so would be to overlook a major political determinant of the politics of the continent and the growth of revolutionary violence.

8. Arab-Israeli and other Middle Eastern quarrels have spilled over into North and Northeast Africa. These have produced tensions not only between Arab and black African states, but also between Arab neighbors—especially Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt.

9. The competition of the major powers in African arenas has caused and continues to cause significant disruption, for great-power influence figures importantly in the policies and alliances of many governments. This competition pits both the Soviet bloc against China, and the main Western nations against the Communist nations.

These factors together have not only created instability and turmoil but have also helped to swell the ranks of Africa's radicals and revolutionaries. They have thus contributed, in varying degrees, to the dynamics of the struggle for local, regional, or

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

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continental power. Everywhere in Africa today one finds revolutionaries who are challenging the established authorities' claims to power. Even in the few states under the rule of "revolutionary governments" —*e.g.,* Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), and the Sudan —there are revolutionaries contesting the right of these regimes to be considered "genuinely revolutionary."

The Revolutionaries

Who, then, are the revolutionaries, and what are their perspectives? Revolutionary movements in Africa, as in the rest of the Third World, can be understood only if we avoid the deterministic categories employed by Communist and Western ideologists and seek instead to identify the movements in terms of their local settings. This approach also offers a means of distinguishing types of revolutionary movements—a distinction crucial for a grasp of the political processes operating not only in Africa but in the Third World at large. The author suggests the following breakdown as a useful framework for political analysis.

Revolutionary Nationalists. Revolutionaries of this sort want to bring about fundamental changes within a single country and to implement a foreign policy based upon that country's national interest. It ought to be stressed that, as Robert D. Crane of the Hudson Institute has pointed out,[1] "revolutionary nationalism" differs from "rebellious nationalism," the motive force behind anti-colonial movements that seek primarily to remove alien rule but have no ideological commitment to major societal changes. While most African leaders—like Kenya's President Kenyatta, the Ivory Coast's President Houphouet-Boigny, Botswana's Sir Seretse Khama, or Lesotho's Chief Leabua Jonathan—would qualify as "rebellious nationalists," they could by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as revolutionaries. Good examples of revolutionary nationalists would be Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, Algeria's President Houari Boumedienne, Guinea's President Sékou Touré, and the Congo (Brazzaville)'s President Marien Ngouabi.

The revolutionary nationalists and their movements have a strong predisposition toward nonalignment in foreign affairs; but because in the first stage of their struggle they are engaged mainly in challenging the West's post-colonial political, economic, or strategic interests, they usually rely more heavily on support from one or both of the main Communist powers than on support from the West. If they are in government, they normally identify with Third World bodies such as the Conference of Nonaligned States; if they are in opposition, they tend to identify more closely—but seldom exclusively—with bodies like the Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or the Soviet and Chinese front organizations. They do not refuse aid from or eschew relations with Western countries, although they usually exhibit a preference for some of these nations over others. On the whole, however, they complain strongly about a general lack of response to their causes on the part of the Western world.

Pan-nationalist Revolutionaries. Such revolutionaries define national interest not in terms of one individual country but in terms of some wider entity,

[1] "Revolutionary Nationalism: An Instrument of Systematic Change in the Third World," Hudson Institute Discussion Paper, Jan. 22, 1968.

REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM

. . . we do not claim to make a progress report with regard to our working class. However, we can say that our party has clearly defined the present stage of our revolution, *i.e.,* the stage of national people's democracy. We are now settling down to the task of beginning courageously the struggle for national liberation.

In a country still closely dependent on the capitalist powers, in which the economy, the monopoly of foreign and domestic trade are in the hands of the foreigner, we consider that it is wiser for us not to mention the rare victories of our people when the struggle of our working class for real national independence is still very great. At the same time that we must snatch from the capitalists a few fragments of the key sector of our economy, we must democratize them so that everything may really be for the people and only for the people. In other words, at the same time that we must set for ourselves the basic problems of independence and national sovereignty, it is necessary to conduct the struggle against the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the feudal system, it is necessary to create and train cadres and to produce more to resolve the immediate problems of our masses.

—Speech of May 1, 1971, by Marien Ngouabi, President of the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), in *Bulletin Quotidien de l'Aci* (Brazzaville), May 5, 1971.

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and they stand ready to give higher priority to the achievement of a unified revolutionary movement than to the attainment of the goals of a specific country. Africa has two movements that fall into this classification: the Pan-Arabists, often referred to as Arab revolutionaries or Arab socialists, and the Pan-Africanists. The late President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, in the early stages of his career, constituted the outstanding example of the Arab revolutionary. (Indeed, he originated the modern movement.) Perhaps the best current illustration would be Libya's President, Colonel Muammar al-Qadaffy. The most dedicated contemporary Pan-Africanist is Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the former President of Ghana, who now lives in exile in Guinea; but Guinea's President Sékou Touré has also championed the cause, if somewhat less consistently. This aspect of Touré's policies is reflected in his proposal of February 1971 for the creation of a single, united revolutionary front for Africa.[2]

While Pan-nationalist revolutionaries do sometimes form close alliances with straightforward revolutionary nationalists (recently, for instance, the leaders of Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan have concluded the Tripoli Alliance; and the leaders of Libya, Egypt, and Syria have established the Federation of Arab States), they are by and large more rigorously nonaligned than the revolutionary nationalists. Moreover, Arab revolutionaries, such as Libya's Qadaffy tend to be bitterly opposed to all forms of communism and to be as critical of the USSR and China as of Western nations.

Regional Revolutionary Nationalists. This type of revolutionary belongs to an ethnic or regional group in open revolt against an established national political system which, the minority contends, discriminates against its fundamental interests and refuses to allow it an acceptable degree of autonomy. Regional revolutionary nationalists are essentially separatist in aspiration; and they are prepared, if necessary, to break away from the countries of which they currently are a part. They also opt for military struggle as a means of accomplishing their objectives. Probably the most widely known example of a regional revolutionary movement has been the short-lived Biafran Republic, which resulted from the ill-fated attempt of the Ibos to withdraw from the Nigerian Federation. Other movements still active include *Anya-nya,* the military organization of the Southern Sudanese Nilotic tribes that have carried on a rebellion for almost 20 years now; the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Ethiopia; and the Front for National Liberation (FROLINAT) in Chad. It ought to be pointed out, however, that FROLINAT is less clearly separatist than *Anya-nya* or the ELF. FROLINAT aspires to achieve a "truly independent democratic constitution for Chad for the benefit of all its people without discrimination, not merely for a racial, tribal and religious minority." [3]

A significant aspect of the regional revolutionary nationalist movements has been their religious overtones, for these overtones have tended to lead to outside involvement in the internal affairs of the states in which the movements have developed. The Ibos in the secessionist Biafran Republic, for instance, stressed their Christian affiliations and claimed that these affiliations were the reason that Northern Nigeria's Islamic majority was oppressing them. Despite the fact that the Federal Nigerians as a whole had more Christians in their numbers than were to be found among the Ibos, the Ibos successfully appealed to world Christendom on this basis. The Southern Sudanese, who are all either Christians or animists, have similarly emphasized their affinities with the Christian world and have denounced efforts of the regime in Khartoum to "impose an Arab and Muslim hegemony" on them. Fascinatingly enough, though, they have not directed their appeals for backing simply to Christians. They have also solicited and received some support from Israel on the ground that the Southern Sudanese and Israel have a mutuality of interest since the Sudanese government, under General Jaafar Nimeri, decided to join with

[2] His formulation of the scheme went thus: "A very important problem is facing our continent—the problem of the organic unity of all revolutionary parties, states, and classes in Africa in order to obstruct decisively the criminal enterprise of imperialist recolonization. There must be a united revolution in Africa. All those who have chosen a life of dignity against neo-colonialism must succeed in creating a vast Pan-African political movement to be joined by the Congolese Party of Labor, the Guinean Democratic Party, and the revolutionary parties of Algeria, the UAR, Tanzania, Zambia, and all other progessive parties. All progressive trade unions, youth movements, and women's associations should also join the proposed political movement, which will draw up a common strategy for the new Africa. We are sure that we can solve this problem by holding, as soon as possible, a great Pan-African congress to draft the statutes of a Pan-African party to which all progressive African political parties will be affiliated. Why should the revolutionary African countries not sign a military alliance pact enabling them to give military assistance to any member who may need it? Imperialism deserves only one thing: death. We must accelerate this death." Radio Conakry broadcast (in French), Feb. 20, 1971.

[3] *Africa Contemporary Record, 1970-71,* London, Rex Collings, 1971, p. B 278.

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the Arab states in their policy of confrontation with Israel. Although the Eritrean Liberation Front was initially headed by a Christian, it has increasingly stressed the Muslim nature of Eritrea as contrasted with "the Christian Highlands," the seat of Ethiopian power; and as a Muslim group the ELF has managed to garner backing from the Arab revolutionaries in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere. FROLINAT's leader, Dr. Abba Siddick, has likewise won the support of Libya on the basis of "Muslim solidarity."

Marxist-Leninist Revolutionaries. These revolutionaries differ from the revolutionary nationalists and the Pan-nationalist revolutionaries in at least three major respects. The Marxist-Leninists seek to create Communist states based on "scientific socialism"; they reject both the narrower nationalist and the wider Pan-nationalist aspirations of the other two groups; and they oppose all notions of nonalignment and advocate open participation in either one or the other of the Communist camps.

Africa's Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries consist of three basic types. Some identify themselves with Moscow; others are oriented toward Peking; and the last describe themselves as "national Communists." These divisions came about as a result of both the development of the Sino-Soviet struggle and Communist tactical innovations in the Third World, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. With respect to the latter, a few words should be said in elaboration. In the early 1960's, Moscow found Soviet national interests increasingly at odds with its role as promoter of the international Communist movement. For example, the USSR felt it expedient to lend its wholehearted support to Nasser at a time when he had thrown most Egyptian Communists into prison. To resolve this dilemma, the Soviets endorsed the policy of "national communism" as appropriate to certain circumstances in the Third World. Specifically, Moscow decreed that in countries where a "progressive" national front existed, and especially where it was in power, the correct tactic was for the local Communist party to disband and for individual Communists to join the "national-front" party with a view to exercising influence within its ranks. A recent authoritative Soviet publication recognizes eight such "revolutionary democratic" parties in Africa. They are the governing parties of Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), and Tanzania; the *Partido Africano de Independencia de Guiné "portuguesa" e das Ilhas de Cabo Verde* (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau; the *Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola* (MPLA) in Angola; and the *Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) in Mozambique. (Significantly, the list does not include the African National Congress of South Africa or the South-West Africa People's Organization. While it contains no Sudanese party either, this omission can be explained by the fact that no "national-front" *party* existed in the Sudan at the time that the publication appeared. General Nimeri's Revolution Command Council has since endeavored to remedy that situation.)[4]

Many African countries have at least Communist cells. While no pro-Moscow or pro-Peking group enjoys major influence anywhere on the continent or any real influence at all in black Africa, the pro-Moscow groups by and large are more numerous and boast greater memberships than the pro-Peking ones. Moscow-oriented groups (most of whom operate from exile headquarters) exist mainly in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Réunion, Mauritius, Madagascar, and the Sudan. Peking-oriented groups are to be found in the Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa. The "national Communists" are confined primarily to Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan, and Guinea. Their position is harder to assess than that of the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking groups. The national Communists' avowed blueprint for revolution involves the establishment of "single-party" systems of government in their countries and then the transformation of the present mass nationalist parties there into "vanguard" parties.[5] Such a plan entails gaining sway within the current regimes, and only in the Sudan and Egypt have national Communists managed to obtain appreciable influence within the existing governments. Even in these cases, moreover, it is difficult to judge how successful the individuals are in carrying on their Leninist work of "boring from within," or whether their own militancy diminishes as they function within the ruling elite.

The continent's only significant Communist parties, however, are those of North Africa, the Republic of South Africa, and the Sudan. Of these, the Egyptian and South African parties constitute the oldest, both having been founded in 1921. The Egyptian party has served as the nursery for the growth

[4] Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, *The Political Parties of Africa*, Moscow, 1970.

[5] *Ibid.*

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ON ARAB SOCIALISM

[Islamic socialism is] not a step toward communism, nor is it an evolution from capitalism. It is completely different from the socialism which is communism. It aims at social justice and is based on Islam, a great religion which has its own principles for the organization of society as well as of individual lives. . . . When we ban gambling, liquor and immoral night clubs . . . and when we abolish foreign languages from our streets and from our documents and signs and replace them with Arabic, when we revive Islamic values—not superficial values but true Islamic values as sent by God—when we revive Arabism, we do all this to defend the real character of the nation, its dignity, glories, and heritage, and thereby we arm ourselves against imperialism.

—From interview with Libyan Premier Muammar al-Qadaffy by Robert Stephens in *The Observer* (London), Jan. 30, 1972.

of generations of Arab Communists throughout North Africa and the Middle East. It fell on hard times during the 1950's when Nasser came to regard Arab Communists as a threat to his efforts to forge Arab unity and clapped many Egyptian Communists into prison. In the early 1960's, the party, at Moscow's behest, formally disbanded with the understanding that its members would be eligible as individuals to join Nasser's Arab Socialist Union. This step caused a large section of the party to turn away from its former orientation toward Moscow. Today, the Egyptian party exists largely as an exile group.

The South African Communist Party (SACP) became illegal in 1950, but it succeeded in operating clandestinely within South Africa until 1960. Most of its leaders, with the exception of those in prison (notably Abram Fischer, who is serving a life sentence), left the country after 1963 to establish an exile organization in London. There the party publishes a quarterly journal, *The African Communist*.

Historically, the SACP's relationships with the African National Congress and other black nationalist groups of South Africa have been uneasy, for the black nationalists have viewed the Communists as their rivals. But during the 1960's the traditionally non-Communist (or even anti-Communist) leadership of the ANC in exile found it useful to accept all the black South African Communists in exile into the ANC External Mission because of the considerable support that the SACP has rendered the ANC. In April 1969, at its conference in Morogoro, Tanzania, the ANC also agreed to set up a revolutionary front organization with representatives of other South African racial groups, most of them members of the SACP.[6] One must hasten to add, though, that this move generated strong criticism within the ANC, and the final outcome is by no means settled yet.

It should be noted, too, that in 1971 the SACP leadership in exile decided to change its revolutionary tactics and concentrate on "reestablishing the party as an organization of professional revolutionaries closely linked with the working class and peasantry."[7] In a resolution on the role of armed struggle, the SACP rejected the (Chinese) theory that localized activities of full-time guerrillas would in themselves spawn revolution, but it likewise repudiated the notion that armed activity should await complete political mobilization and advanced nationwide organization. It emphasized, however, that armed struggle must not be approached as a purely military question—that operations must be planned to arouse and organize the masses. While the principal undertakings would be initiated in, and based on, rural areas, armed ventures in the towns were to constitute an indispensable corollary effort. The fighting forces must be comprised of "political cadres"—that is, they must be subordinate to the political movement and demonstrate ideological conviction and commitment rather than just the discipline of a traditional, "bourgeois" army. Political and military leadership must be coordinated and eventually integrated.[8]

Of the older Communist parties, that of the Sudan looms as by far the most important. Since we shall discuss it at greater length in another context a bit later, just a few general remarks about it will suffice here. The party had its roots in Egyptian and Sudanese anti-imperialist struggles during the 1920's but only began its independent existence in 1945; by the 1960's it had built up its strength to significant proportions. Indeed, Abdel Khalik Mahgoub, the Secretary General of the party, had emerged as possibly the most prestigious of all African Communist leaders. Hence, Moscow's decision to counsel Communist parties in most Arab countries to dissolve themselves in accordance with the wishes of "national-front" rulers did not sit well with him. Unlike many other Communists, he neither turned toward Peking nor

[6] See the account of the April 1969 gathering in *Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70*, London, Rex Collings, 1970, pp. C 148-54.

[7] *World Marxist Review* (Prague), March 1971.

[8] See *The African Communist*, No. 43, Fourth Quarter, 1970, pp. 51-62.

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agreed to disband his party. His refusal greatly embarrassed the Russians and in July 1971 precipitated a major crisis in relations between the USSR and the Sudan—as well as between the Sudan and its militant allies, Egypt and especially Libya. The ultimate outcome was Mahgoub's execution and a firm crackdown by the Sudanese government on those Communists of his persuasion.

As for the other North African parties besides the Egyptian party, there is relatively little to be said. Within a few months after Algeria achieved independence in 1962, the new government of Ahmed Ben Bella banned the Algerian party (PCA). For a time, individual Communists did hold some positions within the regime, but they quickly lost these after Ben Bella's ouster in June 1965. The PCA now functions in exile with a tenuous link to internal elements through student and clandestine political opposition groups such as the Avant-garde Socialist Party (PAGS). In January 1971, the Algerian authorities dissolved the National Union of Algerian Students, accusing it of having become a tool of the PAGS. The Tunisian Communist Party has been illegal since an attempt to assassinate President Bourguiba failed in January 1963. In 1960, King Mohammed V of Morocco declared the Moroccan Communist Party incompatible with Islam and banned it, but in 1968 Mohammed's son and successor, King Hassan II, allowed its former Secretary General, Ali Yata, to resuscitate it under the name of the *Parti de Libération du Socialisme*. This authorization lasted only briefly —in fact, just a year.

To sum up, then, few Communist parties are permitted to operate openly anywhere in Africa, so most of them maintain themselves from headquarters abroad—*e.g.*, the South Africans in London, the Egyptians in Eastern Europe, and the Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans in Paris and Prague. But veiled Communist groups do function on the continent either within legal trade-union or student bodies or under suitable (usually transitory) soubriquets like the Nigerian Workers' and Peasants' Party.

Islamic Revolutionaries. Revolutionaries in this category identify themselves first and foremost as Muslims, and they oppose both the revolutionary nationalists and the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries with equal fervor. Their major movement in Africa is the Muslim Brothers. This movement has strong groups in Egypt and the Sudan (where it is known as the Islamic Charter Front) and less potent groups in Algeria, Libya, and Morocco. Though Nasser's Egypt vigorously suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sudan has now outlawed it, too, the movement has demonstrated a tenacious capacity for survival. Its funds come mainly from sources in Saudi Arabia, and its headquarters are situated in Geneva.

The Muslim Brothers regard themselves as a "purifying force within Islam"; however, their leaders are not *ulamas* (traditional professional Muslim theologians) but a modernizing elite of academics, students, army officers, civil servants, and professional men. The movement's methods of organization resemble those of the Communists. It operates through clandestine cells usually located in the universities, the army, and the civil service.

National Liberation Revolutionaries. These revolutionaries fall into a separate classification because of the nature of their immediate goal. They seek to liberate the African majorities of their individual lands—South Africa, Namibia (South-West Africa), and Rhodesia; the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau; the French territories of the Coast of Afars and the Issas, the Comoro Islands, and Réunion; and the Spanish colonies of the Spanish Sahara and the Canary Islands—from white minority rule. More specifically, they are committed to armed struggle as the means of attaining their objective and spurn negotiation with the governments of the white-ruled countries. This characteristic not only distinguishes them from African nationalists who are willing to engage in such negotiations, but also qualifies them as "revolutionaries."

Judged purely by the criterion of operative guerrilla forces, there are today eight major movements of this variety. These include the *Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola* (MPLA), the *Frente Nacional de Libertaçao de Angola/Governo de Republica de Angola em Exilio* (FNLA/GRAE), and the *Uniao Nacional pro Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) of Angola; the *Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique* (FRELIMO); the *Partido Africano de Independencia a de Guiné "portuguesa" e das Ilhas de Cabo Verde* (PAIGC) of Guinea-Bissau; the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), which unites military elements from the earlier nationalist movements, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Rhodesia; the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa; and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia.

Among the lesser important movements are the *Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique* (COREMO) of

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Mozambique; the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA) of South Africa; the *Mouvement National de la Libération des Comores* (MOLINACO) of the Comoro Islands; and the *Mouvement pour l'Autodétermination et l'Indépendance de l'Archipel Canarien* (MPAIAC) of the Canary Islands.

The primary supporter of most of the movements is the Organization of African Unity. Of the major movements, for example, the OAU recognizes and backs all but the FLNA and UNITA. The OAU works through the African Liberation Committee, which it established in 1963 with headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Not only does the Liberation Committee disburse funds from OAU member-states and try to coordinate the activities of the different movements, but it has also endeavored to prevent foreign involvement in Africa through the liberation struggle by insisting that all foreign aid, whether arms or money, be channeled exclusively through it.

But, in practice, this effort has not proved altogether successful. While the Communist nations do channel some of their aid through the Liberation Committee, the USSR and the People's Republic of China provide additional direct help to the organizations that they particularly favor—*e.g.*, the MPLA of Angola and the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau. In China's case, this outside aid does not go just to those movements that carry the OAU's endorsement, but to others as well—for example, the COREMO of Mozambique. While the bulk of the financial aid that the Liberation Committee dispenses comes from African states, most of its arms are supplied by the Soviet bloc, China, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. It also gets some financial assistance and nonmilitary material from the Communist nations.

Because the Liberation Committee and all the major liberation movements have wanted to keep their nonaligned posture from being eroded by one-sided support from outside the continent—that is, from the Communist world—they have deliberately sought to encourage support from Western sources. Indeed, they have managed to get the United Nations to circulate an appeal to all its members to provide the movements with funds, to be channeled through the Liberation Committee. However, Western aid has thus far been quite limited. Some Scandinavian governments—notably Sweden and Denmark—do make annual contributions to the Liberation Committee's treasury, but no other Western government does so. A number of Western-based political and voluntary organizations, including the World Council of Churches, furnish assistance—mostly in the form of medicines, educational resources, and clothing. In 1970, a conference of Western organizations also convened in Italy to mobilize support for the Portuguese African liberation movement, and on that occasion His Holiness the Pope gave an audience to the liberation leaders.

This general lack of response from the West has bitterly disappointed the liberation movements; moreover, the willingness of some Western governments to supply certain kinds of military equipment to the rulers of the white redoubts in Southern Africa has reinforced the movements' perceptions of widespread Western indifference and/or hostility to their cause. Substantial evidence has been advanced, for example, that Portugal derives considerable direct and indirect benefits for its military undertakings in Africa from being a member of NATO,[9] and the African liberation movements have roundly denounced Portugal's NATO partners for abetting the efforts of Portugal to hang on to its African possessions. Similarly, they have decried Britain's decision to sell arms to South Africa for external defense as an act of enmity toward the liberation struggle.

The revolutionary liberation movements have three basic elements in common. First, all assert their desire for nonalignment in world affairs. None of the movements wishes to attach itself exclusively to any country or international camp; however, because some rely heavily on Communist support, their representatives tend to move more frequently in international Communist than in Western political circles. Second, the top leaders and main elements of all of them are revolutionary nationalists. (Among these leaders, Amilcar Cabral, the founder and Secretary General of the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, must be rated as one of the Third World's most important revolutionary thinkers.[10]) Third, every movement is essentially a united-front organization containing widely disparate political elements. There are both Communists and committed anti-Communists in not

[9] S. J. Bosgra and C. van Krimpens, "Origins of Portuguese Military Equipment, Portugal and NATO," *African Contemporary Record, 1969-70*, pp. C 117-39.

[10] Though a committed Marxist, Cabral is a nonaligned politician and a hard-headed realist. He rejects the theories of those, like the Maoists, who argue that the revolutionary impetus must come from the peasants and workers. He identifies the initial source of revolutionary power under colonial conditions as the African petty bourgeoisie rather than the working class and the peasantry, though he acknowledges that the petty bourgeoisie may betray the liberation struggle after achieving victory over the colonial forces. See Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea—An African People's Struggle*, London, Published from 21 Theobald's Road, WC1, n.d.

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only the rank and file but also the leaderships of some of the movements, especially the ANC of South Africa, the MPLA of Angola, and FRELIMO of Mozambique. The strength and influence of the Marxist-Leninist cadres vary from movement to movement. For example, Communists form a more significant element in the PAIGC, the MPLA, and the ANC than in SWAPO of Namibia, UNITA of Angola, ZAPU of Rhodesia, FRELIMO of Mozambique, or the declining PAC of South Africa and ZANU of Rhodesia.

As a result of the great reliance that the liberation movements have had to place on the backing of the Communist countries, African Marxist-Leninists have gained increased opportunities to build cells within the movements. These cells have, in turn, exerted sufficient pressure within movements like SWAPO, the ANC, FRELIMO, UNITA, ZAPU, and ZANU to confront the non-Marxist top leaders of the movements with a major problem. Either the leaders must in some measure accede to the demands of the Marxist-Leninists, or the leaders must try to control or expel the Marxist-Leninists and risk losing support from Moscow or Peking. The internal dynamics produced by this dilemma are discernible within all the liberation movements; indeed, the dilemma is an important element in the ideological struggle that goes on inside each movement concurrently with the struggle against a common enemy. It seems likely that the longer the military struggles last and the more dependent the guerrillas become on the backing of the Communist states, the more Marxist-oriented the leaderships will tend to become. This tendency has been noticeable in both the changing rhetoric and organizational structure of most liberation movements as their struggles have developed. In 1969, for instance, the ANC of South Africa reappraised its tactics and began to call for "a qualitative change in the organizational structure" for the purpose of "fighting a People's Revolutionary War." [11] This is a far cry from where it started originally.

The heavy reliance of the liberation movements on the support of the Communist nations has also been divisive in another way, for the Sino-Soviet rivalry has had a pronounced impact on movements vying with one another for influence. Most movements contain at least individual leaders inclined toward either Moscow or Peking, and the USSR and China have shown a disposition to back different movements operating in competition within a single territory rather than the same one, each Communist power basing its choice on an assessment of which group seemed most likely to side with itself. In the case of the Rhodesian movements, for example, the Soviets have tended to favor ZAPU, while the Chinese have championed ZANU. However, it ought to be pointed out that the Chinese have been much less successful in winning expressions of support from the major African movements than the Soviets have.

[11] See the source cited in fn 6.

The Sudan: A Case Study

As our discussion has already suggested, these different revolutionary elements contend with one another for influence on the African scene. For purposes of illustrating this competition and gaining a deeper understanding of the interests and activities of Africa's various revolutionary movements, let us look in some detail at the prelude to and aftermath of the sanguinary "Revolution of Correction" in the Sudan that lasted from July 19 to July 23, 1971. The Sudan is almost a textbook case in that its society contains all but one of the revolutionary types—the national liberation revolutionaries—that we have identified. At least, the diverse types did exist until the "Revolution of Correction"—the culmination of a power struggle between two groups of revolutionaries—resulted in the defeat of the Marxist-Leninists at the hands of General Nimeri's Revolution Command Council (RCC).

On May 25, 1969, the Sudan's parties of *nationalist rebellion*, the Umma and the National Unionist Party, which had spearheaded the anti-colonial struggle and achieved power under a parliamentary system of government, were overthrown in a military coup led by a Young Officers' Movement under the command of Colonel (now Major-General) Jaafar Nimeri. There had been an earlier military coup (which had produced the regime of General Ibrahim Abboud, 1958-64), but it had been staged by the nonrevolutionary establishment of brigadiers and generals. The young revolutionary officers differed greatly from those who had held power formerly. This new military group included both *revolutionary nationalists* and *Pan-nationalist* or *Arab revolutionaries*. While Nimeri himself is an Arab revolutionary with a strong personal attachment to Nasser, the revolutionary nationalists were in the majority.

This balance reflected fairly accurately the temper of Sudanese sentiment at large. Among the Sudanese there persist old suspicions of Egypt stemming from an earlier period when Cairo sought to establish its

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hegemony over the Nile Valley. These suspicions have constituted one of the factors behind the growth of Sudanese nationalism and its later, more militant manifestation of revolutionary nationalism. A second underlying factor has been the fact that the Sudan is divided between an Arab/Muslim society in the north and a black Nilotic/non-Muslim, mainly animist and Christian society in the south. At the time the country gained its independence in 1955, the southerners had opted for a federal system with local autonomy; and a year later, after their hopes were frustrated and they began to fear total domination by an "Arab Islamic North," they turned to violence. Out of this conflict grew the armed struggle of the *Anya-nya*, a revolutionary movement of *regional nationalists.* As a result of this revolutionary challenge, northerners came to a deeper realization of the importance for the unity of the country of a nationalism based on the Sudan rather than on "the Arab nation." Moreover, the steady intensification of the armed struggle in the south, despite massive military repression, helped to generate disillusionment with the essentially bourgeois nationalist parties and to fan revolutionary nationalism among the younger officers of the Sudan's unvictorious army, as well as among other sections of the elite.

Well before the revolutionary nationalists and Arab revolutionaries loomed on the political horizon, two other revolutionary movements—the Communists and the Muslim Brothers (the Islamic Charter Front)—had appeared, and they both were functioning in the country at the time of the 1969 military coup. The Egyptian Communists had nurtured a Sudanese Communist Party as far back as the 1920's; after operating through a series of anti-imperialist fronts like the White Flag League and the Movement for National Liberation (which had links with the Comintern), it had finally emerged, as we have already indicated, as an independent Communist party in 1945 under the direction of experienced Marxist-Leninists such as Abdel Khalik Mahgoub and the trade-unionist Ahmed al-Sheikh. Of all the revolutionary groups, it alone had managed to bridge the gap between north and south to some degree. As early as 1925, the Egyptian Communists, with considerable prescience, had correctly diagnosed the danger of conflict between northerners and southerners in the Sudan and had urged their Sudanese comrades not to neglect that largely-ignored region of their country. By the 1960's, the Sudanese Communists had succeeded in producing one outstanding southern Communist leader, Joseph Garang.

The Muslim Brotherhood of the Sudan had also been inspired by Cairo, and its growth had more or less paralleled that of the Sudanese Communist Party. These two modernizing and revolutionary groups had become bitter rivals for influence among secondary-school and university students. The fervor of the Muslim Brothers, however, fed not only on fears of, and antipathy toward, the atheistic Communists but also on their growing mistrust of the Islamic leadership of the country's two major religious sects, which dominated the traditional nationalist parties.

When Nimeri's Young Officers staged their coup in 1969, they at once abolished all the established political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party. However, the RCC did give the Communists an opportunity to join with it as individuals in a revolutionary front. This offer produced a crisis within Communist ranks. One section of the party—led by veterans like Ahmed Suleiman—chose to adopt the position of *national communism*, and some of the group became ministers in the military-controlled regime. Another section, under Mahgoub, refused pointblank to disband the party on the ground that while Nimeri's officers were revolutionary, they had not attained authority through "the power of the masses" but through an elitist coup. Despite strong pressure from Moscow, which was interested in cultivating Nimeri's regime, Mahgoub refused to change his mind. The crisis among the Communists embittered the two rival sides and sparked intrigue within the regime itself.

The quarrel between the Communists finally came to a head—under mounting pressure from Nimeri—in July 1970. At a party conference in Khartoum, Mahgoub's faction claimed to have defeated the national Communists' proposals for the dissolution of the party. In November, Nimeri's patience finally gave out. He dismissed three ministers from the RCC—Major Hashim al-Ata and Lieutenant-Colonel Babikr al-Nur (both Communists and Mahgoub supporters) and Major Faruq Uthman Hamadallah (a revolutionary nationalist whose quarrel with Nimeri was not fundamentally ideological), and he ordered Mahgoub's arrest. Three months later, Nimeri launched a campaign denouncing the Communists for indulging in the "hobby of sabotage, personality cult, subservience, excessive selfishness, self-love and lust for power." [12] Then in April 1971 he flew to Moscow to insist that in the future contacts between

[12] Radio Omdurman Domestic Broadcast (in Arabic), Feb. 12, 1971.

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CAVEAT FOR COMMUNISTS

. . . the question is not between the authorities and the Communists but between the Sudanese people's movement and a particular group which intends to kill this movement. The Sudanese masses have proved their ability to confront this group. They put an end to the situation on July 22 [1971] when Nimeri returned to power. When we cooperated with the Communists, our cooperation was honest and sincere. We put them in a higher national position than others. . . . Had Nimeri's regime wanted to uproot communism from the Sudan as it promised, it would not have allowed the Communists to be present at the Sudanese National Union constituent congress to debate and express opinions. It would also not have relaxed its pressure on the Communists but would transfer them from their houses to prisons. The regime does not want a Communist Party, nor does it allow the growth of this and other parties, but it does not object to the presence of Communist ideas. Nimeri wants the Communists in the Sudan to be the same as the Communists in Egypt—under the ruling party—no cells, no political bureau, no central committee and no coups.

—From statement of Major Mamun Awad Abu Zayd, Secretary General of the Sudanese Socialist Union, quoted in *An-Nahar* (Beirut), Jan. 16, 1972.

the Soviets and the Sudan must only be through his RCC—a demand to which Moscow acceded.

On May 30, 1971, the Communist Party Central Committee met clandestinely in Khartoum and decided that "the time has come to change the regime." It called for a "Revolution of Correction." The political and military wings of the party commenced to plan their coup under the political direction of Mahgoub, who had in the meantime been freed from jail and was reportedly hiding out in the Bulgarian Embassy in Khartoum. The plotters' London cell (al-Nur and Hamadallah, the latter of whom had made common cause with the Communists) enlisted the support of Iraq through Hamadallah's links with Baghdad's revolutionary Baathists. (The Iraqi Baathists opose the leaderships of both Egypt and Libya, the two countries with whom the Sudan is linked in the Tripoli Alliance.)

The Communist coup was skillfully executed. Nimeri and all his colleagues plus about 50 carefully-selected officers—all committed anti-Communists whom their captors described as "Arab Socialists"—were arrested by the plotters. The Manifesto of the "Revolution of Correction" spoke of the revolution's alliance with the progressive forces of the world led by "the great Soviet Union," and on the second day of the coup, the Russian ambassador was the first and only foreign diplomat to call on the head of the new government, Major al-Ata.

On the third day of the takeover, Libya's *Pan-nationalist* or *Arab revolutionary* leader, President Qadaffy, intervened in affairs by ordering the British aircraft carrying Colonel al-Nur and Major Hamadallah from London to Khartoum to land when it was overflying Tripoli, and then taking the two into custody. At the same time, Qadaffy and Egypt's President Sadat were consulting with each other on how to defeat the Communist coup and to restore Nimeri to power. It had been precisely against such a broad contingency that the Sudanese Communists had sought to obtain the support of the Iraqis; moreover, the Communists had hoped that once the new regime was firmly established, Moscow would feel bound to support them, despite objections from Egypt. Before there was time for any of the external forces to undertake full-scale intervention, however, Nimeri's own backers in the Sudanese army set in motion (largely on the initiative of noncommissioned officers) a successful countercoup. At the point when it was about to triumph, the leaders of the original coup gave orders to kill the anti-Communist prisoners. Twenty-two were cold-bloodedly massacred in their cells.

After a public interrogation and a court-martial, Nimeri approved the execution of 15 leaders of the coup, including five of the most prominent Communist leaders—Mahgoub; al-Sheikh (a former recipient of the Lenin Peace Prize); the southerner, Joseph Garang; Major al-Ata; and Colonel al-Nur. This action touched off a campaign of violent denunciation on the part of the USSR and other Communist states. Nimeri issued an ultimatum to the Russians to stop "the campaign of calumny" within 48 hours or face a complete rupture of diplomatic relations. His line was supported by Qadaffy but strongly opposed—in accord with obvious Egyptian interests—by Sadat, on whom the Soviets brought considerable pressure to bear. Deferring to Sadat in the end, Nimeri did not formally sever relations with the Soviet bloc but contented himself with expelling some of the Soviet and Bulgarian diplomats and ordering a full inquiry into the reasons for and circumstances of the coup. To counterbalance the Soviets, he also began to strengthen his ties with the People's Republic of China (especially as regards military aid) and to promote a detente with selected Western countries, particularly Great Britain.

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These developments in the Sudan illustrate the general phases of the political evolution of much of Africa in recent years, and it is well to keep these phases firmly in mind as we turn to a brief assessment of what the future may hold for the contending revolutionaries on the continent.

The Future

In the first phase, protests by movements led by rebellious nationalists—who came mostly from the rising indigenous middle class—brought about the demise of the colonial regimes; the sovereign governments that emerged largely reflected the bourgeois-nationalist outlooks of these leaders, though there were also radical elements in leadership positions. Initially, the new military establishment, whose senior officers as a rule had the same values, backgrounds, and interests as the middle-class politicians and civil servants in control of the governmental machinery, supported the civilian elements; but when the authority of the new political class began to weaken, the armed forces sometimes seized control (*e.g.*, in Sierra Leone, Dahomey, Somalia, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Uganda, etc.).

The second phase commenced with the loss of power by the bourgeois-nationalists, whether of the civilian or military variety. As the position of the bourgeois-nationalists had eroded, a process of radicalization had taken place within the circle of modernizing political elites—comprised of younger politicians, middle-rank and junior army officers and civil servants, professional men, trade-union leaders, university staffs and students, etc.—and the new political stage witnessed the accession to power of radical but nonrevolutionary elements. They were ardent nationalists and usually pragmatic socialists, as opposed to ideological left-wingers.

Where the radicals too failed to produce real economic and social change and to establish a viable political system, the way opened up for still a third phase of development. One of its most characteristic features has been the transfer of authority to the Young Officers' movement in the armed forces. While these military men have not for the most part been allied with the revolutionary political groups of different persuasions, such groups have become more prominent during this phase, and the conflict between the various revolutionaries has sharpened.

At the same time, however, opposing elements—namely, the bourgeois-nationalists and radicals—have begun to reassert themselves. In many instances, they have managed to regain some of their lost positions and influence, especially where the revolutionaries have proved no more successful in achieving economic progress and instituting an effective political system than the elements that they replaced. Today, indeed, counterrevolutionary forces are at least as important in African politics as the revolutionary forces. (It ought to be stressed, though, that the "counterrevolutionaries," like the revolutionaries, are by no means all of the same political stripe. They may be either conservative and "reactionary" or radical and "progressive.")

This historical development indicates that there is nothing inevitable about African political processes. To be more specific, it does not sustain the theory that power will inexorably pass by stages from the hands of bourgeois-nationalists into those of ideological revolutionaries. To date, Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries have failed to win power anywhere on the continent. In some cases, as in Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Somalia, the Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria, they have been outflanked by the revolutionary nationalists; in other cases, as in Libya, by the Pan-nationalist revolutionaries. Moreover, the political trend leftward has turned out to be far from irreversible. In fact, there has been a tendency for countries to fluctuate between various kinds of government—bourgeois-nationalist, radical, and revolutionary nationalist.

Whether Communist revolutionaries oriented toward either of the major Communist nations will ever gain control of an African state therefore remains an open question, though the battle between competing revolutionaries will almost assuredly continue. The answer will depend, in the author's view, on four main factors about which it is impossible to make forecasts with any certainty at the moment: the ability of the nonrevolutionary radicals and the revolutionary nationalists to overcome some of the more serious economic and social problems facing modern Africa; the attitudes of the Western nations toward the governments seeking to achieve meaningful changes in their societies; the ability—and the willingness—of either the USSR or Communist China, or both, to intervene effectively in support of revolutionary movements in general or particular revolutionary movements; and the policies that the Western nations, the USSR, and China pursue in the predictably more violent struggles that lie ahead in the racial cauldron of Southern Africa.

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Peking's African Diplomacy

By George T. Yu

Among the foremost targets of the campaign of the People's Republic of China "to win friends and influence people" in Africa have been the United Republic of Tanzania and the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Indeed, the attention level of the Chinese press to the two countries, the extent and variety of Chinese aid and technical assistance projects, and other indicators all attest that China has assigned a high priority to relations with the two states. Moreover, China's ties with both have developed without interruption since it first set up formal links with them. Not even the Cultural Revolution disrupted the process. In short, it would be no exaggeration to say that Tanzania and the Congo (B) have constituted primary focuses of Chinese policy in Africa, and that there has been a high degree of consistency in Peking's policy and behavior toward both over the years.

This article will analyze and compare these two important foreign-policy ventures of the Chinese in Africa. In doing so, it will seek to arrive at some assessments regarding the general character and quality of Chinese diplomacy.

China's African Policy

To understand China's policy and behavior toward Tanzania and the Congo (B), one must view them in the broader context of Peking's policy toward Africa at large. This overall policy has had three fundamental objectives.[1] First, the Chinese have tried to establish and maintain their revolutionary credibility by supporting African liberation movements and new African states. Since the late 1950's, Peking has regarded Africa—with the decline of colonial empires on the continent, the emergence of many newly independent nations there, and the continuing struggle against the remnants of white rule—as one stage for the world's unfolding revolutionary struggle. Therefore, China has felt that it, as a self-styled revolutionary force, must firmly back the elements striving to bring about change in Africa.

Second, the Chinese have attempted to use Africa as a direct and indirect battleground in their fight against the United States and the USSR. This purpose has manifested itself in two ways. China has staked out a claim as the champion of the smaller countries against "aggression, control, intervention or bullying by the two superpowers," [2] and it has supported any state or grouping which could present a challenge to the superpowers. At the same time, China has tried to incite Africans against American "imperialism" and Soviet "revisionism" and "social imperialism." Not only has it labored to "expose" the "true nature" of the United States and the Soviet Union, but it has also endeavored to identify the Soviet Union with "US imperialism," thereby discrediting Moscow's revolutionary credentials.

Finally, the Chinese have sought to bolster their own global position and prestige by securing various forms of support in Africa. Specifically, they have

Mr. Yu is Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois (Urbana). He has written China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction, *1970, and other works on Chinese policy toward Africa.*

[1] For a recent statement of these objectives within the general framework of the broad objectives of Chinese foreign policy, see the editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking) in honor of the 44th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army, Aug. 1, 1971.

[2] See, for example, *ibid.*

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wanted to create an African preference for the "Chinese model" of obtaining national independence and carrying out nation-building, and to garner legal recognition and international backing for the PRC from African governments.

Chinese behavior over the years has accorded closely with these objectives, though the situation in Africa, the constraints of China's own policy and resources, and a host of other factors have prevented the full realization of Peking's goals. However, there have been several distinct phases of Chinese activity with respect to the continent. The years from the Bandung Conference in 1955 to the onset of the 1960's constituted the initial period. During this phase, China cautiously began efforts to win African recognition and support—confining its undertakings for the most part to Africa north of the Sahara. By the close of the period, it had obtained diplomatic recognition and a measure of international backing from four African states: Egypt (1956), Morocco (1958), the Sudan (1958), and Guinea (1959).

The years 1960-65 comprised a second phase in Chinese activity. During this time, Peking mounted a major campaign for influence in Africa, wooing nations on the continent more or less indiscriminately. At the height of this diplomatic offensive (1964-65), Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi toured the region, and China committed a total of $190.1 million in aid to seven African states. Two chief factors explain the level of intensity of Chinese enterprises during the period. First, there was a burgeoning of new sovereignties in Africa. Between January 1960 and December 1965, no fewer than 29 African colonies gained their independence—with 16 of them emerging in 1960 alone. Second, Africa became an arena of Sino-Soviet conflict, and the two Communist powers began competing with growing ferocity for the support of African states on various issues. (One of the most noteworthy instances of Sino-Soviet rivalry involved the convocation of the abortive Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in June 1965.) While China's labors during the period bore highly mixed fruit, they did produce formal links with 15 additional African states: Ghana (1960), Mali (1960), Somalia (1960), Tanganyika (1961), Algeria (1962), Uganda (1962), Zanzibar (1963), Kenya (1963), Burundi (1963), Tunisia (1964), Congo-Brazzaville (1964), Central African Republic (1964), Zambia (1964), Dahomey (1964), and Mauritania (1965).

In 1966, Peking's activity in Africa entered a third phase, which has lasted up to the current moment. This period has been characterized by a reduction of China's overt presence in Africa and by a greater selectivity in China's search for friends and allies. Instead of courting the continent at large, the Chinese have concentrated on developing in-depth relations with a few states. A variety of factors probably underlay this switch in approach. Reverses that the Chinese suffered in the last half of the 1960's obviously played a part. These resulted from a combination of China's behavior, African images of Chinese policies, and the high degree of instability of African politics. Peking's militant posture and inflammatory statements during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-68) antagonized many African nations, and changes in government in several countries brought to power elements not at all sympathetic to China. A number of African states—*e.g.*, the Central African Republic (1966), Ghana (1966), Tunisia (1967)—even went so far as to suspend or terminate relations with Peking. As a consequence, the total of African nations with which China maintained formal ties fell from a high of 18 in 1964-65 to a low of 13 in 1969.

However, other considerations besides reverses of this sort may have been involved in the Chinese retrenchment. By the mid-1960's, a post-independence era had dawned in Africa. Aside from Angola, Mozambique, and a few smaller colonies, the lands on the continent had all acquired their sovereignty, and the tremendous diversities that had always existed were beginning to find significant reflection in the policies and outlooks of the individual governments. Hence, some Chinese adjustment to that reality was by no means inappropriate. Since the demise of the Cultural Revolution, China has continued to stress the development of close ties with a limited number of African countries—though seven more African states have accorded the PRC official recognition since October 1970.[3]

Both Tanzania and the Congo (B) have been among the group of African nations with which China has sought to evolve in-depth relations. Furthermore, these two African states represent perhaps the most successful of such ventures from Peking's standpoint. As the Chinese leadership sees things, China's relations with both countries have assisted it in its pursuit of two ends—securing wider official recognition and backing in the world, and combating the "aggressive designs" of the United States and the

[3] They include Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and Libya.

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Soviet Union. For example, Peking has contended that its relations with Tanzania express the "profound friendship of the Tanzanian and African people for the Chinese people" and symbolize their mutuality of interest in ridding Africa of "imperialist" influence and in promoting African development.[4] It claims no less regarding its relations with the Congo (B).

Approach to Tanzania

Having set Chinese behavior toward Tanzania and the Congo (B) in a general framework, let us now turn to a more specific examination of the evolution of Peking's relationships with the two. China's interest in Tanzania antedates its interest in the Congo —largely because Tanzania proved willing to enter into official relations with the Chinese first. In 1961, immediately after Tanganyika, one of the two constituent parts of today's United Republic of Tanzania, became independent of Great Britain, the new state (following the earlier example of its former colonial rulers) recognized the PRC, and the Chinese established an embassy in Dar es Salaam in January 1962. Zanzibar, the other constituent part of the United Republic, gained its sovereignty from Great Britain at the end of 1963 and also opened formal relations with the PRC. In October 1964, subsequent to the joining of the two entities the previous spring, Tanzania finally set up an embassy in Peking. Undoubtedly, the creation of official ties enabled the Chinese to bridge the communication gap that had formerly existed. It afforded them direct access to Tanzania (and East Africa), and it gave them a chance to acquire a greater appreciation of the indigenous environment and situation.

During the initial years of China's contacts with Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Chinese behavior involved more rhetoric than substance. In Tanganyika, the Chinese devoted themselves primarily to "public relations." Ho Ying, the Chinese ambassador, proved one of the most active heads of mission in Dar es Salaam within a short time after his arrival. Hardly a week passed without mention in the local press of some public act which he had undertaken. Moreover, he was responsible for forging links with other East African states. In Zanzibar, the overthrow of the Arab-dominated government by non-Arabs with revolutionary pretensions barely a month after the island won its independence encouraged the Chinese to assume a more forceful role there. China hailed the Zanzibar revolution as a victory for the people of Zanzibar and Africa, praised the new regime for demanding the removal of the US satellite-tracking station on the island, and approvingly reported Zanzibar's policy of self-reliance and land nationalization.[5] It also carried out exchanges with various Zanzibari groups and issued joint statements condemning "the new colonialism headed by the United States." Nonetheless, Chinese support for the "revolutionary" regime took essentially the form of words, not deeds.

After the founding of the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, Chinese activity not only changed in nature but also intensified, and Sino-Tanzanian relations warmed considerably. The number of official exchanges of visitors increased significantly. Among the Chinese who journeyed to Tanzania was Premier Chou En-lai (in 1965), and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere traveled to China on two occasions (in 1965 and 1968). A Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship was concluded in 1965. Over the course of the years, Peking extended economic, technical, and military assistance to Dar es Salaam. Elsewhere, I have described the unfolding relationship as a Chinese-Tanzanian "partial informal alliance."[6]

Dar es Salaam's increasing commitment to the construction of its own indigenous version of "socialism" undoubtedly constituted a factor in the growing intimacy of the relationship, but of far greater apparent importance were Tanzania's internal and immediate external situations and China's appreciation of and reaction to them. Perhaps the outstanding example of this interplay with respect to Tanzania's domestic conditions involves the African state's requisites for economic development. Since Tanzania achieved independence, it has been engaged in a major developmental program; however, like other new nations, it has lacked the necessary capital and skills to implement that program. Moreover, it has encountered major

[4] "A Warm Welcome to President Nyerere," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 18, 1968.

[5] For a sample of Chinese comments on Zanzibar, see *Jen-min Jih-pao*, January-April 1964.

[6] See this writer's *China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction*, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California (Berkeley), 1970. Unless noted otherwise, data for the Tanzanian section of this article have been taken from that study.

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difficulties in attempting to obtain external funding for developmental projects—not only because of the general retrenchment of the world's chief suppliers of aid, but also because of some of its own political decisions (such as the severance of diplomatic ties with Great Britain in 1965 during the crisis over Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence). The Chinese have stepped in to fill the breach—at least in part.

Through 1970, China's loans and grants to Tanzania totaled about $250 million. Loans and grants made in 1964 and 1966 account for approximately $50 million of this figure. In 1970, China provided Dar es Salaam with additional credits of $200.5 million. All the loans have been extended interest-free, but while the earlier ones were to be repaid within 20 years, the 1970 one is repayable over 30 years.[7] One can gain some perspective on the magnitude of the Chinese contribution from a few comparative data. The sum of $250 million represents about one-third of China's aid commitments to Africa and roughly one-sixth of all China's aid commitments. By 1971, China had displaced the United Kingdom as Tanzania's primary source of bilateral aid, and the amount of China's aid had even surpassed that of all multilateral aid to the country.[8]

This Chinese financial aid has been allocated largely to the planning of rural development projects, the construction and furnishing of industrial plants, and the building of railroads and other elements of the infrastructure. To date, the biggest completed undertaking (in terms of money invested) has been the Friendship Textile Mill, constructed at a cost of more than $7.7 million and finished in 1968. But Chinese aid has not been devoted solely to a few show projects. It has been used to fund such diversified undertakings as the construction of fresh-water tanks in Zanzibar; the building of a bookshop, bank, and post-office complex at the University of Dar es Salaam; and efforts to control the tsetse fly in the bush of mainland Tanzania.

If one excludes the 1970 loan of $200.5 million (which was for a special project that we shall discuss in a moment), Peking's financial aid to Tanzania, while it has made possible a variety of ventures, has been far from lavish—only about $50 million. Nonetheless, figures alone do not tell the story of the value of Chinese aid from the Tanzanian standpoint. Its mere availability and the timeliness of that availability have counted for a lot in Dar es Salaam's eyes.

Construction is inaugurated on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, Peking's largest aid project in Africa.

—From *China Pictorial*, No. 1, 1971.

Two cases will illustrate the point. In 1965, Tanzania broke diplomatic relations with Great Britain (though these were subsequently renewed in 1968) over London's refusal to use force to reverse Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. The British at once "froze" a $21 million loan to Tanzania, thereby putting in jeopardy the execution of developmental projects that the African nation had already embarked upon. Peking then offered to finance many of the projects with a loan of $5.6 million and a grant of $2.8 million in 1966.

The most striking example, however, has been China's commitment of $401 million to finance the construction and outfitting of the Tanzania-Zambia railway, half of that amount ($200.5 million) going to Tanzania and half to Zambia. Tanzania (and Zambia) had long sought this rail connection, but repeated appeals to the World Bank, the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and others for financial and other support for the undertaking had yielded only rejections. From Dar es Salaam's viewpoint, Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence

[7] *The Standard* (Dar es Salaam), July 12 and 24, 1970.

[8] The United Republic of Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1970-1971*, Dar es Salaam, 1971, pp. 1-2.

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heightened the urgency for the laying of the railway, for the Tanzanians felt that the reorientation of Zambia's economic links with the outside world (currently the land-locked nation's main export route was the railroad through Rhodesia) would strengthen Zambia and therefore bolster the forces of African freedom. Hence, when China in late 1965 offered to build the railway, Tanzania accepted forthwith. The formal agreement committing China to the venture was signed in Peking on September 5, 1967;[9] the ceremonies inaugurating the actual construction of the railway took place near Dar es Salaam on October 26, 1970.

Though the economic sphere provides the most dramatic demonstration of China's responsiveness to Tanzania's internal needs, this responsiveness has evinced itself in other areas as well. For instance, Peking has rendered Tanzania technical assistance in specific realms where there has been a critical gap between local requirements and local resources. Medical personnel offers a good illustration. This category of human resources is one in which Tanzania's shortages have been exceptionally acute. As of 1969, the nation had only 502 doctors—about one for every 25,000 persons in the country.[10] Moreover, there is a serious imbalance between medical services in the countryside and those in urban centers, for most rural areas have very limited services or none at all. In 1967, discussions about the possibility of Chinese help in dealing with the general problem got under way in Peking, and early the next year a Chinese medical team came to Tanzania to survey conditions. Chinese assistance actually began in April 1968 with the arrival in Dar es Salaam of a contingent of Chinese doctors, nurses and interpreters. It was immediately divided into smaller groups, which were then dispatched to rural portions of mainland Tanzania. While such assistance affords only partial and/or temporary solutions for the basic difficulties that confront Tanzania, this fact, from the Tanzanian perspective, does not diminish the significance of Peking's willingness to supply it.

In regard to Tanzania's immediate external situation, China's reactions have been equally sentient—in two ways. First, Peking has acted in accord with Dar es Salaam's conceptions of the way to ensure African freedom. Tanzania has stood in the forefront of African states committed to the total liberation of the continent from colonial rule. As most of Africa north of the Zambesi garnered independence, however, the stubborn resistance of the white minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia to majority rule stiffened, and the resolve of the Portuguese government to hang on to its colonies of Angola and Mozambique increased. Consequently, Tanzania became convinced of the necessity of guerrilla struggle for the "liberation" of these territories and has lent considerable support to the various native movements of this sort which have sprung up. Despite the fact that none of the existing movements is under the control of Communists, the Chinese have given not only moral backing but also concrete aid to many of these movements.

Second, China has helped Tanzania cope with what Dar es Salaam has perceived as a major security problem. Tanzania has a common border with Mozambique, whose national liberation movement Dar es Salaam supports. Since the Mozambique rebellion first broke out, the Portuguese authorities in the colony as well as the Rhodesians and South Africans have possessed military superiority over Tanzania and could conceivably subject the country to reprisals, subversion, etc., to try to thwart its activities in behalf of the rebels. These and other conditions persuaded the Tanzanian government that it ought to build up a military establishment, and China has aided in this effort.

Chinese military assistance to Tanzania commenced in 1964; since the termination of the Canadian-Tanzanian military assistance program in 1970, China has become the principal source of military hardware and training for the African nation. Detailed data on the Chinese contribution have never been revealed, but a few general things can be said about it. China has provided military instructors to train Tanzanian military officers and new recruits locally, and it has transported specialized personnel —*e.g.*, marine police, other naval personnel, tank crews, etc.—to China for instruction. It has also supplied arms and materiel, including small arms, tanks, trucks and patrol boats. In 1969, President Nyerere reported that most of the nation's "armyware" came from the People's Republic of China and that Tanzania would continue to "receive Chinese military instructors." [11]

[9] "The People of China, Tanzania, and Zambia are Opening the Road to Friendship," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 27, 1970.

[10] *The Standard*, Aug. 27, 1969.

[11] See *ibid.*, Sept. 21 and Oct. 6, 1969.

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In sum, Peking's sensitivity to Tanzanian needs and its response to them have constituted the chief reason for the expansion of Sino-Tanzanian relations. Thus, what successes the Chinese have registered in the African land may be said to reflect the astuteness of their statecraft—their careful pursuit of their goals in consonance with local circumstances.

Dealings with the Congo (B)

Let us now pass on to an analysis of the evolution of the PRC's relations with the Congo (B). These began most inauspiciously. At the dictate of the relatively conservative and pro-French President Fulbert Youlou, a defrocked priest with strong anti-Peking sentiments,[12] the Congo, upon gaining its sovereignty in 1960, rejected Peking's recognition and instead established diplomatic ties with the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. It continued to maintain these ties until after Alphonse Massamba-Debat replaced Youlou as head of the Brazzaville government in the wake of what became known as "the three glorious days" (of revolution) in August 1963. Once the French recognized the Peking regime in January 1964, the new Congolese government transferred its recognition from the Republic of China to the PRC, and an exchange of missions soon took place. A Chinese embassy was opened in Brazzaville in June 1964; a Congolese embassy was set up in Peking the succeeding September.

The relationship warmed quite rapidly. In July 1964, China extended a $25.2 million loan to the Congo.[13] The ensuing October, the Congo's President Massamba-Debat visited China. During his stay there, he signed four agreements with the Chinese on behalf of his nation: a friendship treaty, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, an agreement on cultural cooperation, and an agreement on maritime transport.[14] During subsequent years, the frequency of high-level official exchanges between the two states mounted steadily. In 1965, for example, Chi P'eng-fei, then Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, traveled to Brazzaville; and in 1967 Congolese Prime Minister Ambroise Noumazalay attended the October celebrations in honor of the founding of the PRC. The overthrow of Massamba-Debat in July 1968 and the installation of a new government headed by Major Marien Ngouabi merely heightened the trend. In early August 1968, less than a month after the change of regime, an official Chinese delegation led by Huang Hua, then ambassador to the United Arab Republic and the only Chinese ambassador who had not been recalled to China as the Cultural Revolution gathered steam, showed up in Brazzaville to participate in the celebrations marking the anniversary of the August (1963) Revolution. Over the ensuing months, other important exchanges occurred. In 1970, for instance, Su Yu, Chinese Vice-Minister of National Defense, journeyed to the Congo, while Major Alfred Raoul, made a visit to the Chinese mainland.

China's relations with the Congo, particularly since President Ngouabi's assumption of power, have sometimes been characterized as resting on ideological foundations. There is, to be sure, an element of truth in this observation. China and the Congo communicate with one another and the world in the language of Marxist ideology; both repeatedly echo such themes as the call to struggle against imperialism and against new and old colonialism and the necessity of an alliance of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the unfolding world revolution. Moreover, Ngouabi has promised to use Marxist-Leninist principles—*i.e.*, to follow "scientific socialism"—in shaping his domestic programs, and in December 1969 he declared the Congo a People's Republic.[15] But the Congolese leader by no means fits the model of a steeled Marxist-Leninist, though the Chinese have referred to his assumption of power as representing "a step further in the Congolese revolution."[16] Nor does his government pursue a line consonant with Chinese prescriptions for remaking society. One must, then, look deeper for the basic reason for the flourishing of the relationship.

As with Tanzania, the main factor seems to have been the Congo's internal and immediate external needs and Peking's response to these. In the domestic sphere, the Congo's requirements for economic development afford one illustration. The country has been heavily reliant upon France for financial and technical assistance; however, Brazzaville has felt that it cannot necessarily depend upon French aid

[12] See Fulbert Youlou, *J'accuse la Chine*, Paris, Round Table, 1966.
[13] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), July 10, 1964,
[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1964.
[15] For an account of Congolese politics, see Arthur H. House, "Brazzaville: Revolution or Rhetoric?," *African Report*, April 1971, pp. 18-21.
[16] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 19, 1970.

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forever. In addition, such great reliance on France tends to give Paris considerable leverage with respect to the Congo's internal course. Hence, the acquisition of other sources of help has been highly desirable from the Congolese viewpoint.

By and large, the amount of Chinese loans and technical assistance has been small. Through 1970, China's promised financial aid totaled $25.2 million.[17] These credits were extended in the 1964 loan mentioned earlier, which was to be interest-free and repayable within 10 years. Thus far, the Chinese have actually funded only a few projects. The largest single one is the Koussoundi Textile Mill, whose construction was begun in November 1966 and finished in May 1969 at an estimated cost of $4 million.[18] Others in process or completed include a shipyard for fishing boats, a state farm, and a survey for the construction of a hydroelectric power plant. China has rendered technical assistance in several areas. Among the more significant contributions have been the training of workers at the Koussoundi Textile Mill and the supply of medical personnel. The medical program was started in 1966 and expanded in 1967. Most of the Chinese medical teams that have been furnished under it have been dispatched to the undeveloped northern interior.[19]

In no sense, then, has China become the dominant outside force in the Congo's economic picture. In every year since independence, for example, France has provided Brazzaville with at least $10 million in aid; furthermore, over the entire post-independence period, the European Economic Community has given the African country an additional $50 million at minimum.[20] Of note, too, Paris has continued to back the Congolese currency, and Brazzaville has remained within the franc zone. The worth of Chinese financial and technical aid from the Congolese standpoint, however, has not lain primarily in the size of the contribution. Instead, it has derived from the demonstration to Paris that, despite French dominance in the Congo, Brazzaville is not without other friends to whom it might turn in the event French largesse ceased or French demands in return for continued help became excessive.

[17] House, *op. cit.*, and NCNA, July 10, 1964.

[18] For one account of the textile mill, see *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Aug. 15, 1969.



The spinning section of the Koussoundi Textile Mill built by the People's Republic of China in the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

—Photo by Wide World Photos.

Perhaps the most important realm in which Peking has fulfilled the Congo's domestic requirements, however, has been the political rather than the economic. Over the years since 1963, and particularly since President Ngouabi assumed power in 1968, the Congo has suffered from political instability as a result of fierce competition among Congolese political and tribal groups for power. After Ngouabi seized authority in 1968, for instance, he sought to govern the country by means of a coalition embracing the army, the Congolese Labor Party, and a few other specific political and tribal groups, but he has faced strong challenges from groups outside that coalition. As a matter of fact, between 1968 and 1970 there were no less than four abortive coups against his regime. For this reason, the elements in control of the Congolese government have tended to look to various foreign powers for support against their local enemies in

[19] "Good Doctors Growing Out of the Teachings of Chairman Mao," *ibid.*, June 26, 1969.

[20] For a description of French-Congolese economic cooperation, see Geneviève Sigisbert, "Congo-Brazzaville: Après deux ans de gouvernement Ngouabi" (Congo-Brazzaville: After Two Years of the Ngouabi Government), *Europe, France Outre-mer* (Paris), April 1971, pp. 13-18.

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order to maintain their rule. China has been one of these powers, and while Peking has undoubtedly been troubled by the political instability in the African nation, it has faithfully lent its backing to the existing government. (It ought to be stressed that Peking's policy in this case cannot be taken as implying an endorsement of military coups and military regimes as such or a readiness to forge ties with any regime which recognizes the PRC. In all probability, the Chinese leadership merely preferred in this instance the certainty of relations with a friendly regime in power, whatever forces it represented, to the uncertainty of throwing China's weight behind dissident elements. Broadly speaking, China has distinguished recognition and maintenance of relations with African states from recognition and support of African "liberation" movements, and as separate policies the two should not be confused.)

Chinese political support of the Congo goverment has taken various forms, both symbolic and real. For example, Peking has denounced the series of attempted coups against the Ngouabi regime and attributed each to "subversive and sabotage activities instigated by United States imperialism and its running dogs." [21] Moreover, it has cited them as proof that the United States is endeavoring to crush the Congolese revolution—that the "new and old colonialists" and the "imperialists" are striving to arrest the progress of the African revolution—and that the leaders of Africa must exercise vigilance to overcome the temporary difficulties.[22] In short, the Chinese have treated the abortive efforts to overthrow the Congolese government as an aspect of a common struggle against a common enemy (whom they define as the "superpowers," including the USSR, and not merely "imperialism.") Within this broad framework, China's financial, technical, and military assistance to Brazzaville (the first two types of which have already been outlined, and the last will be discussed below) has had dimensions above and beyond its straightforward economic, social, and external-defense implications.

Apropos of the immediate external circumstances of the Congo, the Chinese have shown themselves keenly attuned to Brazzaville's sense of threat from its neighbors—chiefly the Republic of Zaire, as the former Congo (Kinshasa) is now known. This sense of threat reached its zenith in 1970. By that juncture, the current ruling groups in the Congo (B) had become convinced that President Joseph Mobutu's regime in Kinshasa had had a hand in the various attempts to unseat President Ngouabi. Indeed, an attack upon Brazzaville in March 1970 had been launched from the Zaire capital, and the rebel commandos had called upon President Mobutu to send paratroopers to aid their cause. As China has viewed all the regimes in Zaire with a jaundiced eye since the demise of the rump Lumumbaist government of Antoine Gizenga in 1961, it has had no qualms about supplying the Brazzaville authorities with military assistance.

Our information about this military assistance is exceptionally limited, but China is known to have offered military aid to the Congo beginning in the late 1960's. In 1971, the two countries signed a military-aid agreement. This provided, among other things, that the Chinese would supply the Congolese army with heavy equipment and would train Congolese military specialists in China.

All in all, however, it must be admitted that the Chinese reaction to the Congo (B)'s external situation is far less critical in accounting for the growth of Sino-Congolese ties than is the Chinese response to the African state's internal situation. The Congo's national security has never really been seriously threatened from without, for the African country has retained special relations with France and has no neighbors that enjoy overwhelming military superiority. Moreover, it has taken steps recently to ease tensions with its neighbors and has thus enhanced

FIGHTING "IMPERIALIST" INTRIGUES

The Congolese people have a glorious tradition of anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggles. Since the "July 31" movement in 1968, the Congolese people have more resolutely opposed imperialism headed by the United States and staunchly defended national independence and state sovereignty. They have repeatedly frustrated sabotage by new and old colonialism and its schemes for a counterrevolutionary *coup d'état*, advancing the national democratic revolution of the Congo step by step. . . .

We are happy to see that the government and people of the Congo, under the leadership of President Marien Ngouabi, are sharply vigilant and are determined to make every effort to overcome temporary difficulties in their way to progress and to smash all the criminal conspiracies of imperialism and new and old colonialism.

—*Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), July 21, 1970.

[21] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 19, 1970.

[22] "A New Development in the Friendship and Cooperation Between China and the Congo," *ibid.*, July 21, 1970.

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its security. For instance, President Ngouabi has ended support for a number of rebel movements threatening other independent African governments. Even the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which had been launching guerrilla attacks into the Angolan enclave of Cabinda bordering on the Congo, has shifted its headquarters and operations from Brazzaville to Zambia and Eastern Angola since 1968. During 1970, Brazzaville also acted to improve relations with Kinshasa. Whatever the relative importance of the internal and external factors, however, this in no way diminishes Chinese appreciation of and response to Congolese conditions as an explanation for the blossoming of the Sino-Congolese relationship.

Conclusions

What conclusions, then, do these two case studies suggest? The writer would submit that there are three major ones. First, the high value that China has attached to relations with both Tanzania and the Congo (B)—as evidenced by the resources that Peking has invested in improving them—stems not from the intrinsically vital character of either country to China, but from the functional roles that the two play in China's overall foreign policy. By contributing to Tanzania's and—to a lesser extent—the Congo's domestic development, for example, China has established itself as a source of economic and technical aid for African lands and, in so doing, has given evidence of its own national capabilities and power. In rendering military and related forms of support to Tanzania, one of the principal forces behind the push for Africa's total liberation, Peking has tended to substantiate its claims of commitment to that cause. By extending strong moral backing to the government of the Congo, which the Chinese have depicted as a state repeatedly subjected to "imperialist subversion and sabotage," China not only has drawn attention to its self-proclaimed role as a champion of small-country opposition to "superpower oppression" but has also highlighted Peking's view of the general shape of international politics at present. Since no African nations loom large in Chinese strategic calculations, any intimate relationship which China has evolved or might evolve with another individual African land is likely to rest on the same kind of foundations.

Second, the fundamental reason why the Chinese have managed to fashion strong ties with both Tanzania and the Congo (B) lies in a combination of the two countries' needs and Peking's sensitivity and response to these needs. To be sure, the political elites of the two African states have displayed a certain degree of ideological affinity with the Chinese. The Tanzanian government, for example, has voiced dedication to the creation of a "socialist" society, and it has not hesitated to borrow specific programs and ideas from foreign sources, including the Chinese, whenever it deemed these suited to its own goals. By the same token, the Congolese government, at least since President Ngouabi acquired power, has announced its intention to pursue the path of "scientific socialism" and employs a Marxist vocabulary to describe its undertakings. But in neither instance has the ideological factor been the overriding one. Sino-Tanzanian relations have flourished because China has shown an appreciation of Tanzania's developmental and security requirements and a willingness to help satisfy them; Sino-Congolese relations have likewise thrived because Peking has recognized not only the Congo's developmental and security requirements but also the Brazzaville regime's requirements vis-à-vis its internal enemies and has been ready to assist in meeting them. In light of this evidence, it seems probable that future Chinese successes in both these and other African nations will depend heavily upon local circumstances and needs and the ability of the Chinese to perceive and react positively to them.

Third, the burgeoning of China's relations with Tanzania and the Congo has resulted from Peking's grasp of the differences in the situations confronting them and its employment of specific foreign-policy instruments suitable to each context. In other words, the Chinese have demonstrated appreciable flexibility in their handling of relations with the two states.

This observation raises the larger question of the Chinese leadership's perception of Africa generally. The two cases examined suggest that, rhetoric aside, China has developed an appreciation of individual variances on the continent—that she can distinguish between conditions in one land and those in another, select an appropriate response for each instance, and choose the most efficacious tools to accomplish her purposes there. To make further gains in Tanzania and the Congo as well as other African countries, Peking will most certainly have to exhibit such capacities in even greater abundance than it has heretofore.

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The Soviet System
Petrification or Pluralism?

By Jerry F. Hough

During the last years of the Khrushchev era, scholars vigorously debated the nature of the power relationships within the Soviet Communist Party Presidium, but their images of the relationship between the leadership—however defined—and the rest of society were usually quite similar. Whether the scholar spoke of an "administered society," an "organizational society," or an "ideological system," he summarized the Soviet system as "a command-dominated society," as one in which there is "totalitarianism without terror," as one in which the political system is "used by the political leaders to create a new society along the lines of their own beliefs and aspirations."

Even iconoclastic models were not very iconoclastic on this point. The so-called "conflict model" focused almost exclusively upon conflicts within the leadership and, in so doing, created the strong impression that all persons below the very top were acted upon rather than having any impact on the resolution of conflicts. Similarly, Alfred Meyer's "bureaucratic model" presented an image of modern bureaucratic society very similar to that of Herbert Marcuse and Barrington Moore. Such a society, he argued, "is characterized [in all countries] by the prevalence of certain totalitarian features," including "the imposition of ceaseless social change unwanted by the constituents." [1]

Since the fall of Khrushchev, the situation has changed drastically. Although thus far there is wide agreement about the collective nature of the leadership within the Politburo, the basic consensus about the nature of the political system as a whole has disappeared. Now there are a number of competing images or models of the system, and scholarly uncertainty is further reflected in the fact that these images themselves are often quite ambiguous.

Three Models

A "Directed Society." One group of scholars still emphasizes the directed nature of Soviet society and the political leaders' "determination . . . to make a 'new man,' without regard for the individual or

Mr. Hough is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto and is currently on leave as a Research Associate at the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). *The author wishes to thank Professors Don Forbes, Don Schwartz, Peter Solomon, and Susan Solomon of the University of Toronto, as well as Professors Robert Putnam and William Zimmerman, for their valuable comments during the preparation of this article.*

[1] Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism without Terror," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.) July 1964, pp. 558-75; T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," *ibid.*, pp. 539-57; Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power USA/USSR*, New York, Viking Press, 1964; Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966; Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965; Alfred G. Meyer, "USSR, Incorporated," in Donald W. Treadgold, Ed., *The Development of the USSR*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1964, pp. 21-28.

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social costs."[2] Or at least they emphasized this view in 1966-67 when the articles most clearly expressing it were written. A succinct summary of this position is provided by Jeremy Azrael:

While the ouster of Khrushchev has inevitably resulted in more open access to the political arena for other elite groups, it has not seriously weakened the political-power position of the party apparat . . . *If the growth of ideological agnosticism is apt to be a relatively slow process among all convinced Communists, it is likely to be particularly slow among the* apparatchiki . . . *It is precisely by stressing the continuing need to remold society and to juxtapose consciousness to spontaneity that the* apparatchiki *can best hope to legitimate their political sovereignty and the hegemony that they exercise over all facets of Soviet life . . . [Even among the] young men [in] the manpower pool from which the apparatus has been and is being replenished . . . [there] is unlikely to [be] a rapid erosion of the authoritarian-mobilization impulses that their world view implies . . . The final demise of the "permanent revolution" is many years away.*[3]

"Oligarchic Petrification." A second group of scholars presents a model that retains much of the traditional image of a directed society: *i.e.*, they emphasize the dominant role of the officials at the top of the hierarchy, the flow of power from the top down, and the continued importance of ideology. In this view, however, the men at the top are not a dynamic political leadership determined to transform society, but rather a "government of clerks" anxious only to preserve their power and perquisites of office.

The word "ideology" is no longer defined as it once was by the theorists of totalitarianism ("a reasonably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to change and reform a society"[4]), but has reverted to the meaning used by Karl Mannheim and many others: the rationalizations that legitimate and support the dominant interests in a society.[5] Since the Soviet Union is still directed from the top and since the top leaders have lost their will to change society, the Soviet system is described as being in a state of stagnation, decay, immobilism, or petrification. To quote Zbigniew Brzezinski:

Oligarchic petrification would involve the maintenance of the dominant role of the party and the retention of the essentially dogmatic character of the ideology. In effect, more of the same. Neither the party nor the ideology would be in a particularly revolutionary relationship to society; instead, the main thrust of the relationship would be for the party to retain political control over society without attempting to impose major innovations. Strong emphasis would be placed on ideological indoctrination and the confinement of ideological deviations. Political leadership could remain collective, for the absence of deliberately imposed change would not require major choices. The domestic result would be rule by an ossified bureaucracy that would pursue a conservative policy masked by revolutionary slogans.[6]

Unfortunately, the model of oligarchic petrification can be quite ambiguous. Professor Brzezinski's reference to "the maintenance of the dominant role of the party and the retention of the essentially dogmatic character of the ideology"—which he sums up as "in effect, more of the same"—clearly suggests continuity with the Soviet past; yet, these terms have different meanings than they did in the past. The end of "deliberately imposed change" means that the party is not, in fact, dominant over

[2] John A. Armstrong, "Comparative Politics and Communist Systems: Concluding Remarks," *Slavic Review*, March 1967, p. 27. Armstrong's remarks were made in a symposium, and he was supporting a point made earlier by Robert S. Sharlet (*ibid.*, p. 24). See also Paul Hollander, "Observations on Bureaucracy, Totalitarianism, and the Comparative Study of Communism," *ibid.*, June 1967, pp. 302-07; and for a more recent version of the model, Roy D. Laird, *The Soviet Paradigm*, New York, The Free Press, 1970.

[3] Jeremy R. Azrael, "The Party and Society," in Allen Kassof, Ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1968, pp. 70-73. (The order of the sentences has been changed somewhat.) In fairness, it should be noted that Azrael's analysis of the mobilizational nature of Soviet society seems to have changed since this article was written (see his "Varieties of De-Stalinization," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970, pp. 135-51).

[4] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 74.

[5] As Karl Mannheim has argued in his classic book on the subject, "There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it." *Ideology and Utopia*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965, p. 90.

[6] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, New York, Viking Press, 1970, p. 165. As its wording suggests, the model comes in a discussion of alternative paths of future Soviet development, and Brzezinski actually predicts a combination of petrification and technological adaptation in the 1970's. The model does seem, however, to summarize Brzezinski's analysis of the last seven-and-a-half years of Soviet history, and it is cited here for that purpose alone.

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society and the bureaucracy in the same sense that it was previously depicted to be. In the language of Friedrich and Brzezinski, the Soviet Union has changed from a totalitarian dictatorship into an authoritarian dictatorship or even an oligarchy.

There are several possible variants of the petrification model that would render it less ambiguous. One such variant would specifically identify the party with the party apparatus, depicting the latter as the central bureaucracy in the Soviet system. (Indeed, this is conceivably the meaning Brzezinski had in mind.) This image of a petrified system would be particularly neat if coupled with Leonard Schapiro's view of the policy position of the party apparatus:

By and large, the views that favor discipline, centralized controls, and absolute priority for heavy industry can be regarded as those of the party apparatus, while the views that look toward greater reliance on material incentives, increased application of market principles, decentralization of industrial controls, and higher priority for consumer goods can be identified with the government apparatus, including the planners and managers.[7]

There is, however, not the slightest evidence to support the hypothesis of a party apparatus united on a conservative policy position—and a great deal of evidence to indicate that the hypothesis is wrong.[8] Nor is there any evidence that there is a simple power relationship between the party and state hierarchies.

A second—and, in the author's view, far more defensible—variant of the petrification model would feature rule by an inherently conservative bureaucracy, an "ossified bureaucracy" in Brzezinski's phrase. The party apparatus would certainly be included as an important component of the bureaucratic system, but it would only be one component. One could use the language of Milovan Djilas and speak of rule by a "new class" embracing all "those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold."[9] Or one could—and perhaps should—emphasize the relative supremacy of the defense and heavy-industry bureaucracies over the others, as evidenced by the fact that men with experience in these two areas have come to occupy a very large number of key positions in the party and state machinery of the Soviet Union.[10]

"Institutional Pluralism." A third group of scholars has been moving—albeit with great tentativeness in most instances—toward a model of the Soviet system that represents a far more drastic break with the traditional images—a model that will be termed "institutional pluralism." Like the adherents of the petrification model, these scholars accept Alfred Meyer's insight that the Soviet Union is a giant bureaucracy, but they have a quite different conception of the nature of bureaucracy. They do not believe that either Soviet society or bureaucracy is inert. Soviet society is viewed as undergoing a series of dynamic changes produced by industrializa-

[7] Leonard Schapiro, "Keynote—Compromise," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1971, p. 2. I do not mean to suggest that Brzezinski would accept this interpretation, but only that it would make the model neat.

[8] The view that Soviet politics revolves around conflict between a conservative party apparatus and a progressive state apparatus is an old and widely-held one whose persistence defies explanation—at least, in this writer's view. Even the most obvious evidence seems to contradict it. For example, the men who in 1952 would have been called the two leading party *apparatchiki* after Stalin were Malenkov and Khrushchev, but they would hardly be regarded as the leading conservative figures of the post-Stalin era. For an examination of the more esoteric evidence on this question, see Jerry F. Hough, "The Party Apparatchiki," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 47-92.

[9] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, New York, Praeger, 1957, pp. 39-40. Djilas' definition of "the party" is quite different from that adopted in the previous variant, and it conveys a clearer impression of the meaning of this model. He conceives of the party in the sense of "the compact party, full of initiative," which, he says, "diminishes," "is disappearing," or "grows weaker."

[10] The present General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, and the *de facto* second secretary of the Central Committee (Kirilenko) are ferrous metallurgy and aviation industry engineers, respectively, with extensive party work in centers of the defense and heavy industries. The Central Committee secretary handling planning/financial and also (apparently) military affairs (Ustinov) was Minister of Munitions and then Minister of Defense Industry from 1941 to 1957 before becoming the top official coordinating defense industries in the Khrushchev era. The Chairman and two First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers do not have a heavy-industry background, but the eight Deputy Chairmen are all heavy-industry engineers. Six have been Ministers for Heavy Industry or Defense Industry, and a seventh was a Deputy Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy before becoming a top planning official with responsibility for that branch. In the three largest republics, the political leaders are former enterprise managers in defense industry (Solomentsev in the RSFSR and Shelest in the Ukraine) or in non-ferrous metallurgy (Kunaev in Kazakhstan). Since the mid-1950's, the obkom first secretaries in over 80 percent of the 25 most industrialized oblasts have been engineers (usually with substantial managerial experience), and nearly all of these men come from heavy rather than light industry. While the percentage of all obkom first secretaries is not too large, they are concentrated in the populous, urbanized oblasts with large numbers of party members. In 1966, 146 units (small republics, oblasts, and the city of Moscow) sent delegates to the 23rd Party Congress. Less than a quarter of these units had first secretaries with a heavy-industry background, but they named over 40 percent of the delegates.

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tion, and Soviet professional-administrative personnel are seen more as the sort of functional specialists who are considered to be a major source of innovation in the West than as the conservative bureaucrats of the petrification model.[11] The scholars of this group believe that ideas and power flow up the administrative hierarchies as well as down, and they do not see immobilism in the process of policy formation. In the words of Robert Daniels,

What appears to be evolving in the Soviet Union is a new kind of politics, participatory bureaucracy. . . . In any complex modern bureaucratic organization, it is impossible to function purely from the top down: all manner of influences—information, advice, recommendations, problems, complaints—must flow upwards. . . . The problems of managing a complex economy and technology have made it abundantly clear to the Soviet leadership that they must allow this reverse stream of influence to flow freely, and their main concern is that the flow be kept within the organizational structure of the Communist Party.[12]

Daniels heavily qualifies this image by emphasizing "the power of the party and its monopoly position in the Soviet power structure" and by treating the admission of "segments of the administrative and intellectual class into the decision-making and controlling process" as a future possibility rather than as a present fact. In this respect, he seems to have moved only partially away from the earlier image of "policy groups" whose members come from a very narrow elite and who are "careful not to cross the shadowy line between advocacy and pressure." [13] Other scholars, however, have gone further, emphasizing the existence of group activity "outside the formal system of political authority" [14] or the role of "intermediate actors" and "intermediate participation." [15] Still others have been willing to assert that "Soviet interest groupings . . . share political power in the Soviet policy process." [16]

Like the petrification model, this third construct of the Soviet system is not without its ambiguity. No one is yet willing to equate pluralism of the Soviet type with that in the West. If compelled to characterize the Soviet system as either a "dictatorship" or a "democracy," the third group of scholars would vehemently protest the choice but would ultimately join the others in electing the former term. At most, in Skilling's words, the Soviet Union is viewed as "a 'pluralism of elites,' or to borrow Robert Dahl's expressive term, a 'polyarchical' system, but oligarchical rather than democratic in character." [17] One receives the clear impression of far less direction and/or control from above than in other images of the Soviet system, but the degree of direction and/or control remains far greater than in the classic pluralist model. This intermediate stage has not been defined very precisely. One senses what Daniels means when he speaks both of influence flowing upwards and of the "monopoly position" of the party in the "Soviet power structure." But the concepts are by no means clear.

Perhaps the difficulty is the absence of a generally-accepted model (or, more precisely, an ideal type) for a political system that is somewhere in between authoritarianism and classical pluralism. Such a model—which the author has chosen to call "institutional pluralism"—would certainly contain a number of the features of the conventional American model of pluralism. These features may be described as follows:

(1) There exists in society a multiplicity of interests: nothing is monolithic about society or the political system, and no single interest dominates either.

(2) The political process revolves around conflict among a complex set of crosscutting and shifting alliances of persons with divergent interests.

(3) Citizens and officials usually treat politics as "the art of the possible" and see it "as a set of give-and-take interactions in which each side bargains for a set of more or less limited objectives." [18]

[11] In the words of Alex Inkeles, "in most areas of life the best way to predict the attitudes, values, and orientations of men in the Soviet system is to draw on the general knowledge that we have about men holding comparable positions in Western industrial societies." *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 427.

[12] Robert V. Daniels, "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, Ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, New York, Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co., 1971, pp. 22-23.

[13] Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.* (fn 1), p. 196.

[14] H. Gordon Skilling, "Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses," in Skilling and Griffiths, *op. cit.* (fn 8), p. 42.

[15] Franklyn Griffiths, "A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy-Making," *ibid.*, pp. 369-77.

[16] Philip Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process," *World Politics*, October 1969, p. 50.

[17] "Interest Groups and Communist Politics: An Introduction," in Skilling and Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[18] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1966, p. 57.

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So long as they stay strictly within this framework, they are free to express their views.

(4) Political leaders serve essentially as mediators or brokers in the political process, their "most universal function" being to bring "men together in masses on some middle ground where they can combine to carry out a common policy." [19]

(5) Governmental decisions on various questions are most heavily influenced by those especially affected by them and especially knowledgeable about them. In short, the government process is one of "minorities rule," featuring "the steady appeasement of relatively small groups." [20]

(6) To the extent that accommodation of the demands of some groups requires restrictions upon other groups, the changes are undertaken gradually and in a way that is accommodating to the disadvantaged group. Incrementalism is thus the hallmark of the system.[21]

The differences between institutional pluralism and classical pluralism center on the framework in which the political process takes place and on the types of political behavior that are tolerated. The model of classical pluralism features the opportunity for all citizens to choose between the programs of competing elites in elections and to form new organizations (pressure groups or parties) to advance their political interests. Indeed, the contention that a pluralist system is the most equitable possible rests on the assumption that the disadvantaged and the dissatisfied will regularly use such political mechanisms to seek redress of their grievances. In the model of institutional pluralism on the other hand, those who want to effect political change must, with a few exceptions, work within the official institutional framework. Those who fail to do so run the danger of severe repression, especially when they call for nonincremental change in the fundamentals of the system. While any citizen can make appeals or suggestions for incremental change through official channels, the leading political participants will almost always be "establishment" figures—usually civil servants and political figures, but also policy-oriented scholars and educators. However, the model assumes that the institutional forces are at least somewhat responsive to broader societal forces. It includes an image of bureaucratic officials as men who are driven to represent many of the interests of their clientele and low-level subordinates, as well as an image of politicians as men who take the danger of popular unrest into account as they mediate conflicts among the political participants.

To repeat, the model of institutional pluralism is an ideal type that is meant to conform to Inkeles' usage of the term "model"—an abstraction, a set of "ideas or concepts which have a certain unity." [22] No scholar—and certainly not the author—believes that it accurately summarizes the situation in the Soviet Union today; at most, it could be claimed that the Soviet Union is moving in the direction of the model. Indeed, since past Soviet policy has made the specialized elites associated with heavy and defense industry far stronger in numbers, talent, and power than other members of the upper stratum, the model itself suggests that current Soviet policy will reflect this imbalance for some time to come, and that the dominance of heavy industry will disappear only incrementally.

The crucial question is—how are post-Khrushchev developments in the Soviet Union best summarized? Does the Soviet Union still correspond most closely to a model of "a command-dominated society," or has it moved substantially in the direction either of the petrification model or the model of institutional pluralism? Is the Soviet political system one in which power—whether used for change or for the prevention of change—is still concentrated in the party leadership, or has there been a diffusion of power to other elements of Soviet society?

Passing of the "Directed Society"

Seven-and-a-half years have passed since the fall of Khrushchev, and a series of recent events—the 24th CPSU Congress and the republic party congresses that preceded it, the new five-year plan, and the elections to the republic supreme soviets and councils of ministers—have combined to provide a wealth of new policy and elite data. The purpose of this article is to explore the relevance of the three models described above in the light of these new data.

Any reasonably relevant model is likely to illuminate at least some aspects of a political system.

[19] A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1914, pp. 61-62.

[20] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 27-28, 133, and 146.

[21] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*, New York, Harper & Row, 1953, pp. 82-88.

[22] Inkeles, *op. cit.* (fn 11), p. 431.

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But while the model drawn by the first group of scholars—that of a political leadership which actively strives to transform society in accordance with its ideological preconceptions—may help to explain a number of Soviet phenomena rooted in an earlier period, it seems of very little use in explaining the dynamics of the last seven years. Indeed, whatever the future may bring, recent events make this model appear as anachronistic as the image of a system based primarily on arbitrary terror came to appear in the Khrushchev era.

One of the key elements of any model of an "ideological system" is a political leadership that has "beliefs and aspirations" on the basis of which it seeks to remold society. Classically, this image of Soviet society has pictured it as a system in which the leadership endeavors to transform society along the lines of the guiding Marxist-Leninist ideology. Increasingly in the post-Stalin period, however, and especially in the post-Khrushchev period, the Soviet leadership has given the impression that it is far from certain about the solution of society's problems. Increasingly, it has been willing to listen to policy advice from "society" and to permit far-ranging public discussion of policy questions.

To be sure, not all Soviet specialists agree that the last seven years have witnessed a freer flow of information in the Soviet Union; indeed, many would speak of a reverse tendency toward greater repression of criticism and iconoclastic thought. For example, Brzezinski speaks of a "movement in the opposite direction" between 1964 and 1969 and predicts that "in the short run, development toward a pluralist, ideologically more tolerant system does not seem likely." [23] In this writer's view, however, there is in the West more misunderstanding on this subject than on any other development in recent Soviet history.

The contention that the present Soviet leadership is less tolerant of critical ideas rests on three pieces of evidence. The first—and foremost in terms of the publicity it receives—has been the repression of well-known intellectual dissenters, such as Andrei Amalrik, who have dared to criticize the fundamentals of the system. The second has been the renewed sensitivity of the leadership to criticism of the past, especially of the Stalin era. On this question, censorship clearly has been more repressive under Brezhnev than it was under Khrushchev. The third bit of evidence has been some slight increase in the political weight of the secret police. The Chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, has been elected to candidate membership on the Politburo, while the representation of the KGB in the republic party bureaus has risen from one full member and three candidate members in 1966 to three full members and four candidates in 1971.[24]

None of this evidence, however—and particularly the last—seems conclusive. Even if we accept an increase in the representation of the KGB in the republic party bureaus as a reliable indicator of the degree of repression in the system, that representation in 1971 is still less than it was in 1961 (five full members and two candidate members), and Andropov's election to the Politburo may owe as much to his responsibilities in the foreign policy field as to his police role (he had 14 years of foreign policy experience before becoming KGB chairman). Moreover, KGB representation in the republic party bureaus is largely confined to the least industrialized republics. The republic KGB chairman was named to the party bureau (as either a full or candidate member) in each of the five republics with the lowest level of urbanization, but there is KGB representation on the bureaus of only two of the five republics with medium urbanization and none on the bureaus of the four most urbanized republics. On the surface at least, this pattern suggests less a preoccupation on the part of the leadership with the rise of unorthodox thought in the more "modern" areas than the persistence of more traditional methods of control (and perhaps of a more traditional political culture) in the less modernized regions.

Wider Information and Debate

The contents of the published media, which are quick to reflect changes in policy affecting the flow of information, certainly provide little evidence of an increased sway of "police mentality." The republic newspapers, for example, now contain more articles about victims of Stalin's purges than they did in late 1965 and early 1966. The press also reflects less official sensitivity on a number of topics that used to be considered security matters. To

[23] *Between Two Ages*, p. 167.

[24] Three republic KGB chairmen were elected to full membership in the republic party bureaus, and three to candidate membership, at the republic party congresses in February and March 1971. The fourth candidate member was named to the Belorussian party bureau the following July.

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cite just two of many examples, the large aviation plants in Tashkent, Tbilisi, and Kiev, which were never mentioned in the newspapers before late 1966, are now discussed quite frequently, and press reports identify by name such holders of security-sensitive positions as border-guard officials and directors of titanium and computer plants.

Even more important is the increasing extent to which policy questions are now debated in the newspapers, periodicals, and particularly books. To speak of "the retention of the essentially dogmatic character of the ideology" and to state that the years since 1964 have seen movement away from "an ideologically more tolerant system" is to overlook the crucial fact that on all but the most central questions, party policy is less and less incorporated into clear-cut, undebatable "ideology," with a consequent widening of the areas open to public discussion. In almost every policy sphere, ideology is ambiguous and ill-defined; and in almost every policy sphere, the published debate is now freer and more wide-ranging than it was under Khrushchev.

There has, in fact, been virtually no conceivable proposal for incremental change in party policy in the last five years that has not been aired in the Soviet press.[25] The proposals must sometimes be carefully phrased, and the more radical ones often have to be published in scholarly journals and books rather than in the pages of *Pravda,* but there is virtually no official policy that is immune from questioning. Even in the sensitive areas of foreign and nationalities policy, where advocacy of change is permitted only in the most veiled terms, lively debate still goes on in the guise of discussions on the nature of the prevailing factual situation.[26]

Certainly the party leadership tolerates no direct challenge to the basic legitimacy of one-party rule or to its own ultimate authority. It still restricts the flow of information severely by comparison with Western countries, particularly in the media that reach the largest audiences, and as Brzezinski correctly emphasizes, it remains extremely inflexible in its rejection of "alien" world views and its determination to combat their dissemination. Those dissenters who try to circulate forbidden ideas can testify eloquently that neither the KGB nor the labor camps have withered away.

Yet, even in those areas, the present regime seems, if anything, more tolerant than that of Khrushchev. The myth has arisen that Khrushchev merely "relied on verbal chastisement," whereas "the Brezhnev leadership has put writers and other dissidents in jail or insane asylums."[27] However, a look at the past experiences of such dissenters as Brodsky, Bukovsky, Dobrovolsky, Galanskov, Grigorenko, and Tarsis indicates very clearly that their suppression did not begin with the advent of the present regime, but rather under Khrushchev.[28] One cannot be certain how the late First Secretary would have reacted to the increase in open dissent and the circulation of documents such as the *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events) on the scale seen since 1964—and especially to the transmission of such materials to Western newsmen. There is, however, good reason not only to doubt that Khrushchev would have been more liberal than the present leadership, but also to suspect that dissent, rather than being more rigorously suppressed, is now enjoying increased publicity.

A willingness to tolerate a freer flow of information and to hear advice does not correspond to traditional Western images of the ideological mind, but it is not incompatible with a political leadership that strives to transform society. Indeed, if the party leadership were to act upon some of the advice that has been publicly expressed, it would transform Soviet society as radically as Stalin did in 1928-1929. On the other hand, if the leadership prefers to follow the advice of those who insist upon maintenance of the status quo, there can be little

[25] Documentation of this point is too scattered and voluminous to be compressed into a footnote of reasonable length. However, one need only refer to almost any Western article or book dealing with a specific Soviet policy area. Two such articles published recently in this journal were Aryeh L. Unger, "Polit-informator or Agitator: A Decision Blocked," September-October 1970, pp. 30-43, and Zev Katz, "Sociology in the Soviet Union," May-June 1971, pp. 22-40.

[26] See, e.g., Grey Hodnett, "What's in a Nation?" *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1967, pp. 2-15; and Franklyn Griffiths, "Four Soviet Images of the American Political System," unpublished paper (prepared for delivery at the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, June 11, 1971).

[27] *The New York Times,* Sept. 13, 1971, p. 35.

[28] For brief biographical notes about the dissenters, see Abraham Brumberg, Ed., *In Quest of Justice,* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1970, pp. 464-74. Elsewhere, Brumberg questions Khrushchev's liberalism by listing a number of his policies: "the restoration of the death penalty for economic crimes, and the unsavory 'vigilance campaign' of 1962-1963 with its heavy admixture of anti-semitism; the assault on private property in agriculture; the recurrent attack on the liberal intelligentsia, so reminiscent of Zhdanov's repressions of the late 1940's; the creation of quasi-legal bodies to administer justice outside of the confines of legally constituted bodies, such as the anti-parasite legislation and comrades' courts. Finally, the creation of yet another 'cult of the individual' . . . with a dash of nepotism thrown in for good measure" ("The Fall of Khrushchev—Causes and Repercussions," in Strong, *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin,* pp. 11-12).

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change. The question is: what sort of advice does the present leadership seem to be following? Or, to put it in broader terms, what is the leadership's relationship to the rest of society?

End of the "Permanent Purge"?

If one looks at the last seven years of Soviet political evolution in historical perspective, the overwhelming impression one receives is that this period has witnessed a major change in the relationship of the leadership to the key segments of the Soviet "establishment." Whereas Stalin in his last years basically ignored the policy suggestions of the institutional centers of power, and whereas Khrushchev challenged the basic interests of almost every one of these centers (and with some success), the present leadership has not done major battle with any important segment of the establishment and seems, on the contrary, to have acceded to the most central desires of each.

One clear-cut piece of evidence is found in the realm of personnel selection. At the end of the Stalin period Brzezinski could speak of a "permanent purge" in the Soviet Union: he saw its purposes as "many and varied" and the need for it as "ever-present" and not diminishing "with the growing stability of the totalitarian regime." [29] Under Khrushchev, indeed, the purge did seem as permanent as ever, but after his fall the turnover rates among top officials—whatever may have been the cause—took a sharp downturn. For certain categories of officials, the turnover for the *ten* years between 1961 and 1971 has proven considerably lower than it was for the *five* years between 1956 and 1961, and in some cases it was unbelievably low between 1966 and 1971 (see Table 1). For example, not one of the 11 first deputy or deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers was replaced between the last two congresses, and only four of the 57 ministers and state committee chairmen that sat on the Council of Ministers were removed in the same period (another three died).

Khrushchev's successors have seemed especially reluctant to demote anyone who has reached the level of full membership in the Central Committee or higher—or perhaps they have found it especially difficult to do so. In any event, all of the members or candidate members of the Politburo elected in 1966 were renamed to this body in 1971, while 81 percent of the living full members of the 1966 Central Committee retained their membership in 1971 (82 percent, if we exclude the three workers and peasants on the committee, all of whom were replaced). The reelection rate among the voting members of the Central Committee exceeded 87 percent among the living officials who were still 60 years of age or younger in 1971. The fate of the 1966 obkom first secretaries is quite instructive. Twenty-one of the 44 obkom first secretaries with voting membership on the CPSU Central Committee were replaced between congresses, but 15 of these 21 were named to other posts that resulted in their reelection to the 1971 Central Committee, and a 16th had been appointed to such a post and subsequently died.

Table 1: Turnover of Leading Personnel
(in percent [a])

Position	1956-61	1961-71	1966-71
Full members, Politburo	70	36	0
Full members, Central Committee	50	39	24
Secretaries, Central Committee	75	67	27
Members, USSR Council of Ministers [b]	67	45	10
Republic First Secretaries	79	43	21
Obkom First Secretaries (RSFSR)	86	67	43

[a] The figures in each column are the percentages of officials who were not in the same position in the terminal year of the period specified as they were at the beginning of the period.
[b] Excluding chairmen of the republic Councils of Ministers, who are ex-officio members of the all-Union body.

Deference to the Establishment

The unwillingness or inability of the present leadership to remove or demote the members of the top administrative elite has been matched by its abstention from imposing any major policy change that would seriously diminish the status of any important institutional group. The policy decisions of the last seven years, unlike those of the Khrushchev period, have been such as would be expected from committee decision-making in which the leadership assumes the role not of the major policy initiator but of a broker mediating the competing

[29] *The Permanent Purge*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956, pp. 168-70.

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claims of powerful interests. Khrushchev's unpopular initiatives were quickly reversed by the succeeding leadership, and subsequent Soviet policy in any particular area has remained fairly close to what the relevant segment of the specialized elite could be predicted to favor (at least, given the limitations imposed by the prevailing distribution of funds). Certainly this seems to be true of policy with respect to education, agriculture, military affairs, industrial organization, and party structure. On questions involving the relative priority to be given to the interests of different institutional centers of power, any changes that have occurred have been slow and incremental.

The leadership's deference to the top specialized officials seems so apparent that it need not be documented at length. It should be noted, however, that this deference may now be increasingly extended to the top elite of the major regional centers as well. The evidence is not certain on this point, but there are a number of evidences that seem to point in this direction.

First, the regional representation on the Politburo has been gradually increasing. When the voting membership of this body was increased by four at the 24th Party Congress, three of the added full members were regional representatives: Shcherbitsky (Ukraine), Kunaev (Kazakhstan), and Grishin (Moscow). The five large republics, as well as Georgia in the Transcaucasus, all now have officials on the ruling Politburo, while the Baltic states have *de facto* representation in the person of the Latvian, Arvid Pelshe, Chairman of the Party Control Commission.[30] An analogous development has occurred in the republics. The number of first secretaries of outlying oblasts and cities named to republic party bureaus has risen from none in 1956 to two in 1961, six in 1966 (two full members and four candidates), and seven in 1971 (four full members and three candidates).

Second, there has been a change in the pattern of selection of obkom first secretaries, at least in the Russian Republic. Brezhnev has announced a policy "of promoting local officials [to the post of obkom first secretary],[31] sending people from the center to these posts only in exceptional cases," and this policy has generally been followed in the RSFSR. In the 1957-61 period, only 26 percent of new obkom first secretaries in the republic had worked for more than five years in their respective oblasts before their appointment, while 64 percent came directly from the outside. (In earlier periods the percentage of outsiders seems to have been even higher.) Between the 23rd and 24th Congresses, on the other hand, 75 percent of new obkom first secretaries in the RSFSR had at least five years of past service within their oblasts, and most had spent their entire careers there.[32]

Since the center has a wide range of choice among officials living in any given oblast, it is possible that the new personnel policy has not appreciably altered the relationship between the party leadership (specifically the General Secretary) and the obkom first secretaries. However, internal promotion is at least consistent with a possible tendency toward allowing local party establishments to determine their own leadership succession.

Third, a few signs have appeared of slightly greater policy autonomy for the republic leaders, at least on a few issues. On one question—the newspaper treatment of local victims of the Stalin purges—the partial autonomy is readily observable. As indicated earlier, biographies of purge victims have generally been published more frequently now than five years ago, but the republics by no means follow a uniform policy in this matter. At one extreme, the Ukraine in 1970 erected monuments to S. V. Kossior and V. Y. Chubar (both "liquidated" in 1937-38),[33] while Uzbekistan has published a biography of Akmal Ikramov and the collected works of Faizulla Khodzhaev, both of whom were major republic leaders purged by Stalin.[34] (Khodzhaev remained under a shadow throughout the Khrushchev period because of his inclusion among the "Right Oppositionists" prosecuted with Bukharin.) At the other extreme, Kazakhstan appears not to have published any biography of a purge victim in the past five years, and certainly not in 1971.

[30] In contrast to the Politburo, however, the Central Committee Secretariat remains overwhelmingly Russian. All the secretaries and all but one of the department heads are Russian.

[31] *Pravda*, March 31, 1971, p. 10.

[32] Twenty-four obkom first secretaries appointed in this period were promoted from lesser positions within the same oblast. Eleven had been oblispolkom chairman; six had been obkom second secretary; five had been gorkom first secretary, (a new and perhaps significant source of recruitment); and two had held other positions. However, only some 35 percent of the new obkom first secretaries outside the RSFSR were promoted from within the oblast. (This calculation excludes all newly-formed oblasts.) Except in one case, the new first secretaries did come from within the republic in which the oblast was located.

[33] *Pravda Ukrainy*, April 20, 1970, p. 1, and May 19, 1970, p. 1.

[34] I am indebted to Donald Carlisle, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate of the Russian Research Center, for the information about Ikramov and Khodzhaev.

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Even the 70th birth anniversary of Levon Mirzoian, Kazakhstan's initial party First Secretary after the republic's formation, was not mentioned in *Kazakhstanskaia pravda* in 1967, despite the fact that a commemorative article about him did appear at that time in Azerbaidzhan, where he had previously served as a republic party secretary during the 1920's.[35]

To this author at least, the press in the individual republics today gives an impression of greater variation on other questions as well, but it is possible that this is more a change in the eye of the beholder than in the actual situation. It would require a comprehensive study of economic, educational, and cultural developments in the republics to determine the extent of any trend toward greater autonomy for the regional elite. As John Armstrong has pointed out, however, the treatment of the union republics by the central Soviet authorities has for some time been much more differentiated and subtle than most of our conceptions of the Soviet federal system would suggest.[36] As a rule, the more industrialized republics appear to have been granted somewhat more autonomy than those in Central Asia in particular, and this would logically seem to imply some increase in authority for all republics as they become more industrialized.

The Party as Political Broker

Whatever devolution of authority to the leading regional officials has occurred, it is clear that the Soviet Union remains a country in which the vertical administrative units—the ministries and state committees (together with associated educational-scientific personnel and specialized party officials)—are on the whole much stronger than the horizontal or regional ones. (Comparison with Yugoslavia is instructive on this point.) Rather than the regional political leaders, it seems to be the leading specialized establishments which have been the main beneficiaries of the diffusion of power from the top party leadership.

Even within the regions, the administrative subordinates of the central ministries (particularly the subordinates of the heavy-industry ministries) have often had a key role in local decision-making. As the author has tried to suggest elsewhere in drawing an analogy between Soviet regional party organs and the French prefectural authorities, the leading party officials in the regions have been granted the great legal authority of the prefect but have had their real influence limited by the same factors that have weakened such officials throughout the world.[37] The enormous range of responsibilities placed on the shoulders of party officials, the superior knowledge of the specialized administrators, and the latter's ties with powerful central ministries have all combined to bring about a situation in which the local party first secretaries often function more as broker politicians vis-à-vis local specialized officials than as the source of policy guidance for the latter's specialized decisions.

In at least one respect, the developments of recent years may have pushed the local party organs even more strongly toward the broker role. For the first time, party theorists have been strongly emphasizing the coordinating function of the party organs, and the leadership has continued the practice of gradually building up the state apparatus in policy areas where the party organs had previously assumed (or, perhaps, been compelled to assume) a major operational role. The creation of the State Supply Committee and of republic state committees for labor resources (both with offices in the localities) may have reduced the very considerable burdens on the party organs in these realms. Similarly, the resubordination of the raion agricultural administrations to the raion soviets after nearly a decade of independence, together with the new decrees purporting to give the soviets new powers, may conceivably imply the beginnings of a policy of

[35] Mirzoian was first secretary of the Kazakhstan kraikom and then of the republic central committee from 1933 to 1938. His name was also not even mentioned in a page-long article on the history of Kazakhstan in the 1930's that appeared in *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, Oct. 10, 1967, p. 3. The Azerbaidzhan newspaper in which his biography was published was *Bakinskii rabochii*, Dec. 1, 1967, p. 3.

[36] John Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," in Erich Goldhagen, Ed., *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 3-49.

[37] Phillip Stewart, in reviewing this book in the May-June 1971 issue of this journal, mistook my thesis to be that of an all-powerful Soviet regional party first secretary. The confusion may arise from the old problem of distinguishing clearly between legitimate authority and real influence. The conventional Western conception portrayed the local party organs as a vital force in pushing plant managers to technical innovation but considered party intervention to be a quasi-legitimate (and, on many questions, an illegitimate) violation of the chain of command. My own contention is that the situation is the reverse—that the party organs have clear-cut legal authority but not a great deal of influence with respect to technical policy and several other "intra-industry" questions. The evidence which Professor Stewart cites from the book to challenge the thesis that he attributes to me is actually the evidence that I presented to bolster my major thesis.

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significantly increasing what is now the virtually nonexistent ability of local soviets to engage in meaningful regional and urban planning.[38] In the ideological (*i.e.*, the educational-cultural-publishing) realm, the creation of new governmental committees was largely the product of the last years of the Khrushchev period, but the status of these bodies has risen significantly since 1964.[39] Whereas 31 officials attached to such committees were elected full members of the republic party central committees in 1961, their number rose to 38 in 1966, and 45 in 1971. (This is one of the most noticeable changes to take place in the republic central committees over the past decade.)

In view of all this, the image of an "ideological system" hardly seems appropriate to the Soviet Union of the last seven years. How, then, should we characterize the present Soviet political system? Has it petrified, or has it been evolving towards the model of institutional pluralism? Have the frequent reorganizations, striking policy innovations, and permanent purge of the Khrushchev era been replaced by immobilism or by Western-like incrementalism in policy change?

Change in What Direction?

It should be recognized that these are extremely difficult questions to answer, for there are few clear-cut criteria by which one can easily distinguish between immobilism and institutional pluralism. If either model were firmly linked with the power position of a specific institution, such as the party apparatus, then incremental changes in the status of that institution might provide a reliable indicator.[40] But this is hardly the case. Moreover, the crucial consideration really is the *nature* of the party and the party apparatus, not their continued "dominance."

Nor does the relative degree of freedom to advocate incremental policy change serve as a convincing criterion by which to judge the degree to which Soviet society corresponds to either model. The important thing is not simply the flow of ideas but rather what practical force these ideas have, and—even more—their very nature. Hence, as stated above, the basic problem is the nature of the "new class"—that is, the upper five-to-ten percent of Soviet society in socio-economic terms. Does the fact that almost all its members are employed in bureaucratic institutions of one sort or another and are almost all required to be members of the Communist Party ensure that the ideas flowing from them will be conservative rather than innovative? Does the fact that almost all the major political actors are senior bureaucrats (or civil servants, to use a more neutral term) who supervise state, economic, party, or educational-scientific institutions of one type or another mean that ideas challenging the status quo will be filtered out before they reach the political decision-makers?

Ultimately, the test of the direction in which the Soviet political system is evolving must be the nature of the policies that emerge from the system. But here, too, evaluation is by no means simple. There are elements of both change and continuity in the life of every country, and unless the former are very dramatic, we face great problems when we try to decide which merit greater emphasis. If changes are less than dramatic, are they the kind of incremental changes that, taken individually, appear relatively insignificant but which, over time, cumulatively transform society and the political system in a most fundamental way? Or do they constitute merely the sort of minor tinkering that would

[38] The resubordination of the raion agricultural administrations to the soviets occurred in the summer of 1970 (see *Pravda*, July 3, 1970, p. 3). The decrees referred to were published in *Pravda*, March 14, 1971, pp. 1-2, and March 20, 1971, p. 1. In evaluating the decrees, two facts should be kept in mind: (1) any improvement in the position of the soviets begins from a very low point; and (2) even after the decrees, there have been complaints by local officials that the city soviets still do not have adequate authority over housing construction and municipal services expenditures to be able to integrate such development into any meaningful city plan.

[39] In addition to the republic ministries of education and culture, state committees have been created for publishing (sometimes misleadingly translated "press"), movie-making, and television and radio. Vocational education has also been raised to the state committee level in many republics, and nearly half of the republics have ministries for higher and secondary specialized education.

[40] Even if one were to accept the relative status of the party apparatus as a reliable indicator, the picture is a mixed one. Three of the four new Politburo members are party officials, but the long-term decline in the percentage of party officials among the voting members of the Central Committee has continued: from 56 percent in 1956 to 46 percent in 1961, 42 percent in 1966, and 39 percent in 1971. In the republics, apparatus representation has remained essentially stable. The proportion of party officials among the voting members of the republic party bureaus has only risen from 57.2 percent in 1966 to 57.5 percent in 1971, while the difference in the proportion of party officials among the voting members of the republic central committees is not statistically significant—34.1 percent in 1966 and 33.4 percent in 1971. (The figures do not include party officials below the level of raikom secretary and are based on identifications of 93 percent of the 1966 republic central committees' members and 92 percent of the members of the 1971 committees. Very, very few party officials will be found among the unidentified.)

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not invalidate the judgment that the system is immobilized?

In trying to differentiate between immobilism and incrementalism, we essentially are making a judgment as to whether changes are or are not "important" or "significant." As the debate over the New Left's charge of immobilism in the American political system demonstrates, however, any evaluation of this type rests essentially upon a subjective value judgment and/or on an unprovable assumption about what is "required" at a particular stage of history. In practice, there is a real tendency for such judgments to vary according to one's view of the status quo. If the status quo is considered fundamentally unjust, then no change short of the most drastic transformation of the system will be considered significant. If, on the other hand, the status quo is considered more or less tolerable (given the inevitable imperfections in man and society), then incremental change seems much more important—and, in fact, desirable. Judgments of this type must remain basically "non-scientific" in nature.

Evidences of Immobilism

Certainly the patterns of change and continuity in the Soviet Union since 1964 have been sufficiently ambiguous to prevent an absolutely definitive choice between incrementalism and immobilism as the proper label to apply to this period. On the one hand, there have been a number of evidences that might be cited in support of the thesis of immobilism in the Soviet political system. One such evidence surely would be the turnover rates in top administrative

Table 2: Rates of Personnel Turnover, 1966-71

(Precentages of 1966 officials not in the same positions in 1971 [a])

Party Apparatus		State Apparatus	
Position	Turnover (percent)	Position	Turnover (percent)
Full members, CPSU Politburo	0	Deputy Chairmen, USSR Council of Ministers	0
Full members, CPSU Central Committee	24		
Full members, CPSU Central Committee (party and government officials only [b])	19	Ministers and Chairmen of State Committees sitting on the USSR Council of Ministers	12
CPSU Central Committee Secretaries	27		
CPSU Central Committee Department Heads [c]	46	USSR Deputy Ministers of Defense	55
		Commanders, Military Districts	100
		USSR Deputy Ministers [d]	35
Republic Party First Secretaries	14	Chairmen, Republic Councils of Ministers	60
Full members, Republic Party Bureaus	37	Deputy Chairmen, Republic Councils of Mins.	45
Full members, Republic Party CC	41		
Full members, Republic Party CC (party and government officials only)	33	Republic Ministers and Chairmen of State Committees	41
Republic CC Secretaries (except first sec'ties)	58		
Republic CC Department Heads	65		
Obkom First Secretaries	44	Oblispolkom Chairmen [e]	56
Obkom Second Secretaries [e]	67	Directors, 170 largest factories [e]	44
Gorkom First Secretaries (50 largest cities)[e]	61		
Raikom First Secretaries (in 10 republics)	57		

[a] The percentages of turnover shown for members of the CPSU Politburo and Central Committee, CPSU and republic Central Committee secretaries, CPSU Central Committee department heads, republic and obkom party first secretaries, deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, Ministers and Chairmen of state committees sitting on the USSR Council of Ministers, and factory directors represent turnover between the 23rd (1966) and 24th (1971) CPSU Congresses (excluding several changes that occurred a few days after the 23rd Congress). The percentages given for all other categories of officials represent turnover between September 1, 1966, and September 1, 1971, these dates having been chosen to permit the utilization of data on republic government officials designated during the summer of 1971.

[b] This excludes military officers (except the Minister of Defense), diplomats, scholars, and factory managers who are full CC members.

[c] In the five cases in which a Central Committee secretary heads the department, the first deputy head is included in the calculation in order to avoid duplication.

[d] As complete information is not available for all categories of officials, the turnover percentages given for USSR deputy ministers are only approximate.

[e] The figures given for obkom second secretaries, oblispolkom chairmen, gorkom and raikom first secretaries are based on identification of 95 percent of the total number in each case; and for factory directors, on identification of 67 percent of the total number.

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positions. Not only do these rates tend to suggest that there have been few "losers" such as are often produced by the resolution of great policy conflicts, but they have, in themselves, led to a significant aging of the top elite. The voting members of the first Central Committee elected after the 1917 Revolution averaged 36 years of age, and the average age thereafter rose quite slowly in both the Stalin and Khrushchev periods: it still was under 45 in 1934, dropped perhaps a year or two by 1939, then increased only to 49 in 1952, to 51 in 1956, and to 52 in 1961. In 1966, however, the average age of voting members jumped to 56, and from there it rose to 58 in 1971.[41] These figures are, of course, a reflection of the average age of the categories of officials from whom Central Committee members are usually drawn, and it is easy to argue that the increase in average age is likely associated with an increase in conservatism among these officials.

From many points of view, indeed, the policies of the Soviet leadership have been as conservative as the aging might lead one to expect. If the Soviet system is viewed as one committed to certain ideological goals, then the failure of the leaders to carry on the transformation of society prescribed by the ideology logically suggests a loss of dynamism, a "petrification" of "the system." Or if the system is viewed as one in which the party has played out "its historical role" and the present stage of technological development of Soviet society dictates evolution toward constitutional democracy and market socialism, then the painfully slow pace of change along those lines is equally suggestive of immobilism. Whatever the long-term impact of the Soviet program of economic reform may be, the organization and operating principles of the economy (both in industry and agriculture) remain at present much more similar to those of the Stalin era than to those now in force in Yugoslavia. Similarly, however, much public debate may have broadened in the USSR, there is still no evidence of the type of political liberalization that was seen in Czechoslovakia or the kind of devolution of authority from the center to the republics that is found in Yugoslavia. The continued prosecution of dissidents suggests an unwillingness on the part of the Soviet regime to accept ideological deviation that formally challenges the fundamentals of the system.

Moreover, despite some signs of change, the highest rewards and prestige are still accorded to those in the heavy-industry and defense sectors. These sectors continue to receive priority in such matters as material deliveries and housing allocations, and last year's party elections revealed little decline in the status accorded them. It is true that agriculture has experienced some increase in its representation both on the all-Union and republic central committees, but no change has occurred within the urban sector.[42] Even the workers named to these bodies come overwhelmingly from heavy industry—*e.g.*, nine of the ten workers on the all-Union Central Committee and 78 of the 115 identified workers on the republic committees.[43]

Signs of Change

But while this evidence does point to a certain immobilism in the system, changes of some significance have occurred. The devolution of power to the major institutional centers is a very important change indeed—especially if it should turn out to be more or less permanent. Of equal importance are the growing ambiguity of Soviet ideology and the increased vitality of public policy debate. In addition, there have been a number of developments that are not consonant with any petrification model, especially one emphasizing bureaucratic ossification and preservation of the privileges and power of a narrow economic-social elite.

[41] The lists of Central Committee members elected at each party congress and the biographies of many of the members can be found in Boris Levytsky, *The Soviet Political Elite*, Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1970. The 1971 figure excludes the worker and peasant members of the Central Committee. Data on the characteristics of the members elected in 1971 can be found in Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 CPSU Central Committee: A Preliminary Assessment of the New Elite," paper presented at the Northeastern Slavic Conference, Montreal, 1971, and to be published soon in *World Politics*. (Professor Donaldson was kind enough to assist the author in the identification of hard-to-identify Central Committee members.)

[42] All the agricultural ministries (including, for the first time, reclamation, Selkhoztekhnika, and rural construction) are now represented by full members on the all-Union Central Committee, while the number of agricultural ministers (or chairmen of state committees) on the republican central committees has risen from 43 to 51. On the contrary, not a single light- or food-industry minister is included among the 42 ministers and chairmen of state committees named to the all-Union Central Committee, despite an increase of 15 such state officials on this body since 1966. The number of ministers and state committee chairmen from light industry and the municipal services on the republic central committees has remained virtually unchanged (58 in 1971 compared with 57 in 1966).

[43] The members of republic central committees who are most difficult to identify are those chosen from among workers and collective farmers. The republic statistics must therefore be considered merely approximate.

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First, the bureaucracy itself has undergone a number of changes that do not suggest ossification. While, as pointed out earlier, the turnover rates of top officials have dropped markedly in comparison with the Khrushchev years, those at the middle levels of the bureaucracy remain substantial (see Table 2). Moreover, the age of officials at the intermediate levels is considerably lower than that of their superiors (see Table 3). While age is by no means a clear indicator of attitudes, the relative youth of lower party officials is well worth noting, especially in view of the significant role of the party apparatus as a source of policy initiation. If present trends continue, the apparatus will within a few years be staffed predominantly by men whose entire work experience has fallen in the post-Stalin period.

Table 3: Average Ages of Republic and Oblast Officials, 1967 and 1971

Position	20 Oblasts, RSFSR 1967	5 Republics 1971
First Secretaries, republic CCs or obkoms	52	57 [a]
Second Secretaries, republic CCs or obkoms	49	51 [a]
Other Secretaries, republic CCs or obkoms	47	49
Department heads, republic CCs or obkoms	44	46
Gorkom First Secretaries	44	44
Raikom First Secretaries	44	44
Chairmen, republic Councils of Ministers or oblispolkoms	47	52 [a]
Deputy Chairmen, republic COMs or oblispolkoms	50	52
Republic ministers or heads of oblast administrations	49	51

[a] Based on data for all republics, instead of just five.

SOURCES: The information on the officials of the 20 oblasts in the RSFSR comes from lists of oblast deputies selected in 1967. The oblasts (in four cases, actually krai) were Altai, Cheliabinsk, Gorky, Ivanovo, Krasnodar, Krasnoiarsk, Kuibyshev, Kursk, Lipets, Novosibirsk, Orel, Penza, Primorsk, Rostov, Smolensk, Tula, Ulianovsk, Vologograd, and Yaroslavl. The lists were published in the oblast newspapers and were examined in the Lenin Library in Moscow.

The information on republic officials comes from lists of deputies to the republic supreme soviets elected in 1971. The five republics (the only ones where the lists gave the year of birth) were Estonia, Kirgizia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Tadzhikistan.

Moreover, while it is admittedly difficult to ascertain how a bureaucracy actually operates in practice, such evidence as is available on the functioning of Soviet officialdom does not suggest petrification. One of the major Soviet campaigns of recent years has focused on the "scientific organization of labor" (*nauchnaia organizatsiia truda,* or NOT), which has as its goals not only the rationalization of work at the factory-bench level but also "scientific" administration at the middle levels of the bureaucracy. Moreover, it has been characterized by a preoccupation not so much with structural details (as under Khrushchev) as with the development of sophisticated managerial techniques, improved organization of information flow, and the like. One important by-product of this has been the recent renaissance of sociology in the USSR, with the regime itself now placing special emphasis on applied sociological research of potential use to party and governmental administrators. One cannot be certain about the end results of this new preoccupation with "scientific management," but it does suggest that what Peter Solomon has termed "a new administrative ethos" may be in the making.[44]

A second type of change that has been observable in the last seven years is a very gradual erosion of those forces—surely the dominant forces of recent decades—that emphasize priority for industrial growth over other interests. These forces (except for the military) are no longer exempt from attack in the widening public debate. Many economists have advocated a change in the ratio of investments between Group A (heavy industry) and Group B (light and consumer industry) as well as institutional changes that would increase the sensitivity of the economy to consumer demands. It is also the dominance of heavy industry that is indirectly challenged by the mounting press criticisms of unsatisfactory conditions of life in the countryside, by the growing attention to environmental issues (a pro-conservationist film on Lake Baikal was the most popular Soviet film in 1970), and by repeated appeals for the transfer of housing and municipal services to the complete control of the local soviets. While the results of the challenge to heavy industry have thus far undoubtedly been disappointing from the critics' standpoint, they have not been inconsequential. The Ninth Five-Year Plan

[44] Peter H. Solomon, Jr., "A New Soviet Administrative Ethos—Examples from Crime Prevention," paper prepared for the meetings of the Northeastern Slavic Conference, Montreal, 1971.

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(1971-75) is the first long-term plan to call for a higher rate of increase in investments in Group B than in Group A. Moreover, as will be further detailed shortly, the incomes of collective farmers have been rising more rapidly than those of other groups—and will continue to do so under the new Five-Year Plan.

The third type of change—and perhaps the most important of all—has been in the realm of social policy. It is curious that American specialists writing on the Soviet Union, though usually liberal in their domestic politics and inclined to judge American political leaders by their activism on social-welfare issues, seldom consider such issues in evaluating the Soviet leadership. Yet, it must be recognized that the post-Khrushchev leadership has in fact initiated major steps toward greater egalitarianism—steps that amount to a veritable war on poverty affecting millions of low-income citizens.

The most striking evidence of this is the progress made in recent years toward a narrowing of inequalities in income. Although comprehensive wage data are not published in the Soviet Union—a fact which suggests that considerable inequalities still exist—all the available evidence suggests that the pattern of income distribution has been changing quite substantially in the direction of greater equality. Over the last five years, the minimum wage for wage earners (collective farmers excluded) rose 50 percent to 60 rubles a month, and during the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan it will rise to 70 rubles. Since large amounts of persons have been at minimum wage levels, according to an authoritative analyst, "the resulting very substantial reduction in the spread in basic wage rates must have meant a substantial narrowing in differentials in earnings." [45] The minimum pension will also increase.

The assault on inequality of income has resulted in even more significant gains for the nation's collective farmers, who have long been at the bottom of the income ladder. Average kolkhoznik income (excluding income from private plots) rose 42 percent in the 1966-70 plan period compared with 26 percent for all wage earners, and it is scheduled to increase another 30-35 percent during the new Five-Year Plan compared with a 20-22 percent rise for wage earners. The inherent uncertainty of collective farm incomes has also been reduced by the introduction of a guaranteed payment plan. In addition, the collective farmers have for the first time been included in the national pension system, and they will be the main beneficiaries of a new "family supplement" program that provides cash allowances to families whose income is less than 50 rubles per family member (the generally large size of kolkhoz families tends to reduce income per family member to very low levels).[46]

The precise impact of Brezhnev's "war on poverty" will not be clear until Moscow decides to publish fuller income data, but it may well be that the Soviet Union in recent years has seen a shift in income distribution that is quite striking by Western standards, and that the pattern of income distribution in the Soviet Union today is substantially more egalitarian than it is in the advanced Western countries, particularly if income from property is taken into account. In any case, if it is true, as many contend, that the entrenched ruling elite in the Soviet Union has been gaining in power since Khrushchev's fall, at least its allegedly augmented authority does not appear to be reflected in a larger share of the national income.

Some Comparisons

The types of change observable in the Soviet Union do not, of course, demonstrate conclusively the absence of immobilism in the system, but they should give reason for pause. This is particularly true if we examine the Soviet Union in a comparative framework. In any assessment of what some see as petrification of the Soviet system, it is, for example, worth considering that former US President Lyndon Johnson was considered a dynamic innovator in American domestic policy. Johnson initiated forward-looking legislation in the realms of medical care, education, civil rights, and social welfare. Yet, he was able to produce only minor institutional change, and his education, fair housing, and War on Poverty programs can scarcely be said to have changed American reality in a major way. Probably his most important innovation—the Medicare program—was limited to those over 65 years of age

[45] Janet Chapman, *Wage Variation in Soviet Industry*, Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-6076-PR, 1970, p. 126. For a new discussion of Soviet wage policy pointing in the same direction, see Leonard Joel Kirsch, *Soviet Wages* (to be published by Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press in 1972).

[46] *Pravda*, March 31, 1971, pp. 4-5. See also David W. Bronson and Constance B. Krueger, "The Revolution in Soviet Farm Household Income, 1953-1967," in James R. Millar, Ed., *The Soviet Rural Community*, Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1971, pp. 214-58.

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and was financed through the most regressive of US taxes, the social security tax.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, it still seems fair to credit President Johnson with having been a major policy innovator. Then, we may ask, do the programs of the present Soviet leadership really seem like immobilism by comparison? We have already cited evidence showing the results of the steps taken by Brezhnev to reduce inequalities in income in the USSR. Certainly it would seem fair to say that these steps have had a greater impact on the income levels of the poor than has President Johnson's War on Poverty.

A comparative framework may also be of use in analyzing other data that seem to provide clear-cut evidence of petrification. As has already been shown, the rate of turnover among the top Soviet elite has unquestionably declined, and their average age has increased. But does this apparent desuetude of the "permanent purge" mean that its "many and varied" purposes are not being served and that the system has *ipso facto* become immobilized? Or do the new turnover rates mean that the Soviet Union has adopted a pattern of personnel selection that is more normal for an advanced industrial country?

To delve into such questions in a comprehensive way would require a comparative examination going well beyond the scope of this article. However, there is one comparison that is feasible and may also be useful in putting this whole problem in clearer perspective. That is a comparison of the average ages of various categories of Soviet officials with those of their closest American counterparts. At the time of the 24th Congress, the average age of Soviet obkom first secretaries was 52 as compared with 51 for US state governors; industrial ministers in the Soviet Union averaged 60 years of age as compared with 59 for the chief operating officers of the 50 largest American corporations (who are, in fact, the United States' top industrial administrators);[47] the average age of the party first secretaries of the capital cities of 13 out of the 15 Soviet republics (the ages of the other two are not ascertainable) was 47, as compared with 52 for the mayors of the 25 largest American cities.

Moving toward the higher levels, one of course finds no American equivalent of the Soviet Central Committee, but for purposes of comparison one can construct a hypothetical American "Central Committee" of 200 members, composed as follows: the members of the US cabinet, the governors of the states, the Congressional leadership, the chairmen of the Congressional committees, the justices of the Supreme Court, the chief executives of the 50 largest US corporations, the members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, an additional five military officers, and 30 sub-cabinet officials from the White House staff, the executive departments and the independent agencies. Doing this, we arrive at an average age of 58 for this body in the spring of 1971, which interestingly enough is exactly the average age of the membership of the CPSU Central Committee elected at that time.

Similarly, one can compare the average age of the present Soviet Politburo with that of a select group of 15 high officials who might well have been on an American Politburo if one existed. These would be: President Nixon, Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Attorney General John Mitchell, Chief Justice Warren Burger, Special Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger, Director of the Office of Management and Budget George Shultz, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, Speaker of the House Carl Albert, House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee Russell Long, and the governors of New York and California, Nelson Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan. The average age of this group would have been 59 years in the spring of 1971, and if the chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees were substituted for the minority leaders (as they probably should be), the average age comes to 61, identical with that of the Soviet Politburo.[48]

Naturally, a comparative perspective—particularly one based on a two-country comparison—provides no final standard for judging petrification. One might argue that the standard of reference (in this case,

[47] There are a number of criteria by which the list of the top 50 or top 500 American corporations could be chosen. I have used market value of stock, for this methodology produces a list with many of the great growth companies on it. It is worth noting that the 22 growth companies on the list (those with a price/earnings ratio of over 25) had chief executives with the same average age as the executives of the other 28 companies. The lists of corporations and chief officers are found in *Forbes* (New York), May 15, 1971, pp. 91-92 and 128-61.

[48] In July 1971, when a political correspondent of a major American newspaper was asked to provide his list of the 15 most influential political-governmental leaders in the United States, he named the following: Hugo Black, Emanuel Celler, John Connally, Allen Ellender, Henry Kissinger, Melvin Laird, George Mahon, Mike Mansfield, Wilbur Mills, John Mitchell, Edmund Muskie, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, and John Stennis. These men averaged 64 years of age.

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the United States) is also afflicted with immobilism, that the Soviet system is so anachronistic that it requires more radical change than the American, or that the Soviet leadership must be more innovative to compensate for the weakness of innovative forces in the social and economic systems. However, if we do speak of a petrification of the Soviet system, let us recognize quite frankly the assumptions we are employing.

In the author's opinion, the contention that the Soviet Union has been petrifying over the last seven-and-a-half years must rest on one of two possible lines of argument. One is that a few non-pluralist developments (notably the renewed restrictions on freedom to discuss Stalin's repressive actions) should outweigh all other developments in any assessment of the direction in which the Soviet system is moving. The second is that the Soviet Union has indeed been moving in the direction of institutional pluralism, but that the pace of change is so slow in comparison with societal requirements that the system must be called immobilized. (One might further argue that the impetus for further change is disappearing.)

To this observer at least, the first line of argument is very unconvincing. It seems to reflect no more than the "group bias" of Western social scientists—namely the unspoken and perhaps unconscious belief that a political system should be judged solely on the basis of how it treats intellectuals who share their own values.

The second line of argument is more difficult to either prove or refute. Ultimately, as indicated earlier, the question is not susceptible of a definitive answer, except perhaps by a future historian who will have the advantage of knowing what has occurred during the rest of this century. But if this line of argument is to be made, let it be made explicitly. Let the movement in the direction of institutional pluralism be acknowledged, and then let the precise nature of the argument for immobilism be spelled out.

For this purpose, it seems far more illuminating to begin, not with a petrification model that prejudges the analysis, but with an abstract or ideal-type model such as institutional pluralism. Such a model is much easier to use as a model should be used (to "ask how far reality fits" it [49]), and there is less temptation to confuse the model with reality. One can easily and naturally speak of the movement of a system *either* toward the model or away from it. Moreover, with an abstract model that contains elements of similarity to classical pluralism (notably pluralism of elites and some elite representation of mass interests) as well as elements of divergence from it, it is also much easier to go on to raise a series of important comparative questions that tend to be foreclosed by models based on "good-evil" dichotomies.[50]

[49] Inkeles, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

Future Possibilities

Clearly the operation of the Soviet political system in the seven years since Khrushchev's removal seems significantly different from what it was during the seven years prior to that event, but the interpretation of the differences is not an easy matter. Is the "permanent revolution" really dead, or is it only hibernating? Have the political leaders forever lost the ability or the will to challenge the major institutional centers of power, or are the developments of the last seven years simply the product of a rather protracted succession crisis? In short, will historians of the future look back at 1964 as a major turning point in Soviet history or merely as the beginning point of one of a large number of cycles in a Soviet political tradition characterized by basic continuity?

If movement toward institutional pluralism is to be reversed, four possible alternatives suggest themselves. First, a strong leader might emerge—either through a military coup or, more likely, through a consolidation of power by the General Secretary—and initiate drastic political action. Second, one might see the emergence of a strong leader who would base his policy almost entirely on the narrow interests of the military/heavy-industrial elite. Third, a stalemate might develop within the leadership if the low rate of turnover among top officials were to continue so long as to result in a leadership old

[50] The relationship of the elite and the disadvantaged in different political systems is, in particular, a problem that deserves very careful empirical consideration. In the September-October 1971 issue of this journal ("The Status of Soviet Women"—review, p. 62), Ellen Mickiewicz expressed the traditional Western view when she asserted that "without a channel through which to influence politics, it is questionable whether Soviet women can assert their right to genuine equality." The model of institutional pluralism—and a good deal of comparative Soviet-American data on social welfare issues (and surely also on the position of women)—suggests that this is not a closed question. This argument is presented at length in a manuscript which the author will soon finish—*Defining Responsive Government: The Implications of the Soviet and the American Experience.*

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and rigid by anyone's definition. Fourth, institutional pluralism might prove an unsatisfactory compromise, generating inexorable pressures on the system to move toward classic pluralism.

A comprehensive discussion of the various factors that might lead to or foreclose all these alternatives would far exceed the limits of this article. It seems to the author, however, that the burden of proof rests upon those who would prophesy drastic change away from institutional pluralism in any of the alternative directions just indicated.

A prediction of full pluralism, for example, must face the fact that political institutions associated with economic growth, social mobility for the ambitious, representation of the economic elite in the political process, and the achievement of nationalist goals normally are able to defend themselves quite well against frontal attack. Moreover, as Professor Brzezinski emphasizes, such a prediction must also reckon with the multinational nature of the Soviet system.[51] The profound consequences that full or classic pluralism would have for the relationship of the Russians to the other nationalities in the USSR is likely to make that alternative quite unattractive to most Russians, except perhaps as a last resort. Movement toward classic pluralism in the near term would therefore seem unlikely except in the event of major and persistent unrest among the nationalities or a zero-growth kind of crisis in the economic system.

A prediction of clear stalemate, on the other hand, overlooks the fact that the leading party bodies are broadly representative of the different institutional forces in Soviet society, and that the basic political institutions—as will be further elaborated below—are arranged in a way that is quite conducive to the rise of strong leadership. Given these institutional arrangements as well as the historical commitment of the Communist Party to industrial development and to the enhancement of the USSR's position in the world arena, everything that we have learned about the behavior of elite groups and about committee decision-making suggests that a coalition would form to overcome any stalemate that might begin to have obviously harmful consequences in terms of governmental functioning.

Compared to either of these two possibilities (classic pluralism or stalemate), the possibility of a strong leader emerging in the Soviet Union is much greater. Indeed, Myron Rush has argued in this journal that the last seven years have actually been a period of succession crisis,[52] and there are a number of good reasons to suspect that he may be right.

[51] Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, p. 167.

Return to a Dominant Leader?

The basic Western explanation for the dominance of the General Secretary over other members of the Soviet Politburo in the past has been a theory that Robert Daniels calls "the circular flow of power." According to this theory, the General Secretary derives his great power primarily from his responsibility for supervising the party apparatus throughout the country and from his ability to appoint and remove the provincial party secretaries. Since the provincial secretaries in turn control the selection of delegates to the all-Union Party Congress, and since the Congress names (or at least ratifies) the members of the Central Committe, to which both the Politburo and the Secretariat are responsible, "the circuit is closed: The [General] Secretary is confirmed in office by a circular process that ultimately he himself controls—or can control." [53]

Assuming that the provincial party secretaries and the delegates to the all-Union Party Congress are still selected in the ways suggested by the circular-flow-of-power theory, one could well expect Khrushchev's fall to be followed by an especially slow consolidation of power in the hands of the succeeding General Secretary. To an extent that is not fully appreciated by many scholars (and is completely unappreciated by most journalists), the CPSU Congress is the key institution in the process of the circular flow of power. Even when there is no contest at the Congress, the loyalty of the bulk of the delegates to the regional party secretaries and ultimately to the General Secretary is a decisive factor preventing the old Politburo members from challenging the list of new Central Committee members prepared by the General Secretary.

When viewed from this perspective, the fact that the 23rd CPSU Congress came so soon after Khrushchev's removal, and that the next Congress was not held for five years, could have seriously interfered with Brezhnev's ability to undermine the independence of the Central Committee and quickly

[52] "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1971, pp. 9-15.

[53] Daniels, "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," *loc. cit. supra*, p. 20.

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consolidate his power. By the spring of 1966, when the Congress met, changes of first secretary had taken place in oblasts and small republics accounting for only 13 percent of the delegates to the Congress.[54] The 24th Congress, however, should have marked a very important stage in the unfolding of the circular-flow-of-power process, for in the period between the two congresses new first secretaries had been selected in oblasts and small republics commanding 50 percent of the delegates.[55] In all, the proportion of delegates to the 24th Congress politically indebted to post-1964 first secretaries stood at 63 percent, and of course the proportion would be considerably higher if one were to include in it delegates from the small non-Russian republics on the assumption that they owe their party positions wholly or in part to the Russian second secretaries of these republics.[56]

On the basis of the Stalin and Khrushchev experiences, the circular-flow-of-power theory would have predicted that Brezhnev could force through a substantial expansion in the size of the Central Committee elected at the 24th Congress and in the size of the Politburo elected by the new Central Committee; and that he would then be able to remove his major Politburo rivals by the end of 1972. Naturally, it is too early to check the latter prediction, but the 24th Congress did ratify an increase in the number of voting members of the Central Committee from 195 to 241 and in the number of voting members of the Politburo from 11 to 15. While 82 percent of the still-living members of the 1966 Central Committee were reelected in 1971, proponents of the circular-flow-of-power theory would consider it more significant that 38 percent of the 1971 voting members had reached this status since 1966 and 55 percent since Brezhnev's assumption of the party leadership in 1964.

Relationships within the Politburo today may or may not still be shaped by the factors suggested by the circular-flow-of-power theory.[57] (It is the author's personal view that the theory still has relevance for an understanding of the Soviet political system.) In any case, however, it should not be assumed that a return to "limited personal rule" (to use Professor Rush's phrase) automatically implies a return to the relationships that formerly existed between the political leadership and the societal centers of power. Much, of course, depends on the type of "limited personal rule" that emerges. If one accepts Rush's citation of Lenin between 1917 and 1922 and Stalin between 1928 and 1937 as typical examples of such rule,[58] and if Brezhnev or anyone else were to succeed in acquiring a similar position, then movement toward institutional pluralism would scarcely seem likely. Lenin and Stalin had the most clear-cut ability as well as determination to force through change of enormous magnitude in the periods in question.

Yet it is possible for a leader to have a dominant political position, to have the final say on policy questions if he wishes, and still to fulfill, usually, a broker-like role. In short, there must be some category (or categories) between the "limited personal rule" of a Lenin or an early Stalin on the one hand and pure oligarchy on the other, and the term "political boss" may have the proper connotations for such an intermediate type. (Some term such as "limited dictator" might be applied to a leader in the position of Lenin and the early Stalin, and some term such as "full dictator" to one in the position of the post-1937 Stalin.)

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[54] This figure is based on the list of delegates published at the end of the Stenographic Report of the 23rd Congress. The list includes the region from which each delegate comes, and it is a simple matter to add the number of delegates for each region. The unit of analysis is the region specified in the list itself.

[55] Because of the unavailability, at the time of writing, of the list of delegates to the 24th Congress, it was assumed that the relative number of delegates from each oblast and republic was the same in 1971 as in 1966.

[56] For some time it has been the practice to appoint persons of the local nationality to the post of party first secretary in the non-Slavic republics, with a Russian sent in from the outside as second secretary. Many scholars consider the Russian second secretary the key figure in the republic leaderships as the representative of the party center, but his actual relationship to the lower-level obkom, gorkom and raikom first secretaries is at present very unclear. In the author's view, the native first secretary now seems a more dominant figure than the Russian second secretary, and it is quite possible that the lower-level secretaries tend to be beholden to him.

[57] Daniels acknowledges, in fact, that "a fundamental change has occurred in the circuit of power . . . real control does not pass to the top leader, but flows instead from the top collective bodies around through the party organization" ("Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," *loc. cit.*, pp. 22-25). Daniels rests his argument largely on the psychological impact of Khrushchev's removal, but it could be hypothesized that the Politburo has been able to limit the General Secretary's source of power in a more direct manner. One possibility is that the responsibility for selecting obkom and republic party secretaries has been divided among several or perhaps many Politburo members. (For example, the fact that Suslov attended a session of the Leningrad Obkom that selected a new first secretary could conceivably denote Suslov's ability to select a man loyal to himself for that position.) Another possibility is that except in cases of major scandal or mismanagement, the regional elite have been given control over the post of local first secretary. As mentioned earlier, a much higher percentage of obkom first secretaries have been selected in recent years from within the oblasts.

[58] Rush, "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue," *loc. cit.*, p. 10.

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Whatever label is employed for the intermediate category between "limited dictator" and oligarchy, a "political boss" of the type indicated is, in the author's view, not only compatible with the model of institutional pluralism but perhaps a significant component of it. Change in a classic pluralist system often requires political leadership and governmental action to overcome the entrenched resistance of those who benefit from the status quo, and at times very strong leadership may be required in a system of institutional pluralism, particularly in a country where one group has the superior political weight possessed by the elite associated with defense and heavy industry in the Soviet Union.

Forces for Fundamental Change

Compatibility between institutional pluralism and one type of personal rule does not, of course, guarantee that a strong General Secretary would assume such a role. There are, however, many reasons to doubt that any General Secretary in the near future will become more than a "political boss" as defined here. If the last seven years have been a succession crisis, they certainly have been much less dramatic than either 1924-29 or 1953-57, and it is most probable that the movement toward institutional pluralism has been more the product of fundamental, long-term changes in the Soviet political and social system than simply of a temporary configuration of forces in the Politburo.

One change of long-term significance is the background of those from whom the leadership is selected. While Brzezinski's phrase "a government of clerks" seems unnecessarily pejorative, the Soviet leaders now are, in fact, recruited from among persons who have risen through the ranks of bureaucratic organizations rather than from among men with the very different experience and perspectives of the revolutionary. Today 13 of the 15 voting members of the Politburo have been successful republic, obkom, or gorkom first secretaries—positions that require the abilities and frame of mind of the broker politician. Such men, when they reach the top, certainly may have ideas and ambitions of their own, but it would be surprising if the instincts of the broker did not remain.

A second change is the precedent of Khrushchev's removal. As Daniels emphasizes, "This was the first time in the entire history of Russia since Riurik that the established leader of the country was removed by the rules of representative procedure. Since the leader was removed, it follows naturally that he was and had been removable. It follows equally that the successor leadership is removable in the same way." [59] Under the circular-flow-of-power theory, the power of the General Secretary depends upon the same factors that solidify the position of the leader of any political machine—the gratitude, loyalty, and especially the self-interest of subordinates. The memory of Khrushchev's removal will remind any successor that there can be circumstances in which these factors cease to be decisive, and it is hard to believe—barring a major crisis—that a General Secretary will soon choose to challenge the fundamental interests of as many different institutional groups as Khrushchev did.

Most important, however, are the changes of a gradual and subtle nature that have been taking place throughout the Soviet political and social system. Obviously the structure of material and psychological rewards has over time resulted in the flow of a very large number of the most talented people into the "military/heavy-industrial complex" very broadly defined, and just as obviously these people will long remain a powerful political force. Yet, there are many forces at work, both within and outside Soviet society, that are beginning to undermine the dominance of this complex. They are: (1) the creation in large numbers of new types of personnel with perspectives and backgrounds quite different from the production-oriented, heavy-industrial-engineer types who had been the dominating political force in recent years; (2) the tendency of the children of the top and middle elite to enter occupations less clearly associated with the administration and development of heavy industry; (3) the impact of constant press criticism of poverty problems on the legitimacy of heavy-industry and military expenditures; (4) the egalitarian aspects of the ideology, especially those calling for the elimination of urban-rural differences; (5) the assignment of responsibility for health-education-welfare functions (and of seeking appropriations for them) to the "guardians of the ideology"—the ideological party secretaries; (6) elite fear of popular unrest, reinforced by the memory of events in Eastern Europe, most recently in Poland; and (7) developments abroad, such as the reduction of US overseas military commitments under the Nixon Doctrine and evidences of a possible return to more normal conditions in China—

[59] "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," *loc. cit.*, pp. 22-25.

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both of which might tend to diminish the Soviet inclination to stress defense and heavy industry.

There are also forces at work that tend, more generally, to undermine the authoritarian features of the system: (1) the rising educational level of the Soviet elite; (2) the gradual disappearance of the economic-social forces that generate a propensity toward authoritarianism (as discussed in Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*);[60] (3) the erosion of ideological certainty under the impact of events in the outside world and the expanding scope of sociological research at home; and (4) the tendency for dissenters to come from the upper stratum of Soviet society, in conjunction with the fact it is difficult for an elite to ruthlessly suppress its own.

It is possible to imagine a Soviet political leader or a group of leaders becoming alarmed at these developments and deciding to seek a return either to revolutionary ideological purity or to a more single-minded dedication to building Soviet military strength. But possibilities are not necessarily probabilities. The usual reaction of a political leader attempting to consolidate his position is to adapt himself to major societal forces rather than to try to combat them. If we are inclined to predict that a Soviet leader will behave differently, we should ask ourselves the reasons for such a prediction. Is it based upon our observations of the Soviet experience of the last two decades, upon "our notions of what a political system is and does," [61] or upon the lingering impact of the totalitarian model upon our thinking about the Soviet Union?

Predicting the future development of any political system is, of course, even more hazardous than trying to describe an existing one in capsule form. If we are to judge by the evidence of both Soviet and Western experience, the Soviet future will be far more "inconsistent" than any theory suggests. There will be developments that indicate movement toward institutional pluralism and others that seem inconsistent with such movement. The mixture of continuity and change will likely continue to be ambiguous enough to provoke countless more arguments about whether the Soviet Union is or is not petrifying. Only a man who is totally committed to some theory of societal development and who believes that the future is predetermined can predict with a sense of complete confidence.

What is needed as we look at the future of the Soviet system—and at its recent past as well—is not certainty in our judgments, but openness in our approach. We must recognize that, even when we have consciously rejected the totalitarian model, it continues to color many of our assumptions about the rationale and dynamics of Soviet behavior. What is needed is a willingness—indeed, a determination—to subject our assumptions to searching examination and to separate our distaste for the Soviet system from our descriptive analysis of it. Nothing will serve these purposes better than a rigorous comparative approach in the choice of the standards that we apply and strict comparability in the definitions of the concepts we employ.

[60] In *Escape from Freedom,* Erich Fromm suggested that the breakup of feudalism in Western Europe created major psychological disorientation, that the authoritarianism and determinism of early Protestantism provided some relief for these psychological strains, and that the success of the Protestant Reformation is to be explained in significant part by this fact. If the period 1860-1917 is viewed as one of the breakup of feudalism in Russia, then Fromm's analysis would seem to suggest a similar psychological disorientation and propensity in its wake—and there are, in fact, many striking parallels between early Calvinism and Bolshevism, particularly as the latter developed under Stalin.

[61] Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," *Slavic Review,* March 1967, p. 11. Meyer argues (and with good reason) that such notions are too often suspended in our study of the Soviet Union, and that our analysis of that country is seriously flawed by the use of "concepts and models reserved for it alone or for it and a few other systems considered inimical."

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East Germany

EDITORS' NOTE: The problem of defending the legitimacy of Communist seizures of power and systems of rule has been a focus of major concern for many Communist regimes—in particular, the parties in Eastern Europe which assumed control of their countries as a direct result of the Soviet military presence in the wake of World War II. In the case of East Germany, the problem has been crucially compounded by the need to sanctify not only the supremacy of the ruling party, the SED, but the very existence of the German Democratic Republic as a state. The two articles below touch in different ways on the important impact of this issue on the attitudes and policies of the East German regime. Mr. Baylis reviews the SED's continuing search for a legitimating ideological formula that would make its rule acceptable to its own populace and the outside world—prompting most recently a campaign that has emphasized a professed synthesis of centralized economic planning and of public participation in decision-making. Mr. Ludz examines trends on the East German scene in the year since Erich Honecker's assumption of the top leadership, in the process showing the pivotal importance of the legitimacy issue in the new regime's domestic and foreign policy decisions.

In Quest of Legitimacy

By Thomas A. Baylis

Ideology performs a variety of functions in Communist systems, but perhaps the most important is to serve as an instrument for creating and reinforcing the legitimacy of the political leadership in its own eyes, in those of critical internal and external elites, and among the public at large. Most contemporary East European regimes remain uncertain of their authority [1] and find themselves in unending pursuit of the appropriate "political formula" which will earn them increased legitimacy and thus a greater measure of confidence and stability. Nowhere is this more true than in the German Democratic Republic, whose recurrent authority problems have now been inherited by a second-generation leadership made up largely of protégés, albeit ungrateful ones, of Walter Ulbricht.

The search for a suitable legitimizing ideological formula has passed through several stages in the postwar GDR. Initially, the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands—the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, *i.e.*, the East German Communist Party) based its claim to authority on the fact that

Mr. Baylis is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany. He has previously contributed to Survey *and* Comparative Politics. *The present article is a revision of a paper delivered at the 1971 convention of the American Political Science Association.*

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it was the inheritor and purveyor in the GDR of a Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy already "sanctified" through long usage in the Soviet Union. However, over time such appeals have proved insufficient as East German society has experienced technological modernization, the development of a complex "socialist" social structure (including a large and influential technical intelligentsia), a rise in the material aspirations of the general populace, and the external stimuli of reformist communism in Eastern Europe and innovations in Western social thought and practice. Like many industrial societies, the GDR has gravitated, in part unconsciously, toward a situation in which legitimacy is based essentially on popular approval of the regime's success in bringing about economic growth and in satisfying popular demand for goods and services.

The initial rationalization of this development took the form of a major ideological campaign justifying the New Economic System reforms of 1963 and departing in novel and important ways from traditional party rhetoric. This emphasis, however, proved politically unsatisfactory for reasons to be examined below, and has gradually come to be replaced by a new complex formula which seeks to combine an appeal to the centralizing symbolism of economic *planning* with the claim to have realized socialist democracy through widespread popular *participation* in almost every arena of public life.

This ingenious dual formula neatly draws together several diverse strands of current SED doctrine: the necessity of expanding party and state power in order to direct the development of socialist society; the continuing commitment to technological modernization and rapid economic growth; the development of "socialist democracy" and the "socialist personality" through the active involvement of the citizen in shaping his social and especially his work environment; and the sharp demarcation (*Abgrenzung*) or differentiation of the GDR's social system from that of the capitalist Federal Republic. The formula is designed to serve the need of a conservative bureaucratic Communist state to make some sort of accommodation to a changing technology and social structure, as well as to meet persistent self-imposed pressures for legitimation. It has served usefully as an instrument for exorcising the threat to the GDR of the political heresies of Yugoslavia and preinvasion Czechoslovakia and for continuing the regime's gradual retreat from its economic reform program. Yet, as the author will suggest, this formula has serious deficiencies as a viable long-term base for the legitimacy of the present regime, and it may indeed contain the potential for a profound transformation in the structure of rule.

The Problem of Authority

Communist elites, Alfred Meyer has argued, are characteristically preoccupied with the problem of authority and indeed "strain their systems" in the effort to "accumulate" it.[2] They do so for both practical and ideological reasons—*i.e.*, to facilitate the exercise of power as well as to give some reality to the ideal of rule by a broad, conscious proletariat, the "universial class" of the post-bourgeois order. It seems reasonable to suggest that the anomaly of a putative workers' and peasants' state ruled by a narrow elite of functionaries has not been entirely lost even on the GDR's leaders, and that they have sought to enhance their legitimacy while preserving their own positions of dominance. These goals, however, are not fully compatible, and the search for authority in the GDR since 1945 has been a persistently troubled one. It was punctuated by severe, overt authority crises in 1953, 1956, and 1961, and by lesser ones at other times. Failures of economic policy, the surfacing of suppressed aspirations for national reunification, and hostility toward the person of Ulbricht—all bearing on popular perceptions of legitimacy—figured in varying degrees in these crises. The worker uprising of 1953 and the intellectual and student unrest of 1956 were both followed by the purge of dissident party leaders who had advocated policy concessions to the disaffected and the replacement of Ulbricht as means of broadening and strengthening popular support for the regime.

[1] For present purposes, I define authority as an unequal relationship between two or more actors, characterized by the free acceptance of communications and/or compliance with decisions issued by one actor, based on the perception of the propriety and the continuing nature of the relationship by both. This is a modification of the definition of Alfred G. Meyer, "Authority in Communist Political Systems," in Lewis J. Edinger, Ed., *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies*, New York, Wiley, 1967, p. 84. Like most such definitions this one turns on the question of the *legitimacy* of a power relationship. "Authority" is sometimes also used in the sense of ability to rule, whether *legitimately* or not; I have avoided that usage. See also Zvi Gitelman, "Power and Authority in Eastern Europe," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970, especially pp. 237-38.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

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Let us briefly examine the history of the SED's legitimizing formulas as a basis for understanding the leadership's present approach to this crucial problem. At least until after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the SED's claims to legitimate authority were based primarily on the stolid iteration of dogmatic Marxism-Leninism, as borrowed—virtually innocent of any adaptation to German needs—from the Soviet Union. SED ideologists invoked the historical mission and revolutionary struggle of the proletariat; the leading role of the vanguard party (*i.e.*, the SED) in this struggle; the borrowed wisdom and experience, first of Stalin, and later of the post-Stalin collective leadership of the Soviet Union; and the threat to the GDR's population presented by the internal decadence and external aggressiveness of Western imperialism. The energetic inculcation of these principles through all the channels of agitation and propaganda made a limited impact on an unreceptive public and resulted in only small and halting progress toward legitimacy. The appeal to received Marxism-Leninism had—from the leadership's viewpoint—the inestimable advantage, however, of making the party and, in particular, its apparatus the institutional foci of legitimacy.

In part, the circumstances of the GDR's origins and international situation were responsible for its slender base of authority. At the outset much of the pronounced hostility of the general public toward the occupying Soviet forces was transferred to the regime whose rule depended upon them. For many years the SED elite itself remained remote from the mass of East Germans, who viewed as irrelevant that elite's criteria of self-legitimation, such as the German revolutionary tradition and the approval of Stalin. The attainment of legitimacy was also hindered by the long uncertainty over the permanence of the GDR and the lingering possibility of German unification, perhaps only successfully banished with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Finally, the GDR was also confronted by the imposing presence of the Federal Republic—a state whose own authority was increasingly and impressively rooted in West German material success. Even while denouncing the FRG at every opportunity, the SED was aware of the magnetic appeal to its own population of the West German model.

Of course, the East German leaders began their rule not with a blank slate of authority perceptions among the population but with a set of traditional attitudes about authority rooted deeply in German history and culture.[3] Yet, while it may be argued that such familiar orientations as the German "myth of the state," the docile accommodation to hierarchical bureaucratic structures, and the abhorrence of pluralistic conflict have all, over the long run, eased the tasks of Communist authority-building, in the shorter term the SED courted hostility by dismantling many of the concrete institutions to which such loyalties had been traditionally attached.

As a Communist society passes through the progressive stages of revolution, "system-building," and "system-management," [4] the authority of its leaders rests upon shifting ingredients. Where, as in the GDR, the leaders have emerged, not from a successful indigenous revolution, but from a rather checkered revolutionary tradition whose practical significance for their success was distinctly secondary to that of a conquering military force, legitimacy appeals are likely to take on a somewhat schizophrenic character. The problem is compounded by the need for the SED to address its legitimacy appeals to at least four, often incompatible audiences: the Soviet Union, the East German party itself, the GDR's new professional elites, and the public. In the first ten years of Communist rule in East Germany, only the first two audiences were successfully addressed—and they, only intermittently.

In attempting to win the loyalty of its professional elites and the public at large, the SED leadership has increasingly been forced to reckon with an important characteristic of advanced industrial societies—the tendency for legitimation of authority to develop most readily from perceptions of successful government performance, *i.e.*, to be based on what the government's policies have meant for the well-being of the public at large. Thus, the legitimacy of relatively new regimes in the West (*e.g.*, the Federal Republic of Germany) appears to depend more on such performance criteria than on their ability to maintain the stable legal and procedural environment of the classic rational-legal order. Similarly, the quasi-charismatic [5] legitimacy claims

[3] See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*, New York, Doubleday, 1967, especially Chaps. 9 and 13; Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Eds., *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 130-70.

[4] Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-02; see also Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, Eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, New York, Basic Books, 1970, pp. 23-40.

[5] See Alex Simirenko, "Ersatz Charisma: A Sociological Interpretation of Socialist Countries," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism* (Buffalo, New York), August 1971, pp. 3-15.

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of new Communist states, demanding as they do the sharing of a special ideological insight into the logic of history and social structure, are apt to be less persuasive than concrete evidence of economic improvement. Lenin himself appears to have been convinced that economic success was an indispensable aid to the mass conversion of a nation to the *Weltanschauung* of Marxism-Leninism;[6] his Soviet and East German successors have shared that view. It is true that performance-based legitimacy rests on an essentially rational, short-term calculation of self-interest on the part of those granting it, and is thus likely to be less stable and enduring than other forms of legitimacy. However, it may offer a foundation on which more permanent forms can later be developed.[7]

A New Stress on Performance

The SED has undoubtedly enjoyed its greatest measure of popular approval as a consequence of its concrete—especially economic—output or achievements. The Berlin Wall reduced the GDR public's exposure to the accomplishments of the Federal Republic; partly as a result, East Germans have increasingly come to compare the performance of the GDR with that of other members of the Soviet bloc. Among these Communist states, the GDR enjoys the highest standard of living and the widest diffusion of modern consumer goods. Its status as one of the world's leading industrial powers —second only to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe —is well known to its citizens, who take considerable pride in the accomplishments wrought by their own labor in the absence of any substantial foreign assistance. It is thus not surprising that the SED should begin to adjust its ideology to reflect the growing importance of its economic successes as a source of legitimacy.

The difficulty is that authority derived from economic success tends to be the authority of expertise and may not automatically attach to the party bureaucratic elite. In creating its own stratum of scientists, managers, engineers, and economists, in dutiful imitation of the Soviet example,[8] the SED has facilitated East German economic development but has simultaneously complicated its legitimacy problem. It is never easy to create an elite of privilege and prestige while depriving it of power, and the very size and functional importance of the new technical intelligentsia has required some accommodation to its interests by the regime. Substantial "representation" has thus been accorded the technical intelligentsia in the Council of Ministers, the SED Central Committee, and—to a lesser degree —the party Politburo.[9] On one level, at least, the economic reforms adopted in 1963 must be viewed as a concession to the views and interests of this stratum.

These reforms—known as the New Economic System (NES)—sought to introduce market-like mechanisms, such as profitability, as a means of stimulating economic growth and efficiency and rationalizing the allocation of resources; at the same time they were to entail a reorganization of party and state structures of economic decision-making so as to increase the prerogatives and creativity of lower-ranking officials and managers. The NES probably deserves much of the credit it has been given for the GDR's impressive economic growth in the middle and late 1960's. It was worked out, with the encouragement of Ulbricht and undoubtedly also of the Soviet leadership, by a group of economic specialists both within and outside the party apparatus.[10] Therein lies the difficulty, because even though

[6] "We must see to it that every factory and every electric power station becomes a centre of enlightenment; if Russia is covered with a dense network of electric power stations and powerful technical installations our communist economic development will become a model for a future socialist Europe and Asia." V. I. Lenin, "Report on the Work of the Council of People's Commissars," December 22, 1920, in *Selected Works*, III, New York, International Publishers, 1967, p. 514.

[7] It may also turn out that performance-based legitimacy is the *only* type most advanced societies will be able to enjoy. John Schaar argues that "the philosophical and experiential foundations of legitimacy in modern states are gravely weakened, leaving obedience a matter of lingering habit, or expediency, or necessity, but not a matter of reason and principle, and of deepest sentiment and conviction." This is because "the crisis of legitimacy is a function of some of the basic, defining orientations of modernity itself; specifically, rationality, the cult of efficiency and power, ethical relativism, and equalitarianism." "Legitimacy in the Modern State," in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, Eds., *Power and Community*, New York, Vintage, 1970, p. 279.

[8] See Jeremy Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966, Chap. 5.

[9] See my *Communist Elites and Industrial Society: The Technical Intelligentsia in East German Politics* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1968), Chap. 10, and Peter C. Ludz, *Parteielite im Wandel* (Party Elite in Transition), Cologne, West-deutscher Verlag, 1968, Chap. 3. The composition of the new Politburo named at the Eighth SED Congress in May 1971 following Ulbricht's resignation as First Secretary indicates a substantial dilution of the influence of technical specialists in that body; even before, they had been kept in clear numerical subordination to the *apparatchiki*, in striking contrast to their importance on the Council of Ministers and Central Committee.

[10] Wolfgang Berger and Otto Reinhold, *Zu den wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen des neuen oekonomischen Systems der Planung und Leitung* (On the Scientific Foundations of the New Economic System of Planning and Direction), [East] Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1966, pp. 22-25.

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the old-style party bureaucrats might enjoy a kind of routinized legitimacy as the priestly inheritors of the revolutionary tradition and guardians of the ideology, their claims to authority based on economic performance are necessarily more slender. While shifts in the beneficiaries of legitimacy are complex matters, the increasing visibility of technical specialists *within* the political leadership groups of the GDR and most other East European countries has raised the real possibility that a shift in the ideological basis of legitimacy might affect at least internal party power relationships.[11]

The beginning of the New Economic System was accompanied by a profound reorientation of GDR ideology and propaganda toward the advocacy of economic modernization and rationalization, with special emphasis on the deconcentration of economic decision-making, both within industry itself and in its control agencies.[12] The reforms and their ideological justification aroused extravagant hopes and produced certain undesired consequences which the conservative majority of the Politburo perceived as threatening to the dominant role of the party itself. Meetings of factory party groups were often transformed into "production discussions"; the degree of autonomy displayed by the party's Bureaus for Industry and Construction and the new industrial trusts (VVBs) exceeded both expectations and desires; economic functionaries were heard to suggest that the reforms required a shifting of the GDR's trade toward the West. In various forms, the proposition was advanced that some sort of political decentralization was the logical concomitant of economic restructuring.

The fears that such proposals aroused in the leadership were reinforced by the experience in Czechoslovakia during 1967-68, particularly the quick "spillover" from economic reform to unmanageable political liberalization. As a result, both the East German reforms and their ideology were gradually circumscribed and in some cases abandoned. In the process they have been superseded by a program and ideology stressing centralized party and state authority, including centralized planning, along with a continued stress on technological modernization and an intensified rhetoric of mass participation and development of the socialist personality. Ulbricht put the new formula succinctly as early as 1967:

The advantages of socialism *consist in the inseparable and efficacious unification of the comprehensive, energetic participation of working people in the solution of social tasks and the direction of the economy with the broad scientific planning and rational organization of the economic and general social development of the state as a whole.*[13]

This new ideological formula was more than a reversion to late Stalinist dogma; it was an attempt to combine a reassertion of central party and state authority with appeals to more popularly salable principles—those of citizen participation and economic efficiency. Its purpose was to create a source of legitimacy as attractive as the New Economic System, while assuring that power would be retained unchallenged in the hands of the existing party elite.

Planning and Legitimacy

Let us turn first to the portion of the present legitimacy formula which emphasizes "planning." The institution of planning has come to be accorded almost lyrical treatment in recent GDR pronouncements. A Council of Ministers decision of December 1, 1970, announced that the "role and authority of the plan" was to be "elevated" in 1971.[14] Accordingly, No. 2, 1971, of the official East German publication for party functionaries, *Neuer Weg*, invoking the authority of Lenin, called the plan a "second party program." Elsewhere the plan was referred to as "the law of the state and the political-moral commandment *(Gebot)* for our activities," as well as "the expression of the total social requisites and the total interests of our workers' and peasants' state." [15] The 1969 text *Politische Oekonomie des Sozialismus und*

[11] Jacques Ellul argues: "Public opinion, which counts for a great deal even in authoritarian regimes, is almost unanimously favorable to technical decisions as opposed to political ones, which are usually described as either 'partisan' or 'idealistic.' . . . In case of a conflict between politician and technician, the technician has public opinion behind him." *The Technological Society*, New York, Vintage, 1967, pp. 262-63.

[12] See the author's "Economic Reform as Ideology," *Comparative Politics* (Chicago), January 1971, pp. 211-29.

[13] *Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik bis zur Vollendung des Sozialismus* (Societal Development in the German Democratic Republic up to the Completion of Socialism), [East] Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1967, p. 129.

[14] Cited in Joachim Nawrocki, "Vom NOeS zum Computer-Stalinismus" (From NES to Computer Stalinism), *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), April 1971, p. 348.

[15] Horst Bley, Fritz Schellhorn, and Kurt Walter, "Plan und Arbeitsdisziplin—Gebot hoher Effektivitaet" (Planning and Work Discipline: A Requirement for High Efficiency), *Einheit* (East Berlin), No. 1, 1971, p. 38. See Lenin, *op. cit.*, pp. 510-11.

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ihre Anwendung in der DDR (The Political Economy of Socialism and its Application in the GDR—hereafter *Politische Oekonomie*) credited the institution of planning with securing "the unity of the collective political will of the society and the unconditional protection of its basic interests." [16] While other official characterizations of planning have a less pretentious and more instrumental tone to them, it is not an exaggeration to assert that economic planning has indeed come to be put forward as a primary symbol of authority in the contemporary ideology of the GDR.

The broad appeal of planning lies in its implication of *rationality;* in an otherwise uncertain world, it appears to permit a deliberate choice of social purposes and to facilitate their systematic and reliable implementation. Marxists contrast the "anarchy" and "spontaneity" of a capitalist market system to the security and predictability promised by central planning. Democratic as well as Communist advocates of planning praise its freedom from "politics," and most particularly its freedom from the partial and selfish pressures of powerful interest groups; planning is seen as a mechanism giving reality to that evasive ideal, the "public interest." It is argued that by its nature planning implies a unified public will; it suggests centralized authority, but an authority based on social consensus and societal integration.[17]

We know there is a good deal of mythology in this vision. Planning is always a political process,[18] whether indicative and democratic or directive and authoritarian, and however much it may be insulated from *particular* sorts of pressures. East German ideologists and other Marxist-Leninists would not deny the political nature of planning, of course, but would insist that under socialism it expresses the political will of the working class, led by its united Marxist-Leninist party. Interest conflict and irrational political "distortions" of economic decisions are entirely foreign to this vision. Politics and economics, we are repeatedly reminded, form a dialectical unity; the political superstructure in a socialist society is the instrument of a new ruling class whose interest in economic progress is "not partial, but total, permanent, continuous." [19]

Even the slightest acquaintance with the history of economic policy in the GDR raises doubts about this facile employment of the dialectic. Planning decisions have often been far from "rational" in terms of optimizing economic performance.[20] Quite apart from problems of insufficient information, misinformation, and miscalculation of resources and needs, the criteria used in planning decisions have been limited by parameters imposed for essentially non-economic reasons. For example, GDR policy has required (1) that any dependence on Western imports be avoided; (2) on parallel lines, that trade be oriented heavily toward the Soviet Union, even on economically unfavorable terms; and (3) that any devolution of decision-making power to enterprise or regional officials be avoided if it might compromise the leading role of the party center. What appears economically "irrational," of course, may be perfectly rational in a broader and different social and political context. While planning in the GDR, as in many other nations, tends to be treated "econocentrically"—*i.e.,* as principally economic—in official pronouncements,[21] it is concerned in fact with a great variety of social institutions and activities. Its present ideological usefulness, however, lies in its symbolization more of economic than of general social rationality.

KEYNOTE: PLANNED PERFORMANCE

The Eighth Socialist Unity Party Congress answered the questions that arose in our life and pinpointed as the top priority in the main task of the five-year plan for 1971-75 to create all prerequisites for further raising the living standard and cultural level of the people.

—Erich Honecker, "Science and Politics in Socialist Society and Experience of the GDR," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), December 1971, p. 4.

[16] *Politische Oekonomie des Sozialismus und ihre Anwendung in der DDR* (The Political Economy of Socialism and its Application in the GDR), [East] Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1969, p. 205. It should be noted that this text, extravagantly celebrated in the last period of Ulbricht's rule, has come in for some criticism since the Eighth SED Congress. It remains, however, the most important and comprehensive source for contemporary economic doctrine in the GDR.

[17] See, *e.g.,* Karl Mannheim, *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning,* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950.

[18] See Charles Madge, "Planning, Social: I. Introduction," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Volume XII, New York, Macmillan, 1968, p. 126.

[19] Rolf Sieber and Guenter Soeder, *Politik und Oekonomie im sozialistischen Gesellschaftssystem* (Politics and Economics in the Socialist Social System), [East] Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1970, p. 58.

[20] See P.J.D. Wiles, "Rationality, the Market, Decentralization, and the Territorial Principle," in Gregory Grossman, Ed., *Value and Plan,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1960, pp. 184-203, and Reinhard Bendix, "The Cultural and Political Setting of Economic Rationality in Western and Eastern Europe," in *ibid.,* pp. 245-61.

[21] The term is Alvin Toffler's, in *Future Shock,* New York, Random House, 1970, p. 385.

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Planning connotes hierarchy and control; in that sense it comports well with much Communist leadership theory[22] and the familiar doctrine of "one-man management." [23] From the point of view of legitimacy, it serves to symbolize rationality and a commitment to modernization. At the same time, the ideological emphasis on planning seeks to link the technical and economic specialists in charge of the detailed aspects of planning with the party and state functionaries who impose the basic parameters within which the specialists operate. The regime's effort to make the first group into Red experts and the second into expert Reds, by providing the first with a political and the second with an economic education, also furthers the end of making the two the inseparable focus of legitimacy.

The Role of Participation

While its ideological uses are thus numerous, the rhetoric of planning and central party and state power is not so clearly consonant with worldwide contemporary aspirations for participation in decision-making, or with Communist assertions of the popular and proletarian character of socialism. Nor does it take into account the potential positive impact on economic performance of some measure of popular involvement in decision-making—or at least a convincing simulation of such participation. Having found it necessary to renounce the most innovative elements of its economic reform program in order to still the hopes for political and social liberalization which they aroused, the SED has turned to the rhetoric of socialist democracy and participation as both balance and justification for its concurrent emphasis on planning and centralized authority. Strengthened party and state power and the overarching role of the plan become palatable only to the extent that these are persuasively shown to be simply forms of the institutionalized power of the masses. The rhetoric of participation simultaneously serves the SED as a response to certain external social phenomena with a potentially embarrassing appeal to people within the GDR: Western democratic and pluralist ideology, the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav political reforms, and closer to home, the West German practice of industrial codetermination (worker participation in plant management).

It is therefore both from desires to enhance its own legitimacy and, secondarily, from considerations of economic performance that the SED leadership has joined an increased emphasis on popular participation to its formula of centralized planning and control. To be sure, the ideological recourse to the participatory rhetoric of "socialist democracy" is not new in the GDR. The hoary slogan *"Plane mit, arbeite mit, regiere mit"* (Plan with us, work with us, govern with us) has long expressed the Marxist-Leninist insistence that the dictatorship of the proletariat brings real democracy for the first time in human history to the great majority of the population. But, it is argued, in the present stage of socialist development in the GDR—the so-called "Developed Societal System of Socialism"—

socialist democracy reaches a higher stage of its development. . . . [Factories and communes] organize the responsible and creative participation [Mitarbeit] of all citizens in the planning, implementation, and control of all economic, political and cultural tasks in their sphere.[24]

[22] See Alfred G. Meyer, "Historical Development of the Communist Theory of Leadership," in R. Barry Farrell, Ed., *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Chicago, Aldine, 1970, pp. 5-16. Engel's essay "On Authority," in Lewis Feuer, Ed., *Marx and Engels on Politics and Philosophy*, New York, Anchor, 1959, pp. 481-85, is particularly relevant here.

[23] See the discussion in Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry*, New York, Harper, 1956, pp. 362-68; Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 80-86.

[24] *Woerterbuch der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Soziologie* (Dictionary of Marxist-Leninist Sociology), [East] Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1969, p. 94.

A POLICY OF PARTICIPATION

In elaborating a scientifically grounded policy we never lose sight of the determinative fact that socialism rests on the conscious and planned activity of the people, that it arises and develops in the process of the creative activity of millions of people, in which the working class and all working people learn to run their state. . . Of cardinal importance for an efficacious policy is the party's profound confidence in the working people, its regular practice of taking counsel with them, of heeding their opinions, criticisms, and suggestions. . . . There is a vital link between the scientific basis of policy and the creativity of the people. The more accurately a policy corresponds to the interests of the working people, the more effectively it serves them, and the better it is understood by the people, the more powerful is the stream of mass initiative.

—Erich Honecker, *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), December 1971, pp. 6-8.

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In this vein, current ideological writings are festooned with claims of and calls for popular involvement—in a great variety of institutional settings. The GDR, like other Soviet-bloc states, does indeed offer a great panoply of institutionalized opportunities for participation. These include nominations and elections to legislative bodies; involvement in the organs of local government, mass organizations, and the party; critical letters to the press and organized discussion campaigns preceding policy innovations; "social courts" on the model of the Soviet comrades' courts;[25] and the representation of students in university bodies.[26]

The greatest attention, however, is given to modes of participation in the factory or other workplace. A primary channel is the factory production committee, which includes representatives of the workers, the technicians, the managers, and the mass organizations. These committees have "advisory and control" functions, and the director is "obliged to examine [their] recommendations or standpoints, take account of them in [his] decisions, and report differing opinions to higher organs for resolution." In addition to participating in the formulation of the unit's production plan through the production committees, the workers also have an opportunity to discuss the plan in various lower-level channels, including production advisory councils, brigades, and trade union groups.[27]

Emphasis is also placed on "socialist community work" (*sozialistische Gemeinschaftsarbeit)* which is described as the "conscious, creative activity of personnel united in socialist work, research and leadership collectives" directed toward the planned resolution of problems of "economic, scientific-technical, and social progress." Such activities are expected to support the development of the "socialist collective spirit" and the socialist personality; they are designed to involve and in fact include both production workers and members of the technical intelligentsia.[28]

This concern with participation at the workplace represents a tacit acknowledgment of the syndicalist traditions of the socialist movement and, more particularly, a self-consciousness about the appeal of West German codetermination and of the workers' councils which operate in Yugoslavia and which surfaced briefly in Czechoslovakia in 1968-69. (Both latter phenomena have been sharply and frequently criticized in GDR propaganda, which often makes the claim that in Germany only GDR workers enjoy "real" codetermination.) Furthermore, from a Marxian perspective, the workplace—the locus of man's productive activity—is where he engages in "the conscious creative formation of his own environment," developing cooperative, "socialist" interpersonal relationships and furthering his own growth as a "socialist personality." [29] In that sense the style of participation encouraged in the workplace may be viewed as the model for the society as a whole.[30] The irony is that the GDR's participatory model is attuned more to the task of preserving stability and the authority of the party than to enlarging the workers' democratic consciousness.

Influential or Manipulated?

In examining participation in the GDR or in any society, one must recognize that it has two aspects —an "influential" one and a "manipulative" one.[31] In the first case, participation means the channel through which the ordinary citizen exerts some real influence over decisions affecting his round of life; in the second, participation is an instrument through which a regime enlists support for itself and forges social solidarity by creating a sense of involvement. Influential participation is "real" participation from

[25] See Edith Brown Weiss, "The East German Disputes and Arbitration Commissions." Paper delivered at Northeast Slavic Conference, Montreal, Quebec, May 1971.

[26] See "Die Weiterfuehrung der 3. Hochschulreform und die Entwicklung des Hochschulwesens bis 1975. Beschluss des Staatsrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" (The Extension of the 3rd University Reform and the Development of University Education to 1975. Decision of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic), *Forum* (East Berlin), No. 7, 1969 (reprinted in *Deutschland Archiv,* No. 2, May 1969, pp. 511, 521-26). Student representation on "advisory and control" organs on both the university and "section" (roughly, department) levels is provided through the official Free German Youth organization.

[27] *Politische Oekonomie,* pp. 715, 718-19.

[28] *Woerterbuch,* pp. 138-39, *Politische Oekonomie,* pp. 720-21, and "Die Weiterfuehrung," p. 511. Examples are scientific research groups, innovator collectives, "brigades of socialist labor," etc.; such groups are also to be found outside the economic sphere—*e.g.,* in the universities.

[29] See *Politische Oekonomie,* pp. 212, 365-66, 711-12.

[30] Communist systems may be said to have long accepted the basic assumptions of Harry Eckstein's theory of "congruence," which argues that the greatest stability accrues to those political systems which are moving toward a fundamental congruence between the values subscribed to by individual citizens and institutions and the values of the system as a whole. See Eckstein, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," in his *Division and Cohesion in Democracy,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 225-88.

[31] See Robert S. Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences,* Chicago, Rand McNally, 1969, pp. 244-53.

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below; manipulative participation is participation engineered from above. This distinction, clear enough in principle, tends to blur in practice. In all modern societies participatory institutions are used by government for manipulative purposes; in no societies do participating citizens remain entirely without influence over decisions.[32] Furthermore, manipulative forms have the potential for being transformed into genuinely influential forms—as occurred in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968.[33]

There can be little doubt that the SED's promotion of participation in the GDR is primarily manipulative in intent. This is evident in the frequency with which party propaganda proclaims consultative organs—without any decision-making authority—to be meaningful instruments of participation. This intent is also reflected in the discussion of worker participation in such works as *Politische Oekonomie,* where the attempt is made to reconcile workplace democracy with the principle of one-man managerial responsibility (*Einzelleitung*) by relegating participation to "consultative" and "control" functions. Workers' participation in "control" is restricted by conjoining it with the customary control networks of the party, the mass organizations, and the state. While a plant director's duty of consultation and the "collective preparation of decisions with a range of factory groups is not simply *pro forma,* at least in the demands it makes on his time, the insistence on his "personal responsibility" as a way of insuring the "direct regulation and guidance of industrial processes by a united will" continues to be treated as paramount.[34]

Second, participation is linked closely to the ideological work of the party and mass organizations in developing the *consciousness* of the worker. The task of the party, *Politische Oekonomie* says, consists of

> *. . . giving effect to the moral norms of socialism through social education, and making them the habit of all men. Such societal consciousness does not emerge and develop on its own. It requires the leadership of the party on the level of the society as well as—its component—party work in every place of work . . . it requires the organizing, educational and economic function of the state as well as the organizing and political-educational function of the plant director; it demands the unfolding of socialist democracy in the framework of the entire society as well as the further development of the content, form, and methods of participation of the workers in planning and directing [the enterprise].*[35]

But such attempts by the SED to imbed worker participation safely in a setting of hierarchically organized managerial authority and a political socialization process directed by the party have not prevented the emergence of alternative visions of its role that are more compatible with genuine influence.

Thus, in a 1965 book and later article, the legal theorist Uwe-Jens Heuer, citing the young Marx, argued that "socialist democracy" ought to take precedence over "democratic centralism," *i.e.,* that genuine democratic expression should prevail over the prerogatives of centralized political power. Democratic relations in the factory and the "opportunity to decide oneself questions concerning one's own sphere of work" were ends *in themselves* and were critical for overcoming boredom and developing "free individuality" (Marx) among men. Heuer recommended the "highest possible measure of codetermination (*Mitentscheidung*) of individuals and groups."[36] Heuer's work was sharply criticized, and he was transferred from a teaching position at Humboldt University to a research post in the Cen-

[32] The otherwise useful discussion of participation in the United States and the Soviet Union by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington errs, I think, in seeking to strictly dichotomize practice in the two systems along lines similar to my influential/manipulative distinction. Relying on their questionable distinction between "ideological" and "instrumental" political systems, they argue that American participation is "indirect, segmented, and pluralist," while Soviet participation is "direct, hierarchical, and centralized." See Brzezinski and Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR,* New York, Viking, 1964, pp. 90-104.

[33] Galia Golan has emphasized the insistence of the Czechoslovak reformers that a democratic society be created through the gradual rebuilding of existing institutions. "The Road to Reform," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), May-June 1971, p. 18.

[34] *Politische Oekonomie,* pp. 715-16. The emphatic insistence upon apparently incompatible principles of organization and behavior, verbally "united" by the dialectic, is of course a familiar phenomenon in Communist politics. While in some circumstances such insistence undoubtedly is a useful device of agitation and social control, I suspect it is often self-deceptive and dysfunctional, insofar as the verbal solution comes to be mistaken for a *real* solution.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 711. See also Hanna Wolf, "Die SED—eine leninistische Kampfpartei" (The SED—a Leninist Party of Struggle), *Einheit* (East Berlin), No. 5, 1971, pp. 503-15.

[36] Uwe-Jens Heuer, "Gesellschaft und Demokratie" (Society and Democracy), *Staat und Recht* (East Berlin), No. 6, 1967, p. 918, and Heuer, *Demokratie und Recht im neuen Oekonomischen System der Planung und Leitung der Wirtschaft* (Democracy and Law in the New Economic System of Planning and Direction), [East] Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1965, pp. 168-73.

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tral Institute for Socialist Economic Management.[37] In 1967, the veteran SED economist and heretic, Fritz Behrens, speaking at a Marx Colloquium in West Germany, professed to see a trend in socialist countries toward the reduction of state control and a transition to "delegated group property" and "self-administration" in the factories; he specifically cited the examples of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.[38]

These cases illustrate the dangers in the rhetoric of participation and the ease with which a manipulative approach to it can—even unintentionally—lead to its acquiring influential substance. By highlighting the theme of participation, the SED invites the peril of reinvoking the utopianism of an earlier socialism, innocent of the supposed imperatives of modern technology and large-scale organization. Such concepts of genuine workers' participation, despite their compelling attractiveness as an ideological slogan, do not easily accommodate themselves to these perceived imperatives, nor to the bureaucratic habits of an established authoritarian elite. The SED's repeated calls for more "imagination," creativity, self-confidence, "joy in decision-making," "readiness to take risks," and even the development of "ideas, preferably crazy ones" [39] —all of which accompany the rhetoric of participation—are equally alien to the spirit of the existing structure of rule.

Inherent Contradictions

Thus the search for legitimacy in the GDR has led to a curious dilemma. To appeal simultaneously to planning and participation as the basis of political authority is to invoke values and prescribe behavior patterns that are ultimately incompatible. The symbols of rationality, hierarchy, and control clash with more subtle implications of individuality, equality, and spontaneity.[40] Their present tenuous coexistence in SED ideology depends upon a view of most participation as manipulative in character. Conceivably, they might also be reconciled by developing a more flexible and limited conception of centralized planning and control. But the conflict of planning and participation is not apt to be transcended dialectically or otherwise permanently resolved; at best it persists only in an unstable equilibrium subject to easy disturbance. However, it should be remarked that political systems have rarely if ever fallen merely from the weight of the illogic in their doctrinal prescriptions. Experience commends caution in projecting any fundamental political changes on the basis of the anomalies in current SED ideology.

The GDR, after all, shares much of its dilemma with other contemporary societies. Western social theorists have sought for many years to marry proposals for comprehensive social planning with safeguards for the democratic exercise of citizenship.[41] They have had only uncertain success, for the problem of reconciling such goals reflects a quite genuine incompatibility on the level of practice in modern industrial societies. The conflict between what are taken to be the organizational and technological demands of rational policy-making and expanding participatory aspirations—a conflict which has significant bearing on fundamental problems of legitimacy—is not confined to Communist systems. Perhaps, however, Western capitalist nations have devised a superior set of cooptative mechanisms for bridging, or masking, the conflict.[42] The radical inconsistency of the Leninist model of party dominance with even modest concessions to socialist democracy does suggest that the SED's rhetoric of participation may one day prove subversive of the present structure of the party's rule.

[37] Peter C. Ludz, *The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1970, p. 59. The apparent aim of the transfer was to remove Heuer from contact with students while still utilizing his talents.

[38] Behrens, "Kritik der politischen Oekonomie und oekonomische Theorie des Sozialismus" (Critique of the Political Economy and the Economic Theory of Socialism), in Walter Euchner and Alfred Schmidt, Eds., *Kritik der politischen Oekonomie heute: 100 Jahre "Kapital"* (The Critique of Political Economy Today: 100 Years of *Capital*), Frankfurt, Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1968, pp. 296-98.

[39] See the qualities listed in Herbert F. Wolf, "Zu einigen soziologischen Problemen der Vorbereitung von Ingenieurstudenten auf die Leitungstaetigkeit im Betrieb" (On Some Sociological Problems of the Preparation of Engineering Students for Leadership Tasks in the Factory), *Jugendforschung* (East Berlin), No. 15, 1970, p. 32. The phrase about "crazy ideas" comes from an extended discussion in the Free German Youth publication for students and young intelligentsia, *Forum*, concerning "idea conferences." The conferences, initiated by the director of an engineering institute, appear to be socialist "brainstorming" sessions, where unorthodox ideas are to be put forward freely without fear of quick criticism or condemnation. Werner Gilde, "Ideen muss man haben" (One Must Have Ideas), *Forum* (East Berlin), No. 1, 1970, pp. 3-4.

[40] For a useful discussion of this conflict in the context of Soviet party control policies, see Paul Cocks, "The Rationalization of Party Control," in Chalmers Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-90.

[41] See, *e.g.*, Mannheim, *op. cit.*

[42] See Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1964, and André Gorz, *Strategy for Labor*, Beacon Press, 1967.

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Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht

By Peter C. Ludz

May 1972 will mark the first anniversary of the sudden but surprisingly peaceful transfer of power from East Germany's veteran Communist chieftain, Walter Ulbricht, to a successor regime headed by Erich Honecker. At the moment of writing, it is too soon to offer any definitive analyses or firm prognostications concerning how this first shift at the apex of power in the history of the GDR will affect its future course, its society, or its ruling party, the SED (German Socialist Unity Party). It is, however, possible to examine a number of trends and developments that suggest—at least tentatively and for the time being—lines of continuity and lines of departure from the policies and attitudes of Herr Ulbricht. Perhaps the best way to preface a discussion of what is going on in the GDR today is to examine the reasons why that stalwart and seemingly irremovable strong man of the Soviet bloc finally stepped down from the top leadership of the East German state.

Ulbricht's Last Hurrah

Walter Ulbricht's resignation from his position as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED—officially tendered on May 3, 1971, at the 16th SED conference—came as a surprise to many observers. To be sure, he was within two months of the age of 78, and advancing years were a factor—as well as a face-saver—in his acceptance of a much lesser role in the regime (besides his party post, he gave up the chairmanship of the important National Defense Council, remaining only chairman of the Council of State). Yet the very fact that for 25 years he had guided the destiny of East Germany—first as the Soviet Occupation Zone, and after 1949 as the German Democratic Republic—made it strange that there was no advance preparation or announcement of his impending "retirement" as party secretary and strongly suggested that his relinquishment of the leadership was less than voluntary. Seemingly Ulbricht was at the peak of his prestige at home and in the Communist world; in particular, he had been accorded a large share of credit for the development of the GDR into a dynamic, performance-oriented state—the second strongest industrial society (after the USSR) in the Eastern bloc. Moreover, he had long been famous for his adeptness at neutralizing political rivals. Yet once the surprise was sprung and Ulbricht was out of the top spot, it was easy to perceive a number of reasons why pressures may have been brought to bear, from within and without the GDR, to force him to pass on the leader's mantle.

For most of his career, Walter Ulbricht was regarded, by friends and foes alike, as the very epitome of the authoritarian, pro-Muscovite Communist leader; on the domestic front, he insisted on strict controls over East German society even while he showed flexibility in launching the GDR on a reformist course after 1963; in bloc affairs, he unquestioningly supported the Kremlin in its pressures for "integration" and its fight against the liberalizing trends generated by "polycentrism" and "revisionism"; on broader international issues, he was again Moscow's staunchest ally—at least until late 1969 when, for the first time, a divergence developed between Soviet objectives and Ulbricht's view of East German interests (more on which shortly).

Yet despite his reputation as a servant of Moscow who had ruthlessly pushed the "Sovietization" of East Germany and opposed polycentric trends in

Mr. Ludz is Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bielefeld in West Germany. Since 1968 he has spent the second semester of each academic year as Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University (New York). Among his works on East Germany is Parteielite im Wandel *(The Changing Party Elite), the third (1970) German edition of which has just appeared in English translation.*

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other bloc countries, the ironic fact is that in the last eight years of his rule Ulbricht increasingly came to emphasize the importance of independent German achievements in the economic, political, and ideological spheres and to underscore their departure from the Soviet model of development. Indeed, dating from the introduction of East Germany's program of economic reform—the so-called "New Economic System"—in July 1963, Ulbricht took the lead in making "national interest" and "national economy" common phrases in the lexicon of East German officialdom. To cite an early example, in a speech to the Sixth SED Congress in 1963, he declared:

The unity of peace, national interest, democracy, and socialist order determines the historical function of our German Democratic Republic.[1]

Not long afterward, in a speech to the Central Committee in February 1964, Ulbricht clearly differentiated between the East German and Soviet reform efforts in the following terms:

Our new economic system . . . could be described as the concrete application and continuation of the Leninist principles of the management of socialist economy, [an application] consistent with our conditions in the German Democratic Republic, which is a highly developed industrial country. We in the German Democratic Republic are conscious of the fact that we have carried out and are continuing to implement the transition from capitalism to socialism in accordance with our national conditions. These conditions are different from those obtaining when the Soviet Union carried out the transition from capitalism to socialism.[2]

More recently—especially after the abortion of reformist efforts in Czechoslovakia in 1968—Ulbricht spoke up on a number of occasions to recommend the GDR's course of development to other Communist parties in both Eastern and Western Europe as a model worthy of imitation. He was well aware that the successful development of "his" GDR had gradually caught the attention and interest of many observers in the West as well as in the East, and he seldom missed an opportunity to emphasize the independent ideological basis on which the GDR had found its own "right" road to socialism. Among his favorite topics were the distinct ideological and cultural demands of the East German working class; the GDR's recent contributions to Marxist-Leninist theories of education and to the growth of a "socialist ethic"; and the East German Communists' successful molding of a socialist national culture as a result of concrete progress in such areas as scientific endeavor and educational reform.[3]

Over the years Ulbricht's pronouncements must have become increasingly irksome and disturbing to the Soviet leaders. In a certain sense he was projecting himself as a potential rival of Moscow in its claim to ideological leadership; beyond that, by stressing the GDR's independent achievements, he was obviously trying to strengthen its position and influence in the international political arena. Yet as long as the strengthening of East Germany could be reconciled with Soviet goals, the GDR's role as Moscow's most important political and economic junior partner made it possible for Ulbricht to pursue his course without challenge. What vitally changed his situation was a shift in the international climate precipitated in large part by the foreign policy initiatives of Willy Brandt during and after his successful bid to become Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969, which contributed decisively to a new effort at rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States and to progress toward international agreement on a number of long-standing issues, including, most importantly in the current context, the status of Berlin and the broader problem of the future of the two Germanies.

To review the trend of events in barest outline, Brandt—having decided that the only road to a solution of the problems posed by a divided Germany lay through Moscow—undertook negotiations with the Soviets in which he (1) offered, on the part of the FRG, a non-aggression treaty that included implicit recognition of the long controversial Oder-Neisse line as the boundary between East Germany and Poland;[4] (2) opened the door to attractive agree-

[1] Ulbricht speech entitled "The Program of Socialism and the Historical Mission of the SED," published in *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des V. Parteitages der SED: 15. bis 21. Januar 1963, 4 Baende* (Record of the Proceedings of the Sixth SED Congress, Jan. 15-21, 1963, 4 Vols.), East Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1963, Vol. 1, p. 53.

[2] Quoted in Walter Ulbricht, *Zum neuen oekonomischen System der Planung und Leitung* (The New Economic System of Planning and Management), East Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1966, p. 398.

[3] See, e.g., Ulbricht's speech at the 15th Plenum of the CC-SED, in *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Jan. 30, 1971, p. 4.

[4] This treaty was signed by Bonn and Moscow on Aug. 12, 1970, but has yet to be ratified and has some bitter opponents in the FRG. For text see *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), No. 9, 1970, pp. 956-60.

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ments for increased trade and industrial cooperation between the USSR and the FRG; (3) suggested a new approach to the "German question" that endorsed a concept of two German states within one German nation and thus downplayed the idea of unification; *but* (4) insisted, as a reciprocal condition of these offers, that quick and concrete progress be made toward an agreement regularizing West Berlin's independent status and its ties to the FRG.

The possibility of a new phase of detente held attractions for the leaders of most of the powers involved—but emphatically not for Walter Ulbricht, at least insofar as the Federal Republic was involved. For a number of years Ulbricht had been willing and even eager for better relations with other West European countries, with the aforementioned aim of strengthening the GDR's position and enhancing its legitimacy; while for the most part his efforts were rebuffed, in the case of France he had shown great flexibility and astuteness in building up ties that led that country quite far along the road to formal recognition of the GDR. On the German question, however, Ulbricht's position was rigidly uncompromising: it amounted to absolute and unconditional insistence that the German Democratic Republic be recognized by the Federal Republic of Germany under international law *prior* to any negotiations between the two governments. On the Berlin issue, he had steadfastly professed the conviction that the enclave of West Berlin constituted the "base of operations for a neofascist and imperialist policy of expansion" on the part of the FRG and the Western powers and thus represented an intolerable threat to the GDR.[5] Ulbricht had never swerved from this position and, if anything, was even more adamant in his stance in the decade after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Very probably it was above all his unwillingness to modify his rigid posture on these issues that precipitated his downfall. As late as three months before his "resignation," at a meeting of the SED Central Committee on January 29, 1971, he reiterated his demand for recognition of the GDR by the FRG as a precondition to intra-German relations, even though a softening of the Soviet attitude on this question was clearly perceptible by that time.[6] Meantime his unyielding posture on West Berlin was creating an impediment to progress in new negotiations between the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union to reach a Berlin settlement (a four-power agreement was eventually concluded in September 1971 which reaffirmed West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic, in disregard of the Ulbrichtian view of East German interests [7]).

While there is no way to tell what went on behind the scenes, the circumstances outlined make it a highly reasonable assumption that the Soviet leaders finally intervened to force Ulbricht to step down (if so, the deal could well have been arranged at the 24th CPSU Congress, which convened from March 30 to April 9, 1971). From their point of view, Ulbricht—in his prime a master maneuverer for political gain—had become so inflexible that he simply could not adjust to the change in the international climate and the consequent shift in Soviet objectives. Besides the renewed Soviet interest in arriving at certain international agreements with the United States, Moscow seemed obviously ready to establish a dialogue with the FRG and to explore Herr Brandt's tempting prospects of West German credit allowances and future industrial collaboration. Beyond these considerations lay the broader question of future relations and balances between Eastern Europe and the European Economic Community—a matter of increasingly vital interest to the Soviets in view of West Europe's impressive progress toward economic integration. In this situation, the Soviet leadership could not afford to run the risk of allowing Ulbricht's rigid attitudes—equated with GDR policies so long as he was at the helm—to spoil the show. It was time to downgrade Ulbricht and to call the East German junior partner to heel.

Shifts in Foreign Policy

Against this background, it should not be surprising that the most important policy shifts initiated by the Honecker regime have involved the GDR's external relations—in the first instance, with the USSR and the Soviet bloc. Very quickly the new party chief indicated his intention to move toward greater dependence on Moscow both politically and economically. In a major address to the Eighth SED

[5] See, e.g., his speech to the Seventh SED Congress, published in *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VII. Parteitages der SED: 17. bis 22. April 1967, 4 Baende* (Record of the Proceedings of the Seventh SED Congress, April 17-22, 1967, 4 Vols.), East Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1967, Vol. 1, pp. 61 ff.

[6] See Ulbricht's speech in *Neues Deutschland*, Jan. 30, 1971, p. 4.

[7] The agreement was signed on Sept. 3, 1971; an official German translation was published in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Sept. 4, pp. 6 f.

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Congress, convened in mid-June 1971, he strongly reemphasized the GDR's ties with the Soviet Union and projected a course of foreign policy that was geared to accommodate Moscow.[8] On this occasion and in subsequent developments, it became clear that the GDR would give the USSR full backing on all issues related to the Soviet *"Friedenspolitik"*—literally "peace policy," used to depict Moscow's present inclination, within definite limits, to move toward detente. Honecker's policy on the "German question" will be taken up shortly. Insofar as the broader issues involved in East-West relations are concerned, East German statements and sources have echoed nearly every nuance or shift in the Soviet attitude on such complex issues as the need for a European Security Conference or the prospect for eventual agreement on US-USSR troop reductions in Europe.[9] For example, the Soviets' long-standing emphasis on the desirability of convening an all-European Security Congress seemed to abate somewhat in the summer of 1971 and then to pick up again later in the fall—an oscillation that was faithfully reflected in the coverage given the issue in the East German daily and weekly press. The GDR has also echoed the Soviet policy line on the People's Republic of China; in one instance, commentaries published respectively in *Pravda* and *Neues Deutschland* resembled each other almost verbatim in many passages.[10]

The GDR's closer relations with the USSR have been paralleled by closer ties to the other bloc countries. In his speech to the Eighth SED Congress, Honecker declared that the GDR stood next in line after the USSR in its support of the process of strengthening the "uniform basic interest of the socialist countries." His acceptance of Moscow's bloc policies has been underscored by a complete freezing of the trend, observable under Ulbricht after 1968, toward the emergence of independent GDR policies vis-à-vis Poland, Hungary and Romania. Thus the GDR under Honecker is reasserting what constituted its basic posture for most of the 1960's and earlier, during the process of the integration of the bloc countries under Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)—the only modification, if any, being that the GDR's own "national" interests may initially be relegated to the background more than they were under Ulbricht.

STRENGTHENING THE BONDS

Complete coincidence of viewpoints and interests between the SED and the CPSU in all questions of socialist and communist construction and in international policy as a whole characterizes our cooperation in the political, ideological, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres, as well as—last but not least—in the cause of the military defense of socialism. The increasingly close interweaving of our countries' national economies, the coordination of plans, and the joint solution of long-term tasks benefit each of our states.

—Erich Honecker, in *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 7, 1961.

The trend toward closer ties was confirmed at the 25th Comecon Conference which took place in Bucharest in July 1971. Prime Minister Willi Stoph, who represented the GDR at the conference, reported that its main purpose was to coordinate the long-range plans of the member countries for the years 1971-75, and the final communiqué spoke of the "organization of a new type of economic cooperation" between members.[11] Just prior to the conference, an East German economic journal elaborated on what it called the "new quality" of future cooperation within Comecon in terms of the following objectives:

Perfection of the coordination of national economic plans;

Effective and lasting international specialization and production cooperation, especially in branches crucial for technical progress;

Expansion of the collaboration between scientific, technological, and research institutes;

Establishment of international scientific-technical and other organizations;

Expansion of reciprocal trade;

Active application of currency and financial relationships and of international credit;

Comprehensive development of ties between ministries, economic agencies, associations, and enterprises.[12]

[8] Honecker's speech was published in *Neues Deutschland*, June 16, 1971, pp. 5 f.

[9] See, *e.g.*, Peter Florin, "The Foreign Policy of the Working Class in the Foreign Policy of the GDR," *Horizont* (East Berlin), No. 24, 1971, pp. 3 ff.

[10] Compare I. Aleksandrov in *Pravda*, July 24, 1971, and "M.A." in *Neues Deutschland*, July 29, 1971.

[11] Stoph's interview and the communiqué were both published in *Neues Deutschland*, July 30, 1971.

[12] Edlegard Goehler and others, "Socialist Economic Integration—A Law of Socialist Construction," *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (East Berlin), No. 7, 1971, p. 949.

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While one may be permitted some skepticism about the feasibility of a number of these ambitious goals, in the case of intra-bloc trade, the GDR—at least—is firmly committed to efforts to expand its foreign trade with the Soviet Union and the other Comecon countries. In discussions of the new Five-Year Plan presented at the Eighth SED Congress[13] and adopted in December 1971, frequent reference was made to the regime's intention to increase the proportion of the GDR's trade with socialist countries (meaning predominantly the Comecon bloc) from an already heavy 72 percent to 75 percent of total trade by 1975. While this increment is not dramatic, its significance has to be weighed in terms of the projected expansion of the volume of trade. In brief, total East German trade is to increase 9 to 10 percent annually, reaching a peak of 63 billion marks in 1975; of this figure 47 billion is scheduled for trade with Comecon countries and only 16 billion for trade with the West and with developing countries. Over the five-year period these figures represent an increase of 70 percent in trade with the socialist countries, as contrasted to 42 percent with the West.[14]

Honecker's German Policy

Perhaps most important among the new regime's moves to align its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union was its decisive shift of posture on the "German question."

Honecker's course vis-à-vis the Federal Republic could be best described as a double-track approach: on the one hand, he quickly made it clear that he would continue and even intensify the policy of "demarcation" pursued under Ulbricht—*i.e.*, the systematic differentiation of the two Germanies and the ideological diabolization of Bonn as the "agent of imperialism" and "class enemy" (a line reflecting the East German Communists' recognition of their own, and consequently the GDR's, political instability). Yet at the same time, he took the steps necessary to facilitate an East-West detente—either because of a pragmatic reassessment of East German interests, or because of Soviet pressures, or because of a combination of both.

In short, while still demanding recognition of the GDR by all countries (especially the Western nations) and admission of the GDR to the United Nations, Honecker abandoned Ulbricht's key condition that such recognition must be extended by the Federal Republic as a prerequisite to any dialogue with Bonn. On the Berlin issue, he discarded the tired Ulbrichtean clichés of the past, admitting for the first time (in his Eighth Congress speech) that West Berlin had a "special political status." This crucial change in policy—together with the aforementioned FRG-USSR non-aggression treaty, which had been signed on August 12, 1970, and the four-power agreement on Berlin reached on September 3, 1971—opened the door to the first formal East-West German talks in the history of the two polities.

In the four-power agreement, the Soviets formally agreed—for the first time since the partition of Germany—to share the responsibility for the expeditious handling of traffic and communications into and out of West Berlin. In practical terms, the USSR's assumption of this responsibility obviously impinged on the control rights of the GDR authorities over the access routes to Berlin—rights delegated to them by the Soviets in 1955. The indication was that Moscow had sought and obtained the compliance of the SED leadership in this important particular. In the meantime, there had been hints during the summer of 1971 that the East Germans were prepared to enter into cooperation with Bonn in certain specific areas, including environmental protection, the opening of additional border-crossings, and the improvement of tourist travel, handling of freight, and technical cooperation between the railroad administrations of the two Germanies.[15] Actual negotiations got underway soon after the signing of the four-power accord, and by December three agreements were reached—one between the GDR and the FRG easing the movement of people and goods between the FRG and West Berlin, and two between the GDR and the city government of West Berlin, respectively liberalizing the rules for travel between West Berlin and East Germany and paving the way for the elimination of enclaves within Berlin itself through territorial exchanges.[16]

[13] "Directive of the Eighth SED Congress on the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the GDR," special supplement published in *Neues Deutschland*, June 23, 1971.

[14] See "Is the GDR Stifling Western Trade?," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), July 24, 1971, p. 15.

[15] On the question of ecological cooperation, see *Der Tagesspiegel* (West Berlin), July 21, 1971, p. 5; see also "Bonn Striving for Two Treaties with East Berlin," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 22, 1971, p. 3.

[16] Texts of these agreements were published in *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung* (Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government—Bonn) No. 183, Dec. 11, 1971.

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Meanwhile, East Germany's domestic propaganda machine pressed on with its ideological crusade against Bonn and the FRG. Since Brandt's accession to the top leadership in West Germany, the claim most frequently reiterated has been a variation on the theme that "the imperialist state of the FRG is . . . a dictatorship of the monopoly bourgeoisie, irrespective of whether the government is headed by representatives of the CDU/CSU or rightist SPD leaders" (a reference to the West German coalition parties now out of power, the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Socialist Union, and to Brandt's Social Democratic Party).[17] The rise of the SPD to power as the dominant party in the present SPD-FDP (Free Democratic Party) coalition government was a special thorn in the side of the East Germans, owing to the immense antagonism of the SED for the SPD in decades of struggle by the Social Democratic movement against communism in general and Stalinist communism in particular. For the SED, all Social Democratic parties—and especially the SPD—are enemies and agents of imperialism; the SPD in turn charges the SED with having betrayed the basic democratic principles of socialism. Thus there remains an all but unbridgeable gulf between the two parties, at least in the ideological sector, that finds expression in a wide variety of propaganda themes.[18]

For example, throughout 1971 a major target of attack and complaint in the GDR mass media was the choice of Munich as the site for the 1972 Olympic Games. Not only was the city of Munich branded as a "main base of counterrevolutionary radio transmitters" (a reference to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty), but the Games themselves were represented as instrumentalities of Bonn's "reactionary foreign and domestic policy." When an Olympics medal was put on the market in the Federal Republic, its inscription—"Games of the XXth Olympiade 1972 in Germany"—was denounced in the East German press as an arrogant slogan and proof that in the pursuit of its new *Ostpolitik,* Bonn was attempting to exploit the Olympic Games to further the revanchist aims of "West German imperialism" —*i.e.*, to push for the reunification of Germany on the FRG's terms.[19] In the case of this particular campaign, it is of course possible that the SED leadership was laying the ground for a boycott—or at any rate a drastic curtailment—of East German attendance at the Games, for fear that too many GDR athletes or visitors might decide to avail themselves of the opportunity to remain in the West.

This consideration aside, the Honecker regime's ideological line should be viewed as an understandable and, from the East German viewpoint, even necessary stance. Aside from the traditional hostility of the respective ruling parties, the creation of a negative "image" of the Federal Republic as the external enemy is obviously deemed a crucial exercise to offset the appeal of the richer—and freer—West German state and to give the new regime a chance to strengthen the still weak political system of the GDR, and thus the leadership role of the SED. On the other hand, the new contacts with the FRG are probably considered just as necessary—among other reasons, because Honecker needs to demonstrate his acquiescence to the wishes of the Soviet ally as a means to strengthen his own political position.

These two strands of policy, which at first glance seem contradictory, are by no means irreconcilable —and both can be rationalized in ideological terms. Indeed, the body of Marxist-Leninist "ideology" has grown fat with an array of formulas that can be used to justify just about any course of action. Consider, for example, that the concept of "peaceful coexistence" has come to have three distinct shades of meaning since its formulation by Lenin; it has been applied to denote (1) a form of class struggle, (2) the ongoing non-military contest with imperialism, and (3) a positive effort at cooperation. These definitions can be used in a great variety of combinations and weights to fit any specific political situation, turning the notion of "peaceful coexistence" into a magical umbrella. In the East German situation, paradoxical as it may seem, it is perfectly possible for the SED leadership to combine the waging of "class struggle" (connotation 1) with an increasing readiness for "cooperation" with West Germany (connotation 3); thus the propaganda war may be expected to go on, even if East-West German relations continue to improve.

While Honecker has firmly committed East Germany to closer links and increased trade with the

[17] Quoted from Otto Reinhold, "The Imperialism of the FRG," in *Einheit* (East Berlin), No. 6, 1971, p. 765.

[18] See, for example, *Die westdeutsche Sozialdemokratie in der gegenwartigen Etappe der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Sozialismus und Imperialismus* (West German Social Democracy during the Present Phase of the Conflict between Socialism and Imperialism), official publication of the SED, East Berlin, 1970.

[19] See, *e.g.*, "The SED Zeroes in on Munich," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), July 20, 1971, p. 4.

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Comecon countries, this does not mean that he will abandon Ulbricht's long-standing efforts to improve relations with the West European states. It should be noted that Ulbricht's policies in this respect generally had Moscow's endorsement, and in the current phase of East-West relations, East German efforts at rapprochement would presumably be right in line with Soviet wishes.

GDR Relations with Western Europe

East German policy vis-à-vis Western Europe has involved a combination of political and economic motives. The overriding objective has been to upgrade the international status of the GDR by whatever means and in whatever way possible, toward the end of achieving formal recognition of its legitimacy under international law. While this ultimate goal eluded Ulbricht during his rule, he was able to forge a number of links with various countries through such tactics as the establishment of city partnerships, cultural exchanges, visits to West Europe by representatives of labor unions and other mass organizations, participation in sports events, and—last but not least—foreign trade. For a number of complex domestic and international reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper, Ulbricht's efforts to upgrade the GDR had more success in France than elsewhere; thus it may be useful to touch in briefest outline on the course of relations between the two countries as a clue to the tactics that Honecker will doubtless continue to pursue in the future.

The first direct contact of significance occurred in 1959, when a French parliamentary delegation visited the GDR. During the 1960's a series of sister-city relationships were established between French and East German cities, and the GDR became an active member of the "World Federation of Partner Cities," which has headquarters in Paris. In 1967, factions in the French National Assembly and in the French Senate organized parliamentary "friendship groups" to promote the cause of closer Franco-GDR ties, thereby giving relations between the two countries something of a semi-official sanction for the first time. Meanwhile, efforts on non-governmental levels to promote economic contacts of mutual benefit constantly intensified over a number of years, climaxing in the establishment by the French Manufacturers' Association of its own office in East Berlin in 1970. In October 1970 several members and candidates of the SED Politburo (including Kurt Hager, Hermann Axen, Werner Jarowinsky and Werner Lamberz) visited France as a party contingent—and used the occasion of a press conference in Paris, organized by the French CP, to reiterate the demand for recognition of the GDR.[20] Most recently, in June 1971, the first official delegation of the GDR People's Chamber went to Paris and was received by, among others, Jean Broglie, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the French National Assembly.[21]

The visit of the SED Politburo contingent highlighted an increase in open activity between the East German and French Communist parties—a pattern that has also emerged in the case of SED relations with the CPs of Italy, Norway and Denmark. This stepped-up pace of Communist party relations has followed upon a similar increase of activity and contacts among the Social Democratic parties of Western and Northern Europe since 1969. In the latter development, the West German SPD has played a major role, expanding and cementing its relations with most Social Democratic parties and making friendly overtures to several of the Communist parties as well. In this light, the upsurge in SED party contacts in the West suggests a second political objective on the part of the East German leadership: beyond its basic aim of achieving recognition for the GDR, it may wish to assume the leading role in the ongoing struggle against West European social democracy. Certainly, the profound animosity of the East German Communists for all Social Democrats, and especially West German Social Democrats, makes the SED a likely candidate for the role of arch-opponent.

Insofar as East German economic objectives in West Europe are concerned, it has already been pointed out that the Honecker regime plans a sizable increase in trade with the non-Communist world in the next five years, though the total falls well below the projected targets for trade within the Comecon bloc. In discussing East German trade with West Europe, it is necessary to point out that the GDR, without ever having engaged in any formal negotiations, has long had indirect access to the markets of the countries in the European Economic Community through unique circumstances that evolved basically out of two international accords.

[20] See later interview of Hager published in *Horizont*, No. 46, 1970, p. 3.

[21] See interview of Klaus Sorgenicht, a member of the GDR State Council, in *ibid.*, No. 25, 1971, p. 6.

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First, the Potsdam Concord of 1945 stipulated that all Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit, paving the way for later agreements allowing GDR products to enter the Federal Republic without being subject to international customs regulations.[22] Later, the Treaty of Rome, which set up the Common Market in 1957, implicitly recognized the FRG's position that East-West German trade was an internal matter and thus gave the Federal Republic—as a member of Commart—a controlling voice in the movement of East German goods within the EEC.[23] This arrangement has represented a mixed bag of political and economic advantages and disadvantages for all involved. In the present context, the important point is that if the Western states did come to extend recognition to the GDR, it would have to sacrifice its indirect ties with the EEC. On the other hand, this would seem to be less of a problem to the GDR than in the past, since it has been increasingly successful in pursuing the alternate route of bilateral trade relations conducted through semi-official channels.

The interest of the GDR (as of the USSR) in all questions touching on the EEC has been indicated by the increasing amount of analytical research and literature being published on the subject. Whereas Communist analysts used to tend toward negative forecasts of the possibility of EEC's further progress toward union, they now accept the probability of the eventual integration of the economies and currencies of the Common Market countries (recently grown from six to 10).[24] The Communists' interest in this ongoing process is more than academic: as one East German source put it, the detailed investigation of the processes of "state-monopoly economic integration and the increasing internationalization of economic life" in Western Europe is ". . . of special importance for working out and perfecting an effective GDR foreign-trade strategy in economic relations with capitalist industrial countries."[25] Statements such as this suggest that with respect to its trade and economic activity outside the Soviet bloc, the GDR is moving away from its past one-sided concentration on the countries of the Third World and closer toward an all-European foreign-trade strategy.

[22] The accord now in force is the so-called Berlin Agreement on Interzonal Trade (IZT) of 1960.

[23] See "Protocol Relating to German Internal Trade and Connected Problems," in *Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and Connected Documents* (English language), Brussels, Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom, 1957, Annex 2, p. 261.

[24] See, *e.g.*, H. D. Kuhne, "Disputes over the Development of Two Imperialist Currency Areas," in *Sozialistische Aussenwirtschaft* (East Berlin), No. 5, 1971, pp. 30 f.

[25] G. Hofmann, "Tendencies of Capitalist Concentration in the EEC Countries," *Sozialistische Aussenwirtschaft*, No. 1, 1971, p. 18.

Developments on the Home Front

When we turn to consideration of the East German domestic scene, perhaps the single most striking fact to be mentioned is the smoothness with which the switch in the top leadership was accomplished and the lack of repercussions—at least in public—in the months that have since passed. Thus, only a few weeks after Ulbricht's resignation as party secretary, the Eighth Party Congress conducted its business with very few signs of confusion or reaction over the changes taking place. (Even the firmest of Ulbricht's former supporters did not seem to raise an eyebrow over the fact that Honecker barely mentioned the former leader in his address to the Congress—which Ulbricht, incidentally, did not attend.)

Ironic as it may sound, this surface serenity may well be explained by the essential instability of the East German political system—or, more accurately, by the recognition of that instability on the part of the party leadership that dominates the system. That there have long been tensions and rivalries within the SED is well known; in fact, in an article in this journal less than two years ago, the present author analyzed in some detail the tendency of the SED leadership to divide into three basic groupings of reform "technocrats," hard-line "dogmatists," and pragmatic political "centrists."[26] These rivalries certainly did not suddenly dissipate with Ulbricht's fall; but there may well have been tacit (or explicit) agreement among all elements of the SED leadership that they must pull together for the time being or else take the risk of triggering reactions that could imperil the party itself.

The SED's long preoccupation with the problem of its own political legitimacy and security is underscored by the background of its new top leader. Erich Honecker can best be described as a professional "political specialist." He established an early reputation for organizational ability in the years 1946 to 1955, when he was responsible for directing and building up the Free German Youth

[26] Peter C. Ludz, "The SED Leadership in Transition," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1970, pp. 23-31.

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(FDJ), East Germany's Communist youth corps. Subsequently, in the central SED apparatus, he became the expert on all questions having to do with party organization, control and security. As CC Secretary for Security Affairs, he was the one man most responsible for the insulation of the SED from internal and external "contaminating" influences.[27] As Ulbricht's successor, he now has the responsibility for the similar ideological and political insulation of the whole GDR.

In the past, Honecker's political concerns have inclined him toward alliance with the hard-line elements in the party, though he is also a pragmatic politician. For many years his position as Ulbricht's heir-designate was unquestioned; yet with the progress of economic reform, there was increasing speculation that he might have to share power in a collective leadership with the centrists (notably Politburo member Willi Stoph, who is also the GDR's Prime Minister) and the technocrats (possibly Guenter Mittag) in any successor regime. The fact that he has instead emerged as top man—with decisive control over the machinery of governance, at least for the time being—seems to indicate that the prevailing pressures within the party, and no doubt from Moscow as well, favored priority emphasis on the internal security and order of the East German state.

The internal trends of regime policy over the past several months tend to support this interpretation. On the one hand, there has been an effort to reinforce the ideological claims and to strengthen the political controls of the SED over East German society. The intensification of the policy of "demarcation" with respect to the FRG has already been mentioned—a policy which Honecker must hope will fortify his own position as well as that of the GDR by systematically instilling fear of the West German "enemy." Another development in the ideological area was the adoption of a directive giving increased weight to the political attitude, as opposed to the performance record, of applicants for admission to GDR universities, colleges and technical schools.[28] In the area of economic performance, the new regime has been able to step up control through the "growing responsibility" of the Workers-and-Farmers Inspectorate (ABI), which organizationally is under the direction of both the SED Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, and which has been assigned key responsibility for checking on the implementation of party resolutions affecting the East German economy and society.[29]

At the same time, the regime has tried to increase domestic political stability by taking steps to improve the morale of the East German people. The most important feature of the Honecker course in this respect is a planned rise in the living standard of the population. At the Eighth Congress the SED adopted special resolutions to this effect, patterning them after similar resolutions that had been adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. Willi Stoph reiterated the regime's intentions in his speech on the new Five-Year Plan, emphasizing that its "primary task" was to raise the "material and cultural living standard" of the East German population. The Plan itself set forth the prospect of a considerably greater volume of consumer goods and services over the next five years. Housing construction is also supposed to be increased and improved: for example, the plan calls for the erection of 500,000 new apartment units by 1975—representing an annual rate of increase that is considerably higher than that planned for either industrial output or investments.[30]

Probably this stress on meeting the people's needs was triggered in large part by the widening gap between the living standards of the GDR and those of the FRG.[31] While the economy of the GDR has made significant strides forward under the reform program, East Germans have still had to endure the role of poor relations vis-à-vis the West Germans, who have literally galloped along the road to prosperity. While the SED leadership could not fool itself about closing the gap in living standards in the immediate future, it apparently felt it had to offer the people some reassurance that conditions would improve and that they would soon have more of the amenities of life.

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[27] For details of Honecker's background, see Peter C. Ludz, "The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies," Harvard "Occasional Papers" Series, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 48 ff.

[28] "Directive on Application Procedure, Selection, and Admission to On-Campus Study at Universities and Colleges—Admission Regulations," dated July 1, 1971, published in *Gesetzblatt der DDR* (East Berlin), Part II, 1971, p. 486.

[29] On the role of ABI, see Heinz Matthes, "Reliable Popular Control —Principle of Socialist State and Economic Management," *Einheit*, No. 6, 1971, pp. 715 f.

[30] SED directive on the Five-Year Plan, *loc. cit.*

[31] For comparative statistics on living standards, see *Deutschland 1971: Bericht und Materialen zur lage der Nation* (Germany 1971: Report and Materials on the Situation of the Nation), Cologne-Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971, especially Chap. V.

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Interestingly, the East German leadership expects to achieve these improvements by restructuring priorities and inputs even while reducing the rates of expansion in overall industrial output and investments. Thus, industrial production, which increased at an average annual rate of 6.5 percent in the last five-year plan period, is to be increased only 3.9 to 6.4 percent over the next five years; similarly, investments, which increased annually by 9.7 percent in 1966-70, are planned at a lesser growth rate of 5.1 to 5.4 percent for 1971-75.[32]

Internal Politics

There remains the pivotal—and politically the most interesting—question of whether Erich Honecker has enough influence and/or clout to retain his present dominating role in the leadership.

Certainly there can be no doubt that Honecker has a significant power base which he built up during his years of control over the party security apparatus. An initial sign of the extent (as well as the limits) of his influence was provided by the personnel changes which were announced at the Eighth Congress.[33] His hand was evident in certain appointments to the Politburo, more pronouncedly in shifts on the Central Committee, and finally in the appointments of some first secretaries to the SED Bezirk Committees (the party overseers in the 17 basic administrative divisions of the GDR). Honecker showed a definite preference in these appointments for younger party functionaries (generally in their forties) whose careers have reflected a combination of political pragmatism, ideological activism and organizational capabilities, as opposed to the equally pragmatic but non-ideologically oriented technocrats whom Ulbricht tended to lean on in the last years of his leadership.[34] In a number of cases Honecker promoted personal associates from his years with the FDJ and the SED Secretariat.

Insofar as the Politburo is concerned, relatively few changes were made in the overall membership, giving the impression of continuity with the past. The composition was slightly altered to comprise 16 members and seven candidates, a rise of one in each category. To the surprise of some observers, none of the Old Guard party faithful (including, *e.g.*, Friedrich Ebert and Herbert Warnke[35]) were retired. In this respect, the East Germans again imitated the Soviets, who similarly kept their older functionaries on the new CPSU Politburo elected at the 24th Party Congress. From the point of view of Honecker's interests, two men promoted from candidates to full members of the Politburo—Werner Lamberz and Werner Krolikowski—could be considered his supporters and were probably selected at his bidding. Lamberz, born in 1929, epitomizes the relatively new and relatively young type of party ideologist who has eschewed the hard-line dogmatism of the past in favor of more flexible "scientific" and "strategic" approaches to Marxism-Leninism. Significantly enough, his interest has concentrated on the ideological aspects of the so-called "Western matter"—in other words, on the ideological-propagandistic conflict with the Federal Republic. His intellectual dexterity, as demonstrated in his published analyses,[36] would seem to make him an ideal collaborator for Honecker in the latter's double-track course vis-à-vis the FRG. It also seems possible that Lamberz might develop into a serious rival for the now 66-year-old Albert Norden, a hard-line Politburo member who has long had dominant control over SED agitation and propaganda. The second newcomer to the Politburo, Werner Krolikowski, is another member of the 40-plus age group (he was born in 1928) who has risen in the party apparatus; he has been First Secretary of the Dresden SED Bezirk Committee since 1961, and he is considered a Honecker confidant. Two new candidate members of the Politburo are also regarded as Honecker appointments. Erich Mielke (born in 1907), has been Minister of State Security since 1957, and his elevation within the party no doubt reflects the regime's current emphasis on internal security. Harry Tisch (born in 1927), has been First Secretary of the Rostock SED Bezirk Committee since 1961; his allegiance to Honecker became evident at the

[32] SED directive on the Five-Year Plan, *loc. cit.*

[33] Party personnel actions taken at the Eighth SED Congress were published in *Neues Deutschland*, June 20, 1971.

[34] See Ludz, "The SED Leadership in Transition," *loc. cit.*

[35] Ebert also remains on the Presidium of the People's Chamber; Warnke continues as chairman of the National Board of the 7,000,000-member Free German Trade Union Association (FDGB), East Germany's largest mass organization, which he has headed since 1948.

[36] See, *e.g.*, his articles, "New Demands on the Ideological Work of the Party," in *Der Parteiarbeiter*, East Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1969; "The Leninist Principles of the Scientific Management of Socialist Construction and Their Application in the GDR," in *Der Leninismus und der Revolutionare Prozess: Internationale theoretische Konferenz . . . vom 19. bis 21. November 1969 in Prag* (Leninism and the Revolutionary Process: International Theoretical Conference . . . November 19-21, 1969, in Prague), East Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1970, pp. 67 ff.; and "A Quarter-Century of Victorious History," in *Neuer Weg* (East Berlin), No. 3, 1971, p. 99 ff.

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Eighth Congress when he delivered a speech that indirectly but unmistakably criticized Ulbricht.

The trend toward promotion of "Honecker-type" functionaries was revealed in sharper focus in the composition of the new SED Central Committee approved by the Eighth Congress (whose 189 members and candidates again represent a slight enlargement over the previous CC [37]). Of the 11 former candidates raised to full membership on the CC, as well as eight new men appointed directly to membership, almost all came from the central SED apparatus or the Bezirk party administrations—and almost none from party members manning the economic agencies or directly participating in the economy. A similar tendency could be observed in the case of the 28 new candidates to the CC, although the stress was not so pronounced. Conversely, among the 15 members who lost their seats on the Central Committee, there was a striking preponderance of party members directly involved in economic and agricultural management. While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to provide a complete breakdown of age levels and backgrounds here, it is certainly valid to claim that the 40-year-plus group of professional party workers has been given special weight in the new Central Committee.

Finally, Honecker had an obvious voice in the appointment of at least three new first secretaries of the Bezirk party committees, all in important areas of East Germany (most other appointees were incumbents). In all three cases, the appointees had been top-level officials of the FDJ and had worked with Honecker during the decade that he built up the youth organization, in the process providing the "cadre reserve" of the SED. In East Berlin the chosen man was Konrad Naumann; in Frankfurt/Oder, Hans Joachim Hertwig; and in Halle, Werner Felfe (all born in 1928). It might be noted that a colleague of these men, Horst Schumann—Honecker's successor as chief of the FDJ for many years—had already been appointed first secretary of the Leipzig Bezirk Committee in 1970, upon the death of the incumbent, Paul Froehlich.

Honecker's ability to place a number of his supporters in key positions was certainly an indication of his considerable strength within the party. To all appearances, his influence among party functionaries is not due simply to the power of his position but reflects their genuine respect for the special talents he has demonstrated in dealing with intra-party organizational and cadre problems. According to report, he has built up good relations with leading officials at all levels of the SED apparatus, and he has made a point of being personally accessible to minor and local party officials.[38] Besides his following in the SED and the FDJ, he is said to have good contacts in the Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army). In terms of personal leadership style, he is reported to lean toward directness and informality and to have a hearty dislike for bureaucratic pretense and red tape. So far he has shown none of Ulbricht's disposition to be authoritarian and dictatorial; in fact, he has gone out of his way to pay lip service to the principle of "collective leadership," even though he obviously has the final power of decision in all matters so long as he remains both First Secretary and Chairman of the National Defense Council (the second most important position in the GDR power structure).

Despite these many factors in Honecker's favor, the fact remains that he by no means possesses the degree of authority and prestige, either within the SED or in East German society at large, which Ulbricht enjoyed for many years. While his role in the party has given him an inside track in establishing a personal following, the narrowness of his specialization in matters of party organization, control and security could work to his disadvantage over time. The debit side of the coin is that he has played no part whatever—so far as is known—in overall economic and social planning or more particularly in the crucial reorganization and modernization of the East German economic and educational systems since 1963. Nor has he distinguished himself in any significant way in the field of ideology. Thus he is in the position of having to rely for help in a number of areas on men who have been real, or who are now potential, rivals.

It thus seems entirely possible that a succession crisis might still develop in the GDR. As mentioned earlier, the very smoothness with which Ulbricht was eased out of the top spot suggests the probability that in the minds of at least some of the leaders, Honecker's assumption of power was an interim necessity subject to possible challenge when time and circumstances should permit. For years Honecker's chief rival in and out of the Politburo has been Prime Minister Willi Stoph, whose pro-

[37] The CC was increased from 131 to 135 members and from 50 to 54 candidates; see *Neues Deutschland*, June 20, 1971.

[38] See Harald Ludwig, "The SED before the Eighth Party Congress," *Deutschland Archiv*, No. 6, 1971, p. 596.

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fessional specialty is economic organization—a field in which Honecker cannot personally compete. A second, younger rival is the aforementioned Guenter Mittag, who in Ulbricht's last years was the leading light of the faction of technocrats who guided the course of economic reform. If a power struggle should develop within the Politburo at some future date, it could conceivably see an alignment of Stoph and Mittag—and possibly also Alfred Neumann as a source of conservative support—against Honecker.

The harder question is to determine who would stand by Honecker in the face of such a challenge. Besides Lamberz and Krolikowski, one probable supporter is Horst Sindermann, a tough-minded but capable ex-chief of the Halle Bezirk party organization, who has been on the Politburo since 1963 and who, in the wake of Ulbricht's ouster, was elevated —seemingly at Honecker's behest—to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, making him a potential successor to Stoph. A clear sign that Sindermann has joined the "inner circle" of the Politburo leadership was the fact that he—together with Honecker, Stoph and Hager (but not Mittag)—made up the top SED delegation that visited Moscow in mid-May 1971, obviously to coordinate future Soviet-East German strategy. Sinderman was noted for his total loyalty to Ulbricht; whether he will show the same fealty to Honecker remains to be seen.

Another Politburo member owing his promotion to the new party chief is Paul Verner, appointed Honecker's successor as CC secretary in charge of security, organizational and cadre questions. Verner, whose experience with matters of internal security and order derives from many years as chief of the Berlin SED Committee, could probably be counted in Honecker's corner in the case of a struggle, but there is no way to be sure.

Summary

Latest developments at the time of writing seem to indicate that Honecker is in no immediate danger of such a political challenge and in fact has managed to strengthen his hand in the state apparatus as well as in the party.[39] Still, he is a political man attuned to all political possibilities, so no doubt his main order of business for the present and the foreseeable future will be to rally further support for himself within the SED and in the GDR at large, as well as among the Communist leaders in other Soviet bloc countries.

The importance of the latter fund of support probably means that he will hew rather closely to the lines of policy established when he took over from Ulbricht and will refrain—at least for the time being—from stepping forward with any dramatic innovations of his own, especially in the field of foreign policy. To repeat, then, the GDR can be expected to continue along a course of closer ties to the Comecon countries and firm support for Moscow's line on such international issues as the Sino-Soviet confrontation and the conflicts in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and other areas of the globe. In its policy toward the Federal Republic, the Honecker regime will continue to put great stress on the ideological differentiation of East and West Germany, even while moving in certain limited areas along the paths of possible cooperation with the FRG.

Concomitantly, the new regime will continue to pursue all possible tactics to upgrade the international status of the GDR. In this area it has rather good prospects for some success in the near future. There has been widespread sentiment favoring the admission of the GDR to membership in a number of organizations affiliated with the United Nations, including the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the UN Economic and Social Commission (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Moreover, a number of states, including Sweden, India and Japan, have indicated an interest in expanding their official relations with the GDR. Finally, if a European Security Conference should ever be convened, as a number of states in both East and West would like, it is widely expected that the two German states would participate on a basis of equality.

At home, Honecker has a long way to go to match the image which Ulbricht managed to project of himself as the "father of his country." For the long run, it remains an open question whether Honecker will be able to assert and stabilize his authority in the face of potentially formidable—if presently latent—competition. All that can be said at the moment is that he has established a very good lead.

[39] At the end of November 1971, Honecker, Paul Verner, and several presumable allies were appointed to the Council of State (Staatsrat), which is the third most important ruling body in the GDR (after the SED Politburo and the National Defense Council, both headed by Honecker). While Ulbricht remained chairman of the Council, his intimate associate Otto Gotsche—long head of the Staatsrat Secretariat —was removed. Guenter Mittag also lost his seat on the Council, though he remains on the Politburo. For the composition of the new Council see *Neues Deutschland*, Nov. 27, 1971.

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Cuba's New Dependency

By Leon Gouré and Julian Weinkle

In its steady expansion of economic relations with Cuba over the past decade, the Soviet Union has been motivated primarily by political rather than financial or humanitarian considerations. Basically, Soviet aid and trade do not reflect any major economic need or even any commercial interest in Cuba on the part of Moscow, for the island has little to offer the USSR economy. In fact, Cuba has turned out to be a growing economic liability,[1] for which the Soviet Union has attempted to compensate itself by such measures as the resale of imported Cuban cane sugar. However, the more important compensation has been in the political realm. Moscow views the Cuban Revolution as a triumphant "national liberation movement" which promises to weaken US prestige in Latin America and has given communism a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Thus it is not surprising that the USSR came to Cuba's assistance when the Castro regime seemed to face economic crisis. As the Soviets have observed, "world socialism helps the national emancipation of oppressed peoples," and conversely, the latter's "liberation struggle contributes to the struggle for socialism. . . ." [2]

But if indeed Fidel Castro's 1959 victory can be said to have contributed to the "struggle for socialism," it also injected a discordant note into relations within the international socialist community. The Cuban leader has sought from the outset to maintain a wide sphere of independence in his dealings with the Soviet bloc, while promoting Castroism as the appropriate political model for both Latin America and the Third World in general. Proudly asserting that "we [Cuba] are not anyone's satellite and never shall be," [3] he attempted to export his own brand of revolution, much to the chagrin of the USSR. Predictably, serious disputes arose between Moscow and Havana. As Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Castro's Minister without Portfolio and one of the most influential of Cuba's old-line Communists, was later to acknowledge, "there have been inevitable differences which on some occasions became acute." [4]

The Soviet Union, in attempting to assert its influence over Cuban developments and policies, has lacked the ability to manipulate the local Communist party apparatus or to threaten military intervention as it has been able to do in dealing with the Communist states in Eastern Europe.[5]

[1] Soviet aid to Cuba is presently believed to exceed one million dollars a day. In the past decade, according to Norman Gall, Cuba has received more foreign economic aid per capita than any nation on earth. See Norman Gall, "How Castro Failed," *Commentary* (New York), Vol. 52, No. 5, November 1971, p. 56.

Both authors are with the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami, Florida. Mr. Gouré, Director of Soviet Studies and Professor of International Studies, has written extensively on Soviet affairs, focusing most recently on USSR policy toward Latin America. Mr. Weinkle is Assistant Professor of History and a Research Associate. The present article is based on a chapter in the forthcoming book, Cuba, Castro and Revolution, *edited by Jaime Suchlicki.*

[2] *The USSR and Developing Countries*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, n.d., p. 17.

[3] *Bohemia* (Havana), March 19, 1965.

[4] Prensa Latina (English), June 12, 1969.

[5] Cuba presents special problems in this respect, being too distant from the USSR to be susceptible to control by the Soviet armed forces. The Soviet tactic of using local Communist parties to achieve Moscow's political ends also proved unfeasible in Cuba, where Castro managed very quickly to gain control of the PSP (*Partido Socialista Popular*—Popular Socialist Party) and convert this Communist party into an instrument of his own personal power.

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Consequently, Moscow has attempted to exercise political control by exploiting Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet Union. This strategy has proved increasingly effective as Cuba has faced growing economic difficulties at home and Castro's revolutionary ambitions abroad have gone unfulfilled. Moscow has used its economic leverage not only to moderate Castro's independent ideological position and foreign policy objectives but also to guide Cuba's domestic policies along desired lines, thus paving the way for the progressive integration of Cuba into the Soviet bloc.

In its pursuit of this last objective, the USSR has found itself in the awkward position of encouraging Cuba to concentrate on the production of sugar—a policy which not only contradicts past Soviet prescriptions that rapid industrialization is the key to overcoming underdevelopment but also casts the USSR, ironically, in the same exploitative role which Moscow accuses the "imperialist" United States of having played in its prerevolutionary economic relationship with Havana. Soviet spokesmen like to note that Cuba's experience "is significant . . . for the developing countries, whose economic peculiarities continue to be characterized by monoculture, dominance by monopoly capital in the sphere of production, and a complete dependence in foreign trade on the market of a few imperialist states." [6] Cuba's prerevolutionary dependence on the export of sugar to the US is described by the Soviets as "one of the prime elements of that model of international division of labor which the North American imperialists foisted upon the Latin American countries." [7]

After the Revolution, Castro—presumably impelled by such views and in clear emulation of Soviet experience—resolved to launch an ambitious program of industrial diversification while renouncing Cuba's traditional reliance on the production and export of sugar. This program, however, quickly resulted in severe economic setbacks as well as a growing trade deficit with the USSR, which was supplying Cuba with needed capital goods. In light of the growing cost of subsidizing the sputtering Cuban industrialization experiment, Moscow came to view a return by Cuba to its "historically-determined specialization," *i.e.*, sugar monoculture, to be an acceptable "optional model" for the island's future development. Henceforth Cuba was to concentrate on sugar production and deliver large quantities of this commodity to the Soviet bloc in order to offset the economic burden which the Cuban economy had become for the Soviet Union and its East European associates. What had been pictured as a "sin" when Cuba was trading with the United States was now represented as a desirable phenomenon according to the principles of "proletarian internationalism" and "socialist division of labor"—euphemisms for Soviet self-interest.

Once Castro was "persuaded" to accept this reversal of his rapid-industrialization policy, Cuba's dependence on the Soviet bloc inevitably followed—and her vulnerability to Soviet political pressure was rendered even greater by the USSR's own concerted drive to achieve self-sufficiency in sugar. We shall now examine how Havana's dependence on the Soviet bloc as economic benefactor and prime sugar market evolved in the past 11 years of Soviet-Cuban economic relations.

Initial Soviet Involvement

Soviet economic involvement in Cuba began essentially as a rescue operation in which Moscow came to Castro's assistance after the latter found himself first threatened with a reduction in US sugar purchases and then, in early 1962, cut off entirely from the US market.[8] Moscow initially remained aloof from Castro and his problems, and it was not until February 1960, during a visit to Havana by Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, that the USSR signed a trade agreement providing for the Soviet purchase of 425,000 metric tons [9] of sugar that year and one million tons a year in each of the following four years. (Prior to 1960, Soviet purchases of sugar from Cuba had been more modest—205,600 tons in 1955; 214,300 tons in 1956; 350,000 tons in 1957; 197,900 tons in 1958,

[6] A. D. Bekarevich, *Kuba: vneshneekonomicheskie otnosheniia* (Cuba: Foreign Economic Relations), Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p. 5.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 20.

[8] All trade between Cuba and the United States was suspended in February 1962, one month after the Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers had voted at Punta del Este, Uruguay, to exclude Cuba from participation in the inter-American system because of its "incompatible" ties with a Marxist-Leninist government (*i.e.*, the USSR). The OAS subsequently voted, in July 1964, to condemn Cuban aggression and intervention against Venezuela and called on member states to "suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons." See *Final Act. Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance*, Pan American Union, OEA/Ser. C/II.9 (English), Washington, DC, 1964, p. 6.

[9] In this paper, all tonnage figures are in metric tons, except where otherwise noted.

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and 132,500 tons in 1959.[10]) In addition, the Soviet Union granted Cuba a credit of $100 million, at low interest, for the purchase of Soviet machinery and materials required in the "construction of plants and factories." [11] The agreement also called for the resumption of diplomatic relations, which occurred in May 1960.

When the United States in July 1960 cut its annual Cuban sugar quota by 700,000 tons,[12] the Soviet Union agreed not only to increase its own purchases for that year by one million tons but also to take the 700,000 tons left by the United States. (Actual Soviet purchases, however, reached only 1,467,800 tons for the year.) Following an exchange of views in Moscow between Raul Castro and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the USSR also agreed to supply Cuba with petroleum and other strategic products "in amounts fully meeting" Cuba's needs.[13]

The Soviet Union further expanded its economic commitments to Cuba in December 1960, perhaps in part as a response to the signing in October of a Sino-Cuban trade agreement providing for the purchase by the People's Republic of China of one million tons of sugar in 1961 and granting Cuba credits totaling $60 million. Moscow then pledged to buy 2.7 million tons of sugar from Cuba in 1961 at a fixed price of four cents per pound (1.25 cents a pound below the US-subsidized price) "if the United States carries out its threat not to buy Cuban sugar." [14] Under the new commitment, Soviet payments for Cuban products were to be 80 percent in goods and 20 percent in convertible currency.

The 1960 accord also committed the Soviet Union to assist Cuba in its newly-initiated industrialization program—especially in the construction of an iron and steel mill and an oil refinery, and in the development of Cuban petroleum and ore deposits and electric power resources. As US-Cuban trade continued to constrict, the Soviet Union in 1961 bought 3,345,000 tons of sugar, greatly exceeding the commitments made in December 1960. At the same time, Soviet exports to Cuba, including petroleum products and machinery, increased dramatically from 67.3 million rubles ($74.6 million)[15] in 1960 to 258.3 million rubles in 1961, but Cuba still maintained a favorable trade balance with the USSR through 1961 (See Table 1).[16] Clearly, the new relationship with Moscow involved a major reorientation of Cuba's foreign trade. Whereas the island's trade with the Soviet bloc in 1959 amounted to only $16 million, or roughly 2 percent of total Cuban trade, the figures rose to $905 million and 72 percent in 1961 and $1,056 million and 82 percent in 1962. For the same years, the United States' share dropped from 68 percent to zero.[17]

The Failure of Industrialization

The Soviet decision to channel significant trade and aid resources into Cuba's industrial development proved ill-conceived. As one foreign observer remarked, "when the Russians came to the rescue of the Cuban Revolution, their sense of solidarity was in direct proportion to their total ignorance of the situation and problems in that country." [18] The Cuban leaders were equally naive, both in assuming that the Soviet Union would finance their industrialization effort without hesitation and in anticipating immediate success for the program. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, then Minister of Industries in the Castro government, predicted that ". . . within a

[10] *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik 1918-1966* (USSR Foreign Trade: Statistical Handbook 1918-1966), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, 1967, pp. 227-28.

[11] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 15, 1960.

[12] In the five years preceding the Cuban revolution of 1959, the United States purchased about 50 percent of Cuba's average annual sugar production of 5.1 million tons. See International Sugar Organization, *Sugar Year Book 1960*, London, 1961, p. 38.

[13] *Pravda*, July 21, 1960.

[14] *Hoy* (Havana), Dec. 20, 1960.

[15] For the purposes of this paper, the Soviet ruble is considered equal to $1.11 (US), and the Cuban peso at par with the US dollar.

[16] A word of caution is in order concerning data on Soviet and Cuban economic activities. Both governments, as well as the various bureaus within them, publish "official" statistics on these operations. They are not always in agreement, which tends to cast a measure of doubt on their overall reliability. For a discussion of the problems arising in connection with the use of Soviet and Cuban economic and trade data, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Availability and Reliability of Statistics in Socialist Cuba," *Latin American Research Review* (Austin, Texas), Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1969, pp. 53-91, and No. 2, Summer 1969, pp. 47-81. Also see Vassili Vassilev, *Policy in the Soviet Bloc on Aid to Developing Countries*, Paris, Development Center of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1969, pp. 61-74. Similarly, statistics from Western sources—such as the International Sugar Organization, the United Nations and the US Department of Agriculture—do not always agree. However, these various sources are sufficiently close to reflect the general trends, as well as the critical points, in Soviet-Cuban relations. For the purpose of consistency in this discussion, Soviet sources will be used insofar as is possible, with other sources being cited only where Soviet information is not readily available.

[17] Republic of Cuba, *Boletin estadistico 1966* (Statistical Bulletin 1966), Havana, JUCEPLAN, 1966, p. 124; *Compendio estadistico de Cuba 1967* (Statistical Handbook of Cuba 1967), JUCEPLAN, Havana, 1967, p. 27 (Original figures in pesos).

[18] K.S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1970, p. 209.

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year, industrialization will have eradicated unemployment throughout the country." [19] Regino Boti, President of JUCEPLAN (Junta Central de Planificación—Central Planning Board) and Castro's economic minister, similarly asserted in August 1961 that Cuba's economic growth rate would rise to a level of 10-15 percent in each of the next four years and that Cuba "would be the most industrialized country in Latin America." [20]

Despite such optimism, the Cuban industrialization program soon faltered, and by the end of 1963 the experiment was patently a costly failure which the Soviet Union was no longer willing to underwrite. This experience demonstrated the inadequacies of Moscow's simplistic doctrine stressing rapid industrialization after the Soviet model as the *sine qua non* of economic progress in underdeveloped countries. The failure also generated considerable disappointment and frustration in both Havana and Moscow. As K. S. Karol reports, "much of the obsolete Russian equipment neither met their [the Cubans'] need nor enabled them to get out of their economic difficulties." [21] The Soviet Union, on the other hand, learned the hard way just how ill-prepared Cuba had been for diversified industrial development. A 1968 Soviet study frankly recognized this fact:

Between 1960 and 1963, with the assistance of the socialist countries, a significant number of old enterprises were reconstructed in Cuba, and new plants and factories were built in various branches of industry. However, such a rate of construction inevitably resulted in the dissipation and exhaustion of Cuba's internal savings. Some enterprises were constructed without sufficiently accurate economic calculation. They turned out to be unprofitable since they worked on expensive raw material imported for hard currency and with the insufficiently high labor productivity of poorly qualified Cuban labor.[22]

An important consequence of the disastrous industrialization experiment was the creation of an unfavorable balance in Cuba's trade with the USSR. This came about because of several interrelated developments. First, Havana came to rely on high-priced capital goods and raw materials imported principally from the Soviet Union. Second, in the interest of diversification of the economy, Cuba had cut back sugar production. The result was that, in 1962, Cuba's exports to the USSR declined in value to a point where they failed to balance the growing Soviet shipments to Cuba (see Table 1).

Although Havana's debt to Moscow was beginning to rise, Soviet-Cuban ties deteriorated markedly in the aftermath of what Castro viewed as a Soviet "sell-out" to the US during the 1962 missile crisis. Moscow therefore felt obliged to pacify Castro with further economic concessions. A trade agreement signed in February 1963 raised the Soviet purchase

[19] *Ibid*, p. 49.
[20] *Ibid*, p. 218.
[21] *Ibid*, p. 282.

[22] V.V. Volskii, Ed., *Kuba: 10 let revoliutsii* (Cuba: Ten Years of the Revolution), Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p. 226.

Table 1: Volume of Cuban Trade with the Soviet Union
(in millions of rubles and percentages)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Turnover	160.6	539.0	540.7	507.8	588.6	645.9	689.2	842.2	811.8	770.1	1,045.0
Imports	67.2	258.3	330.1	359.8	329.4	337.9	431.9	506.7	561.8	561.6	580.0
Exports	93.4	280.7	210.6	148.0	259.2	308.0	257.3	335.5	250.0	208.5	465.0
Balance	+26.2	+22.4	−119.5	−211.8	−70.2	−29.9	−174.6	−171.2	−311.8	−353.1	−115.0
Cuba's Share of Soviet Trade	1.6%	5.1%	4.5%	3.9%	4.2%	4.4%	4.5%	5.1%	4.5%	3.9%	4.7%
USSR Share of Cuban Imports	13.8%	41.1%	54.2%	53.1%	40.2%	49.5%	56.3%	58.3%	....	....	....
USSR Share of Cuban Exports	16.7%	48.2%	42.3%	30.2%	38.5%	47.0%	46.2%	52.1%	....	....	....

SOURCES: *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik 1918-1966*, (USSR Foreign Trade: Statistical Handbook 1918-1966), Moscow, Mezndunarodnie Otnosheniia, 1967, p. 69; *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1968 god*, (USSR Foreign Trade in 1968), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, 1969, p. 15; *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), No. 6, 1970, p. 55, and No. 5, 1971, p. 48; *Compendio estadistico de Cuba, 1967* (Statistical Handbook of Cuba 1967), Havana, JUCEPLAN, 1967, p. 27.

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price for Cuban sugar to bring it into line with rising world market prices. A joint communique issued on May 23, 1963, at the end of Castro's visit to Moscow, noted that the Soviet government had proposed the price change "on its own initiative." [23] The agreement also allowed Cuba to withhold delivery of one million tons of sugar due the Soviet Union under the previously designated quota of some two million tons for 1963. While this step doubtless was a response to the sharp decline in Cuban sugar production in that year, the concession ostensibly enabled Cuba to obtain hard currency through sales on the world market.[24] Such currency may have been necessary, particularly, in order to import certain required machinery and equipment which the Soviet Union was unable to provide. In any case, Cuba's trade with non-Communist countries increased to 25.7 percent of her total trade volume in 1963, as compared with 17.6 percent in 1962.[25] But the ultimate result was a further sharp decline in Cuban sugar deliveries to the USSR and a marked rise in Cuba's trade deficit with that country.

Return to Sugar Monoculture

Faced with the realization that its Cuban rescue operation was developing into a costly long-term economic undertaking, Moscow apparently persuaded or forced Cuba to rethink its development policy and return to the traditional concentration on sugar production in order to generate adequate foreign exchange to finance a more modest, decelerated industrialization program and (hopefully) to reduce or eliminate its unfavorable trade balance with the Soviet bloc.

Although Castro had stated at the outset of 1964 that Cuba was entering the New Year with the best economic situation and prospects in a long time,[26] he apparently was persuaded to accept the Soviet view during a visit to Moscow in January of that year. Upon his return he announced that Cuba would henceforth concentrate on increasing sugar production. A long-term trade agreement signed with the USSR in the same month pointedly provided for a schedule of Cuban sugar deliveries totaling more than 24 million tons for 1965-70, at a fixed price of 6.11 cents a pound.[27] Since Soviet payments for Cuban imports were now to be made entirely in the form of goods, Cuba's ability to obtain convertible currency apparently hinged solely on its success in producing sufficient sugar to meet Soviet-bloc commitments and still have a surplus for sale on the world market. As a consequence, the Cuban government announced a five-year sugar plan setting a production target of 10 million tons in 1970.[28] The USSR promised aid in mechanizing sugar harvesting and improving and expanding Cuban sugar mills.

In fact, Cuba failed to achieve its planned level of sugar production for 1965-70 (see Table 2) and to deliver its promised quota of sugar to the USSR during this period (see footnote 27). In a 1970 interview with a Soviet correspondent, Castro admitted:

Previously we did not fulfill many pledges, and accordingly—very naturally and justifiably—a certain skepticism developed concerning our economic plans.[29]

On the other hand, the Soviet supply of mechanized sugar harvesting equipment failed to yield expected results. It turned out that the Soviet harvester, imported in large numbers, was unsuited to Cuban conditions. Castro described the machine as "a great destroyer—where it had passed nothing will grow for a long time to come."[30] Although annual sugar output has gradually increased since the disastrous year 1963, when Cuba reportedly was forced to purchase 10,000 tons of sugar each from England and France in order to meet its commitments to Bulgaria and Communist China,[31] labor productivity in Cuban sugar production has actually decreased.

Shortfalls in Cuban deliveries to the Soviet Union resulted not only from fluctuations in annual sugar production but also from Castro's resolve to meet Cuban commitments to other Communist states and the need to sell sugar on the world market to obtain hard currency. In spite of the rising Cuban trade deficit and increasing political difficulties, Soviet exports

[23] Stephen Clissold, Ed., *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968: A Documentary Survey*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 285.

[24] *Ibid.* In May 1963, sugar prices on the world market stood at nine cents (US) per pound.

[25] *Compendio estadistico de Cuba 1967*, p. 27.

[26] See Castro's speech of January 2, 1964, in *Bohemia*, No. 2, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 39.

[27] *Pravda*, Jan. 23, 1964. The agreement stipulated the following schedule of sugar deliveries: 2.1 million tons in 1965; 3 million tons in 1966; 4 million tons in 1967; and 5 million tons a year in 1968-70.

[28] *Hoy*, Oct. 14, 1964.

[29] *Ogoniok* (Moscow), No. 21, June 1970, p. 3.

[30] Karol, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[31] *The New York Times*, April 30, 1964.

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Table 2: Cuban Sugar Production, 1960-70

Year	Total Production [a]	Planned Production [a]	Percent of crop exported to USSR
1960	5.862	. . .	25.0
1961	6.767	. . .	49.4
1962	4.815	. . .	46.4
1963	3.821	. . .	26.1
1964	4.589	. . .	40.5
1965	6.082	6.0	38.3
1966	4.866	6.5	37.8
1967	6.236	7.5	39.9
1968	5.315	8.0	32.9
1969	4.700	9.0	30.0
1970	8.520	10.0	35.2

[a] In millions of tons.
SOURCES: International Sugar Organization, *Sugar Year Book 1969*, London, 1970, p. 52; US Department of Agriculture, *Foreign Agriculture*, (Washington), Nov. 3, 1970, p. 8; *Foreign Agriculture Circular, Sugar*, (Washington), December 1970, p. 11; *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), No. 9, 1971, pp. 34-55; *Hoy*, (Havana), Oct. 14, 1964.

to Cuba, according to Moscow sources, increased steadily between 1964 and 1968. In fact, the island has grown increasingly dependent upon Soviet deliveries of petroleum and other critical commodities.

The Soviet Union claims to "fully or almost fully" fill Cuba's needs for oil and petroleum products, mineral fertilizer, sulphur, asbestos, cotton, sawtimber, trucks and special automobiles, and metal-cutting lathes.[32] Cuban imports of petroleum and petroleum products from the USSR rose from 2 million tons in 1960 to 5.7 million tons in 1969. Machinery imports from the Soviet Union rose from 54.8 million rubles in 1961 to 213.9 million rubles in 1969.[33] The following figures for USSR imports to Cuba in 1968 are indicative of the critical types of goods supplied: 287,500 tons of fertilizer, 3,203 trucks and 377 special automobiles, 4,619 tractors, 9,741 agricultural machines and 251 combines, 159 metal-cutting lathes, 6,900 tons of cotton, 480,900 tons of grain, 294,900 tons of flour, 51.7 million cans of meat, 43.8 million cans of milk, and 100,600 tons of fats.[34]

It was only in 1967-68, however, at the height of Castro's quarrel with Moscow, that the Soviet Union was able to turn its economic leverage over Cuba to demonstrable political advantage.[35] Clearly annoyed by Castro's acts of defiance, Moscow resorted to veiled economic sanctions, mainly in the form of irregularities and delays in the delivery of strategic items to Cuba. In January 1968, for example, Castro was forced to announce the immediate rationing of gasoline because of the "limited ability" of the Soviet Union to satisfy Cuba's growing demands.[36] According to Orlando Castro Hidalgo, a defector from the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence, the shortage of fuel supplies made it necessary for Castro's armed forces to turn over 30 percent of their stocks for use in agriculture.[37] The USSR also delayed for one month the signing of the 1968 annual trade agreement[38] and reportedly began to charge interest on new credits extended to Cuba.[39]

Moscow's pressure apparently achieved an important shift in Soviet-Cuban relations in August 1968, when Castro gave his qualified endorsement to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in exchange for an assurance of continued Soviet aid. Soviet economic restrictions were lifted shortly thereafter, and following a round of hard bargaining in late 1968 and early 1969, the annual trade agreement for 1969 was signed without undue delay. This agreement targeted a total trade turnover between the two countries of almost 1,000 million rubles for the year. The USSR was also apparently willing to continue to subsidize the Cuban economy, for the 1969 agreement provided "long-term credit to Cuba to cover the differences in the volume of reciprocal supply of goods and services."[40] Actual trade in 1969 amounted to only 770 million rubles.[41] A likely cause of the discrepancy was Cuba's produc-

[32] Volskii, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

[33] *Vneshiaia torgovlia Soiuza SSR za 1968 god* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1968), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, 1969, p. 288; *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1969 god* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1969), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, 1970, p. 50.

[34] *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1968 god*, p. 293.

[35] A major dispute during this period involved the trial in 1968 of a "microfaction" of old-line Cuban Communists headed by Anibal Escalante. This group was accused of having conspired with representatives of the Soviet, Czechoslavak and German Democratic Republic's Communist parties to "destroy the firmness of the [Cuban] revolutionary forces." See *Granma* (Havana), Feb. 2, 1968.

[36] *Ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1968.

[37] *Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate*, Part 20, October 16, 1969, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 1426.

[38] *Granma*, May 23, 1968.

[39] Kevin Devlin, "The Soviet-Cuban Confrontation: Economic Reality and Political Judo," from the Research Department of Radio Free Europe, April 1, 1968, pp. 15-16, cited in Edward Gonzalez. "Castro: The Limits of Charisma," *Problems of Communism* (Washington), July-August 1970, p. 21.

[40] Radio Moscow, Feb. 7, 1969.

[41] *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), No. 6, 1970, p. 55; *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1969 god*, p. 15.

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tion of only 4.7 million tons of sugar for the year instead of the targeted 9 million tons.[42]

For its part, the USSR leveled off its exports to Cuba in 1969. However, Soviet shipments resumed their steady growth in 1970, presumably in conjunction with Castro's all-out drive to produce a record 10 million tons of sugar. The 1970 Soviet-Cuban Trade Agreement targeted a turnover of 1,200 million rubles,[43] but the actual total came only to 1,045 million rubles. Although Cuba produced 8.5 million tons of sugar in 1970, it was able to deliver only three million tons of its five million-ton obligation under the 1964 agreement with the Soviet Union.

A new, long-term trade agreement concluded between the two countries in February 1971 stated that Cuba and the Soviet Union were "extending until 1975 the trade and payments agreement," and that the USSR would make deliveries of goods "worth 100 million rubles more than last year."[44] This would amount to 680 million rubles for 1971, based on the 580 million rubles reported for 1970 (see Table 1). The sugar production target for 1971 was originally set at seven million tons but was subsequently reduced by Castro to 6.6 million tons. Cuba actually produced only 5.9 million tons, which means that with the Soviet commitment to increase its exports the Cuban trade deficit in all likelihood will continue to rise.

Castro's Mounting Debt

It seems useful at this point to attempt to assess the overall dimension of Castro's mounting indebtedness to Moscow. According to available Soviet statistics (see Table 1), the cumulative Cuban trade deficit with the USSR for 1960-70 amounted to 1,508 million rubles. It appears likely that the trade deficit for 1971 will amount to approximately another 400 million rubles, which indicates that the cumulative trade deficit will have surpassed 1,900 million rubles, or $2,000 million, by 1972. The trade deficit, however, represents only part of Cuba's total debt to the Soviet Union. Not included in this figure are the cost of maintaining Soviet technical and military advisors in Cuba (in addition to their ruble salaries, they receive substantial monthly living allowances in pesos); the cumulative interest charged on credits since 1968; Soviet loans of hard currency for Cuban purchases in non-Communist countries; military aid;

[42] US Department of Agriculture, *Foreign Agricultural Circular, Sugar*, December 1970, p. 11, gives a production figure of 5.2 million short tons. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Ideological Radicalization and Economic Policy in Cuba," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, (Beverly Hills, California) Vol. 5, 1969-1970, p. 207, places 1969 sugar production at 4.46 million metric tons. The International Sugar Organization, *The Sugar Year Book, 1969*, London, 1970, p. 52, places the figure at 5.534 million metric tons for the entire 1968-69 harvest period.

[43] Radio Moscow, TASS International Service, Dec. 9, 1970.

[44] Radio Moscow, Feb. 22, 1971.

Table 3: Soviet Sugar Trade

	Imports from Cuba (Raw Sugar)					Exports from USSR (Refined Sugar)	
Year	Volume [a]	Value [b]	Price Paid [c]	Yearly Avg. Price on World Market [c]	Cost to USSR of Sugar Subsidy [d]	Volume [a]	Value [b]
1960	1,467	93.4	3.21	3.15	1.94	243	22.8
1961	3,345	270.4	4.00	2.70	95.87	414	33.2
1962	2,233	183.6	4.13	2.78	66.46	792	56.4
1963	996	123.2	6.22	8.29	(+45.45)	802	94.1
1964	1,859	222.7	6.00*	5.72	11.48	348	50.2
1965	2,330	273.4	6.00*	2.03	203.93	604	43.9
1966	1,841	225.8	6.11	1.76	176.55	1,070	59.8
1967	2,479	302.3	6.11	1.99	225.17	1,106	58.8
1968	1,749	212.7	6.11	1.12	192.41	1,374	79.5
1969	1,332	161.9	6.11	3.38	80.17	1,081	85.6
1970	3,000	364.3	6.11	3.69	159.72	....	...

[a] In thousands of metric tons. [b] In millions of rubles. [c] In cents per pound. [d] In millions of US dollars.

* The authors have no explanation for these deviations from the 6.11-cent price established in 1964 (the 1964 and 1965 prices, as all others, are derived from official Soviet statistics).

SOURCES: *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, statisticheskii sbornik, 1918-1966*, p. 95; *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1968 god*, pp. 32, 50; *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1969 god*, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, 1970, pp. 32, 49; *Foreign Trade*, No. 9, 1971, p. 54-55. Figures for average prices on the world market (column 5) are from the International Sugar Organization, *Sugar Yearbook 1970*, London, 1971.

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and other forms of assistance. A recent Cuban defector who formerly occupied a responsible position in Cuba's central planning agency claims that Havana's total economic indebtedness to the USSR officially stood at $2,200 million in January 1971. Consequently, the total debt—excluding the cost of Soviet arms assistance—is likely to approach $3,000 million by 1972.

It is difficult, of course, to make an accurate assessment of the true cost of Soviet assistance to Cuba. This is particularly so because the prices charged by the Soviet Union for its exports to Cuba appear in many instances to have been inflated over world market prices. An estimate by the National Bank of Cuba places the total cost of the Soviet goods supplied to Cuba at about 50 percent above what Cuba would have had to pay if it had been able to purchase the same quality and types of goods from non-Communist countries. To pay for these goods, Cuba is required to deliver sugar—the only medium it has for generating urgently needed dollar exchange. In effect, Castro is "forced to make dollar investments for ruble sales."[45]

There are other factors, however, which are to Cuba's advantage. In the first place, the Soviet price paid for Cuban sugar has remained above the prevailing world market price since 1964. Furthermore, Moscow has shown considerable leniency in relaxing Cuba's quota for sugar deliveries to the USSR, apparently in order to allow Havana to make hard-currency sales on the world market. (It might be noted in this regard that in May 1971 Cuba's annual quota under the International Sugar Agreement for sales on the world market was set at 2.3 million tons.[46])

Another measure of Soviet aid to Cuba is the volume of Soviet shipping engaged in traffic between the two countries. According to a 1969 Moscow shipping report, 400 Soviet vessels called at Cuban ports on 1,600 occasions that year.[47] This same source stated that "an average of 60-65 large vessels are daily sailing between Cuba and the USSR or are in the ports of both countries," and that more ships would be placed in service "in the next few years." It was also reported that besides the Black Sea ports of Odessa, Novorossiisk, Tuapse, and Batumi—the main shipping points for trade with Cuba—the port of Feodosiya in the Crimea was added at the end of 1968, and a special oil jetty was built there to facilitate the loading of tankers destined for Cuba.[48] According to a Moscow radio broadcast, Soviet ships in 1969 carried 7.8 million tons of cargo to Cuba, including 5.6 million tons of oil, but brought back only 1.3 million tons of cargo from Cuba.[49] This indicates that the Soviet Union bears the additional cost of a highly uneconomical use of its ships in the Cuban trade—a factor further compounded by the long delays in loading and unloading in Cuban ports.

Soviet-Cuban Sugar Trade

Important to any assessment of the Soviet Union's support of the Cuban economy is an attempt to draw some balance for the trade in sugar between the two countries. This trade, together with Soviet deliveries of critical supplies and equipment to Cuba, has brought Cuba to the position of the sixth largest trading partner of the USSR.[50] The Soviet Union, itself a major sugar producer, has been willing to pay high "subsidized" prices for large quantities of Cuban cane sugar. It would appear that this sugar has not only helped supplement Soviet production in meeting domestic demand in the USSR but also provided the Kremlin with a marketable surplus of refined sugar which it has utilized for hard-currency sales and other foreign deliveries.

Let us examine first the matter of the Soviet sugar subsidy. As shown in Table 3, the Soviet Union has paid a price for Cuban sugar in excess of the prevailing world average price in every year since 1960 except 1963, when the Soviet Union raised its payments significantly, but not enough to equal the brief upsurge in world prices. When Khrushchev and Castro agreed in 1964 to a stable long-term price of 6.11 cents a pound, they both apparently believed it to be a fair one. Had Cuba been able to deliver in full its annual commitments of sugar to the USSR, this would in all probability have balanced the cost of Cuban imports from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, if world sugar prices had remained high, Moscow might even have realized a profit in its Cuban trade by reselling imported sugar on the world market.

[45] Karol, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

[46] Cuba's 1972 quota for sugar sales on the world market, as established at the Seventh Session of the International Sugar Council meeting in London last November, is 2,257,500 tons. This compares with a 1972 quota of 1,175,000 tons set for the USSR. See International Sugar Organization Press Release (71) 17, London, Nov. 19, 1971.

[47] Moscow Maritime Press Service, July 4, 1969.

[48] Radio Moscow, Feb. 14, 1969.

[49] Moscow Maritime Press Service, March 25, 1970.

[50] *The New York Times*, March 24, 1971.

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What actually occurred, however, is that Cuba failed to deliver the promised quantities of cane sugar, while at the same time the 6.11-cent price proved consistently higher than the average world price in every ensuing year. Thus, according to Soviet figures and the average annual world market sugar prices, the net subsidy to Cuban sugar for 1960-70 amounted to a cumulative total of $1,168 million (see Table 3) over what the USSR would have paid for deliveries if it had paid the prevailing average world market price in each year.[51] Of course, from 1965 on, these sugar purchases were exclusively applied against Cuban purchases of Soviet goods in what amounted to barter, or paper, transactions. (Before that, some 20 percent of Soviet sugar purchases had been paid for in convertible currency.) As noted above, these Soviet goods were also overpriced by world standards, or so Cuba has claimed. It is therefore virtually impossible to draw a definitive balance sheet for this bilateral trade relationship.

Whatever the economic balance, however, Moscow did gain several secondary benefits from its "subsidization" of Cuban sugar production. As we have seen, the large debt incurred by Cuba gave the USSR leverage over Castro and the Cuban economy. Also, favorable propaganda capital accrued from Soviet "generosity" toward Cuba and its willingness to pay prices considerably higher than those offered on the world market for Cuban sugar: Cuba's "liberation" from the fluctuations of world sugar prices was presented as an example of the USSR's "internationalism" and of its "disinterested" efforts to stabilize the Cuban economy. Significantly, when the long-term trade agreement came up for renewal in 1971, the fixed price of 6.11 cents per pound for Cuban sugar was extended for five years.

The decision to import large amounts of Cuban sugar has had a major impact on the Soviet Union and its trading partners in Eastern Europe. For example, Poland and Czechoslovakia—which as recently as 1962 had delivered a total of 231,000 tons of refined sugar to the USSR—saw their sugar deliveries to the Soviet Union dwindle to only 1,400 tons in 1965.[52] At the same time, Moscow has become an increasingly significant exporter of sugar, thanks to the growing shipments from Havana. From a total of 242,900 tons exported in 1960, the Soviet Union has expanded its sugar exports to 1,374,000 tons in 1968 and 1,080,800 tons in 1969 (see Table 3). The greater part of Soviet sugar exports in recent years have been to non-Communist countries of the developing world—notably Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. Finland and Yugoslavia are also important sugar customers, while Soviet-bloc countries receive only some 15 to 20 percent of Soviet sugar exports.

Beyond providing Moscow with an exportable commodity, the Cuban sugar imports would also appear to have helped meet Soviet domestic consumption and stockpiling requirements.[53] Comparing data on Soviet imports of Cuban sugar with the amounts of sugar exported by the USSR (Table 3), one finds that the Cuban shipments to the USSR more than covered the latter's exports. This would indicate that the Soviet Union, despite being the world's largest sugar producer and despite its prodigious efforts to expand beet-sugar production (in 1966-70, the USSR produced 37 percent more sugar than in the 1961-65 period), still falls short of self-sufficiency. Evidently Moscow is continuing its efforts to achieve this goal, for the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan calls for a further "significant increase" in beet-sugar production.[54]

One may ask why Soviet planners are unwilling to rely for their needs on the "socialist division of labor," which has made Cuba a major supplier of sugar to the socialist world. One reason may be that the USSR is uncertain about Cuba's economic and political future and hence is loath to become dependent on that country for Soviet domestic consumption. Furthermore, reliance on Cuba for sugar would mean surrendering the Kremlin's economic leverage over Castro. Finally, by becoming self-sufficient in sugar, the USSR can hope to earn growing amounts of hard currency through the resale of refined Cuban sugar or the sale of its equivalent in beet sugar. This may, in Moscow's economic calculus, offset some of the

[51] See Table 2. According to Bekarevich, Soviet price support of Cuban sugar for 1960-67 alone amounted to $730.1 million (*op. cit.*, p. 213).

[52] *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR . . . 1918-1966*, p. 159.

[53] According to available Soviet statistics, sugar reserves of the USSR in terms of days of domestic consumption declined from 75 days in 1963 to 56 days in 1964, and then rose to 99 days in 1965. (It also appears that in 1963 the USSR increased sugar exports to take advantage of high world prices.) *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1964 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1964), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1965, p. 634, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1967 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1967), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1968, p. 721. In 1963, a sharp drop in Cuban sugar shipments (to 996,000 tons) and a decline in Soviet beet sugar production likely caused a depletion of Soviet stocks. Although Cuban shipments rebounded to 1,859,000 tons in 1964, Soviet exports of sugar dropped sharply to 348,000 tons (compared with 802,000 tons in 1963). One may infer that the Cuban shipments went to replenish the sugar stocks of the USSR.

[54] *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1971.

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Table 4: Cuban Trade with Comecon Members Exclusive of USSR
(in millions of dollars)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Turnover	31.6	151.2	233.2	268.4	211.0	196.2	229.6	232.2
Cuban Trade	2.3	11.9	18.2	19.0	12.2	12.6	15.1	13.5
Exports	11.7	61.4	110.3	124.1	54.5	100.2	100.9	115.1
Imports	19.9	89.8	122.9	144.3	156.5	96.0	118.7	117.1
Balance	−8.2	−28.4	−12.6	−20.2	−102.0	+4.2	−7.8	−2.0

SOURCE: C. Paul Roberts, Ed., *Cuba, 1968, Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970, pp. 168-69.

losses incurred in its trade with Cuba. From the Cuban viewpoint, it means that Moscow and Havana will be competing for sales on the world market, the former on the strength of Cuban sugar deliveries.

Havana and Comecon

Although Moscow is not willing to become dependent on its trade with Cuba, it does seem intent on integrating the island's economy more closely into the "world socialist economy." As one Soviet commentator observed, Cuba's development

must be based not on the rejection of historically-determined specialization but on the wise use of all its possibilities with the purpose of capital accumulation and transfer in the future to a more effective and rational structure of the national economy within the framework *of the international socialist division of labor.*[55]

While Cuba is regarded as a member in good standing of the "community of socialist states," it has yet to join Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—the main economic institution of the Soviet bloc). Havana is content to send an occasional observer to Comecon meetings,[56] and the Council's membership seems none too eager to have Cuba join, perhaps in light of the heavy burden which Havana has already been to the bloc.

Nevertheless, Cuba continues to maintain close economic ties with other Comecon countries besides the USSR. A number of these have, in turn, granted Castro long-term credits—*e.g.*, a loan from Czechoslovakia in 1960 of $40 million for industrial construction, a credit of $20 million from the German Democratic Republic in 1968 to buy hydraulic equipment, a credit of $30 million from Romania in 1968 for oil-drilling equipment, and an unspecified amount from Bulgaria in 1968 for refrigeration equipment.[57] In 1970, additional credits were granted to Cuba by Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and the GDR. These credits have been necessary, at least in part, because of the consistent deficit which Cuba has been running in its trade with the Comecon states (exclusive of the USSR). The deficit had mounted to a cumulative total of $177 million through 1967 (see Table 4). As in the case of trade with the Soviet Union, the bulk of Cuba's exports to these countries is accounted for by sugar, although they also include tobacco, nickel, and alcohol. Since 1963, Cuban sugar exports to the East European members of Comecon has fluctuated from a low of 250,000 tons to a high of 796,000 tons (in 1969).[58] It is interesting to note that Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic pay significantly less for Cuban sugar than does the USSR—their respective costs being 5.15 and 5.53 cents a pound, as compared to 6.11 cents for the Soviet Union.

Cuba also trades with the People's Republic of China, Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Cuban exports of sugar to China have amounted to as much as 556,000 tons in a single year,[59] and in return China has supplied rice—a staple of the Cuban diet. In recent years, Cuba's annual sugar exports to Communist states other than the USSR ap-

[55] Volskii, *op. cit.* p. 159 (emphasis added).

[56] Daniel Tretiak, *Cuba and the Communist System: The Politics of a Communist Independent (1967-1969)*, Waltham, Massachusetts, Westinghouse Electric Corporation Advanced Studies Group, July 1969, p. 22.

[57] Volskii, *op. cit.*, p. 277-88 (original data given in pesos).

[58] *Sugar Year Book, 1969*, pp. 53-56.

[59] *Ibid.*

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pear to have been in excess of one million tons. In February 1971, Cuba agreed to deliver 120,000 tons of sugar to Chile each year for three years, mainly in exchange for agricultural produce.[60]

Toward Integration

Although Castro has yet to join the USSR-dominated Comecon, he has been under increasing pressure to integrate his economic programs more closely into the Soviet scheme of things. Domestic economic setbacks in Cuba and the 1970 expiration of the long-term trade agreement with the USSR set the stage for a new step in this direction. In December 1970, the Soviet news agency TASS announced the formation of a Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The report commented that "the new commission will deal with the question of further improvement of economic relations, especially draft proposals for organizing cooperation between planning bodies, industries, and departments."[61] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, speaking at the signing ceremony, stressed that "the establishment of the new commission raises Soviet-Cuban cooperation to a high level, will give an opportunity to plan joint works over a long period of time, and will help make better use of economic resources."[62]

The first session of the joint body was held in Havana in September 1971. V. Novikov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who headed the Soviet delegation, stated prior to departing from Moscow that the commission would examine "a vast number of problems in Havana in order to increase Soviet-Cuban economic links."[63] These matters were said to include future collaboration in nickel production, power generation and transmission, irrigation construction, manufacture of medicines, and production of cane harvesters. Upon his return, Novikov indicated that "one of the fundamental problems of the session was the examination of the fulfillment of commercial contracts between the two countries in the past two years and at present."[64]

In a broader perspective, the commission seems designed to get Cuba to develop more effective economic planning geared to the USSR's Ninth Five-Year Plan. According to a Cuban source, the December 1970 agreement was followed by the arrival in Cuba of large numbers of Soviet planning specialists and economists who were to help the Castro government place its long-term planning on a more rational and efficient basis. It has since been reported that Soviet advisors and technicians are working at all levels of the Cuban economic structure to help correct critical shortages and develop fundamental areas of the economy.[65]

If the Soviet Union should succeed in reshaping the Cuban planning structure, the position of professional economic planners and managers would doubtless be strengthened. This, in turn, might result in a further increase of Soviet influence, for most of the planners have been trained by Moscow. Furthermore, in an attempt to ease its critical shortage of technicians, managers, and skilled workers, Cuba has sent large numbers of its citizens to the USSR for training. During the years 1960-65, a total of 3,000 Cuban agricultural workers, 200 shipping and fisheries officials, and 500 Cuban students attended Soviet technical schools.[66] By 1968, some 2,600 Cubans had attended Soviet universities, and some 700 more were studying there in 1969.[67] A 1971 Soviet newspaper account made mention of 3,500 Cuban technicians who had studied in Soviet technical schools and 5,000 Cuban skilled workers who had received on-the-job training in Soviet industry.[68] Significantly, the September 1971 meeting of the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission specifically examined the question of "training of national [Cuban] cadres."

An Uneasy Partnership

What, then, is the prognosis for the Soviet-Cuban economic relationship?

Despite continuing expressions of mutual regard as well as ever-increasing political subservience on the part of Havana, collaboration in the economic sphere can be expected to continue to generate frustration and irritation on both sides. While

[60] Radio Havana, Feb. 17, 1971. The Santiago (Chile) daily, *Puro Chile*, reported on February 28, 1971, that Cuba has been paying for imports of agricultural produce in US dollars.

[61] Radio Moscow, TASS International Service, Dec. 9, 1970.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] Radio Moscow, Sept. 2 and 11, 1971.

[64] *Ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1971.

[65] *The Miami Herald*, April 14, 1971; *Latin America* (London), May 7, 1971.

[66] Volskii, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

[67] Radio Moscow, Jan. 22, 1969.

[68] *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 27, 1971.

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granting credits designed to help Cuba "overcome the difficulties connected with the deficit in foreign trade,"[69] Moscow would clearly prefer that Cuba pay its own way within the Soviet bloc. Yet the trade deficit continues to grow, with little likelihood of reduction in the near future. Meanwhile, the Russians do not hide their dissatisfaction. According to one close observer, they "tell all who care to listen" that they "have been pampering this ungrateful island, and that they can never recover their investments with any amounts of sugar, nickel, and tobacco Cuba may be able to send."[70]

The Cuban leadership, on the other hand, seemingly expected the USSR to provide Cuba with unlimited aid on account of Moscow's "internationalist" obligation to support another socialist state, and it has been disappointed at discovering that Moscow not only places a high premium on its assistance but also expects gratitude in return. On the subject of this Soviet aid, Castro once complained that "they give us nothing for nothing (*i.e.,* for free), and then act as if they were our greatest benefactors, as if they were showering us with gold!"[71]

Nonetheless, neither side is ready to break up the partnership. The Soviet Union, for its part, is apparently willing to continue paying the price, high as it may be, in order to preserve a Communist regime and salient in the Americas which it hopes can be effectively used to reduce the role of the US. It believes that "understanding is growing in Latin America of the fact that the scope of the movement against US influence will become broader when the blockade and artificial isolation of Cuba is ended,"[72] and that Chile's resumption of trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba is a "serious blow to Washington" which sets an example of "independent" foreign policy for other Latin American countries.[73]

Castro, in turn, has persisted in asserting that he will not rejoin the OAS if it means loosening Cuba's military ties with the Soviet Union and abandoning his support of revolutions in the Americas.[74] Yet, ironically, Havana's renewed access to its natural markets and primary source of supplies—*i.e.*, the Western Hemisphere, and particularly the United States—offers the only practical means of reducing its economic vassalage to the USSR and of slowing down the process of Cuba's progressive integration into the Soviet bloc.

[69] Volskii, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
[70] Karol, *op. cit.*, p. 425.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 426.
[72] A. Aleksin, " 'Tikhaia' Interventsiia" (The "Silent" Intervention), *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1970, p. 98.
[73] *Pravda*, Nov. 14 and 15, 1970; *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 17, 1970.
[74] Radio Havana, April 20, 1971.

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Books

Revolution in 20th-Century China

By Allen S. Whiting

LUCIEN BIANCO: *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949.* Translated by Muriel Bell. Standford, Standford University Press, 1971.

TWENTY YEARS AGO the Australian scholar C. P. Fitzgerald offered a sweeping, sympathetic, and thoughtful analysis of the historical processes that culminated in the 1949 triumph of Communist revolution in China.[1] Written almost on the heels of Mao Tse-tung's victory, the book inevitably (if somewhat unfairly) came under challenge later on as a spate of monographic studies examined fresh evidence and old concepts. Now, Professor Bianco's succinct, lucid and penetrating study meets an urgent need in synthesizing all these studies into a new, broad overview of the Chinese Communist path to power. The book first appeared in French in 1967 and now is available for the first time in English translation. The English version has been only marginally modified by the author to correct earlier factual errors and to remove what he describes as "a sizable section of the original conclusion, whose main thrust was to refute or qualify certain ideas then current in France."

[1] *Revolution in China*, New York, Praeger, 1952. Updated and republished by Praeger in 1966 under the title *The Birth of Communist China.*

The book fills an important gap for contemporary American audiences in particular. Part of this is due to the fact that while American scholars have recently produced a great deal of valuable work on pre-Communist China, there was a period of nearly a decade following the Maoist victory during which the repercussions of McCarthyism and hysteria over the "loss of China to communism" rendered 20th-century China virtually "off limits" to academic circles. Moreover, when American scholars again turned their attention to China in the 1960's, they selectively scrutinized various aspects of the Communist regime and its revolutionary history, but while their thoroughness and objectivity were in the best Sinological tradition, their works were too narrowly focused to impart a broader understanding of the basic phenomena and forces at work in the massive, revolutionary restructuring of the world's oldest political system. It is precisely this sort of broad overview of the revolution in China that Professor Bianco seeks to provide.

The author's conclusions are deceptively simple. The three prime ingredients in the success of the Chinese Communist revolution, he holds, were revulsion against imperialism, the revolutionary potential of an exploited peasantry, and the creation of a revolutionary army. "Imperialism, the peasantry, and the army"—this triad has a familiar ring to students of Mao's writings, but Bianco is not merely echoing Maoist cant. He demonstrates convincingly why it was necessary to combine all three elements before a successful Communist revolution could be achieved. Buttressing his argument with rich documentation from non-Communist sources, he shows why the phenomenon of 19th-century imperialism and the opposition to it—in themselves—failed to generate genuine national unity, much less trigger revolution against the ruling elite who compromised with foreign intervention in Chinese affairs. Bianco also demonstrates that the discontent of the exploited Chinese peasantry was insufficient by itself to spur mass revolt for any extended period of time or over broad geographic areas.

For a decade and a half after its official birth in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party floundered and failed in its attempts to combine Chinese nationalist sentiment and socio-economic unrest into a successful revolutionary movement. The Japanese invasion of 1937, however, brought a critical turning point in the CCP's fortunes by enabling Mao and his associates to capitalize on inflamed Chinese nationalism and to apply their extraordinary organizational

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skills to the task of arousing and channeling mass unrest into effective political action. It also facilitated Mao's strategy of building a revolutionary army, since the Communist forces could now claim legitimacy as an instrument of national salvation from Japanese imperialism while remaining dedicated to the ultimate Communist goal of winning power.

In reading Professor Bianco's traditional syncretic analysis, this reviewer was struck by the remarkable similarity between the author's conclusions and those arrived at by another scholar using a quite different and more modern methodological approach. In a brilliant experiment with empirical data, Roy Hofheinz, Jr., attempted to determine which of a number of specific individual factors was most responsible for the Communists' success in China.[2] Although his various quantitative measurements failed to point to a single, decisive factor, they did show anti-imperialism, social unrest among the Chinese peasantry, and creation of a revolutionary army to be the three most significant factors—*i.e.*, precisely the same conclusion reached by Professor Bianco.

One also cannot fail to be impressed by the author's wit and wisdom, his humanity and honesty. His discursive footnotes show familiarity with a wide range of fiction and philosophical writing, as well as with the standard scholarly works. His comments on such problems as the appropriateness of the concept of "semi-feudalism" for analysis of China's prerevolutionary rural society, an area where the author properly draws on his own original research, are incisive. Bianco expands on Mao's categorization of rich, middle, and poor peasants in purely economic terms by adding the "perceptions" of the peasants themselves as a basis of differentiation. Moreover, in his sensitive portrayal of conditions in the countryside, he makes no effort to conceal his concern for the oppression and suffering experienced by the majority of the people at the hands of a self-perpetuating, exploitative and unresponsive minority.

An especially rewarding aspect of this work is its objectivity and candor in dealing with matters that have become obscured by revolutionary and reactionary rhetoric alike. In examining the developmental dynamic of imperialism and the response of the Chinese ruling classes thereto, Bianco explicitly eschews value judgments. He correctly calls attention to the overlooked heritage of xenophobia shared by both Nationalists and Communists, manifested both in Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny* and in more recent Chinese Communist histories. He notes Marx's failure to foresee the revolutionary potential of the peasants but cautions against "substituting an idealized peasantry for a defaulting urban proletariat." In his generally favorable assessment of Mao, he bluntly states, "The creator of the peasant strategy did not have to be a profound thinker, and in fact was not. Later Mao would become a mediocre theoretician . . . [but his] greatness lies not in his writings, but in his deeds." Indeed, Bianco credits Mao with a winning combination of "heroism," "toughness," "audacity," and "courage to free himself from dogma." Thus the author restores reality to an image which Peking's cult of personality has threatened to make a caricature.

In short, Bianco is no doctrinaire apologist or critic. His vantage point, as Mark Selden properly points out in a brief introduction to the book, is that of the great European social historians, detached from and yet involved in

[2] "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns, 1923-45," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Seattle, Washington, University of Washington Press, 1969.

Reviewers in This Issue

ALLEN S. WHITING—Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) and formerly head of the US State Department's Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific; his works include *China's Political System*, 1967, and *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-24*, reissued in 1968.

HOWARD WRIGGINS—Professor of Political Science and Director of the Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University (New York); former member of the Policy Planning Council, US Department of State, author of *Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Aggregating Power in Contemporary Asia and Africa*, 1969, and *South and Southeast Asia in the Asian State System*, 1971.

WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR.—Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Associate of the Harvard Russian Research Center; author of *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations*, 1968, and co-author of *The Soviet Union and Arms Control*, 1970.

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON—Reader in Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Kent (England); formerly a colonial administrator in Malaya and Hong Kong and a member of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam; author of *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, 1968.

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the eternal struggle of humanity to prevail over adversity. He faces the costs of revolution squarely and challenges those who argue that other alternatives were available. Yet, he makes no claim that the CCP has brought permanent solutions; in fact, he prudently refrains from assessing the two decades of Communist rule. Surely, many readers must feel regret that he closes the book at the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, without expressing his views on the regime's accomplishments.

To add one final observation, Professor Bianco's analysis has profound implications for those concerned with the relevance of the Chinese revolution to other societies. Although he touches on this question only obliquely, he in effect denies the transferability of Mao's model in the form either of abstract formulas or of simple emulation of Chinese strategies and tactics. However, if the prime ingredients he lists for Mao's success in China—imperialism, the peasantry, and a revolutionary army—are critical to Communist success everywhere, one might find a striking parallel in what has happened in Vietnam since the end of World War II. The failure of Communist movements *per se* to prevail elsewhere since 1949 (Cuba being a possible, though debatable, exception) may also be evidence of the accuracy of Bianco's analysis, since the clear identification of imperialism with a foreign power, whether present in the country as invader or exploiter, has become increasingly difficult in the post-colonial era. The debate cannot be settled definitively, but Bianco's contribution to an understanding of the revolution in one country, China, is most welcome.

The USSR in the Third World

By Howard Wriggins

ARTHUR STEIN: *India and the Soviet Union—The Nehru Era.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969.
W. RAYMOND DUNCAN, Ed.: *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries.* Waltham, Mass. Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970.

THESE TWO BOOKS provide a complementary focus on Soviet relations with the Third World. Arthur Stein's study of relations between India and the USSR is a detailed chronicling of the bilateral diplomatic and economic transactions of the two countries up to 1968, primarily as seen from the perspective of New Delhi. The thirteen papers in Raymond Duncan's collection examine in depth the ideological perspectives, policy calculations, and hard experience which influenced Soviet theoreticians and decision-makers as they slowly evolved a more sophisticated understanding of the variety, complexity, and socio-political peculiarities of the countries of the Third World.

Professor Stein's reconstruction of the diplomatic and economic relationship between New Delhi and Moscow is authentic, meticulous and balanced. His sources are predominantly Indian materials in English, although he does draw on Soviet articles and policy declarations to enrich his discussion of changing Soviet perspectives and policies. Particularly useful is the material he gleaned from interviews with Indian officials and politicians and from contacts with some of India's leading journalists during his stay in that country in the mid-1960's. He also gives a knowledgeable account of foreign-policy debates in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament).

The author's predominantly chronological account begins with a brief review of the implicit imperial competition between pre-revolutionary Russia and Great Britain when the British Raj held sway on the subcontinent. He discusses in greater detail the ideological rigidity and practical harshness of Soviet dealings with India during the Stalinist period and then turns to examine the post-Stalinist shift by Moscow to a more flexible approach highlighted by the concept of peaceful coexistence. Professor Stein documents the increasing complexity of the bilateral relationship as it became embroiled in a Sino-Soviet-Indian triangle, particularly during the Himalayan confronta-

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tion between China and India. The treatment runs to 1968, when most of the study was drafted.

In addition to descriptive chapters on aspects of Soviet aid and trade activities, cultural exchanges, and propaganda directed toward India, Professor Stein provides a useful summary chapter on the Nehru era, with particular emphasis on interstate relations in Nehru's last decade, when Soviet Russia had shifted toward peaceful coexistence and greater interest in India. It details the support the USSR gave India over the Kashmir issue and identifies the points on which they differed.

In discussing the impact on Indo-Soviet relations of a number of specific developments—the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the United Nations debates on Kashmir, and the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations—Professor Stein provides a liberal sampling of statements from Indian leaders. This offers the reader a useful counterpoint of events and foreign policy perceptions. However, certain dimensions of Indian foreign-policy-making could usefully have been explored in greater depth—particularly the attitudes of the Indian Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Ministry of Finance, and the impact of these views on policy.

A second area which might have been discussed to advantage concerns Indian public opinion. Public opinion, at least as understood by Nehru, acted as a backdrop to foreign policy. Popular indignation at Chinese military activities on the Tibetan border appears to have constricted Nehru's range of options, and he expressed concern about the possible effects on Hindu-Moslem relations within India of any accommodation to Pakistan's demands concerning Kashmir. Yet, the author pays only sketchy attention to the role of public opinion in affecting Indian foreign policy through editorials, the Congress Party structure, or the Cabinet. Only late in the book does he refer to the "Left" faction in the Cabinet, typified by K. D. Malaviya. Did this group within the Congress Party and the Cabinet have any significant effect on the nature of the official Indian approach to Moscow?

Unfortunately, the author fails to deal with these important elements of the Indian domestic political environment in anything more than a peripheral, suggestive way. Furthermore, there is no systematic analysis of how leading Indians assessed Soviet intentions over time. Foreign policy analysts have always considered such assessments important, particularly since the publication in 1959 of Kenneth Boulding's seminal article on "National Images and International Systems." [1] While there are numerous indications of an interest in changing Indian perceptions of the USSR in Professor Stein's volume, he fails to integrate such observations into the discussion.

Despite these shortcomings, *India and the Soviet Union* does provide an accurate account of the bilateral Indo-Soviet relationship and a useful background for understanding Soviet policy toward the Third World in general and toward China in particular. The work also serves to highlight the vivid contrast between Soviet successes and American failures in dealing with India. In most cases, the Soviet leaders appear to have understood and respected Indian sensitivities and to have adjusted policies in deference to these feelings, whereas American policy seems to have roused anti-American sentiment and weakened the position of America's friends in India. Why this was so would make a useful study in itself.

TURNING TO THE second volume, the reviewer is impressed by the diligence, perceptiveness, and intellectual powers which the contributors brought to their study of Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World. The 13 essays—only a few of which have been published elsewhere—are grouped to provide four perspectives on the Soviet system, and each grouping is capped with a helpful editorial summary.

The first section gives an overview of evolving Soviet strategy toward Third World countries in the Stalinist period and on through the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. The second attempts to assess Soviet influence in the developing countries and the factors limiting it. The next group consists of case studies of Soviet involvement in Cuba, Vietnam, and the Middle East. The final essays analyze Soviet policy from 1964 to 1968, changing Soviet views of national self-interest, and new foci of academic research in the USSR affecting foreign policy behavior.

Of particular interest are the three articles on Soviet foreign policy theory—by I. C. Ojha, R. A. Yellon, and E. K. Valkenier. They demonstrate the continuing Soviet search for ideological clarity—for a dynamic theory capable of coping with a complex reality while remaining faithful to Marxist-Leninist tenets. The result of this search has been a proliferation of new concepts and distinctions to accommodate an all-too-variegated real world. The three authors also

[1] *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Chicago), Vol. III, 1959, 120-31.

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note the tension created by the desire to promote "revolutionary" change while pursuing Soviet national-interest objectives (the latter typically pursued at the expense of indigenous Communists, who have often responded to this neglect by seeking aid and comfort from the People's Republic of China). Through all the Soviet theoretical discussions described, there seems to run a note of anxiety over Moscow's loss of its monopoly on doctrinal authority, as well as a sense of relief when the rather stolid, cost-conscious and prudent Brezhnev-Kosygin policies replaced the brash and unpredictable gestures of Khrushchev in the Third World arena.

Implicit, but never elaborated in detail by the authors of the chapters on Soviet theory, is the notion that the Soviet leaders are developing sober new insights into what constitutes effective and usable power in international affairs and the limitations on the use of such power. They generally agree that the principal goals of Soviet policy since World War II have been to weaken US power and enhance Soviet state power. In the course of dealing with the Third World, the Soviet policy-makers have come to appreciate the fact that it is not as important to establish Communist regimes in the developing countries as was once thought, and that traditional Soviet concepts of class and class conflict are not relevant in these countries. There has likewise been a growing sophistication in Soviet theories about economic development; the USSR has even recognized that regimes which expropriate foreign investments may deprive the indigenous economy of useful sources of know-how and capital.

The empirical chapters—on Ghana, Cuba, Sub-Saharan Africa, Vietnam, and the Middle East conflict of 1967—all reveal how very complicated real life is. In each case, easy Soviet optimism was misplaced. Third World leaders either acted irrationally and impulsively, failed to conform to Soviet plans, or drew their Soviet patrons into situations involving severe risks. The mouthing of correct revolutionary objectives was no assurance of a client's will or organizational capability to carry them out, despite much Soviet tactical advice. Aid projects undertaken for good and sufficient political cause proved unworkable or more costly than anticipated, or repayment burdens became so great as to vitiate the political good will gained by the original bold and generous offer of Soviet aid. Soviet assistance planners, faced with this sad experience and also a dearth of aid resources, have become much more concerned with the economic feasibility of specific projects, or of whole economies, and less enamored with spectacular aid gambles. However, these essays do tend to overstress the negative impact upon aid recipients of Soviet bureaucratic red tape, inadequate planning, and delays. There is also no attempt to view these aid flows in comparison with competing American or multilateral arrangements.

Although Leo Tansky's essay on Soviet military and technical assistance suffers from a similar lack of a suitable comparative framework, it merits our attention because of the apparent payoffs to Moscow for her major investments in military assistance to the United Arab Republic, India, and Nigeria (during the Biafran War). Of equal interest is David Morison's thorough discussion of the Middle East crisis and the Five-Day War of June 1967. The question of who misled Nasser regarding Israel's intentions toward Syria remains unanswered, in Morison's view, although he does offer some evidence to absolve Moscow of responsibility. In this essay, as in the essay on Cuba, the risks to the USSR of becoming overly involved are explicitly outlined. In evaluating these risks, the Soviet leaders had to anticipate the likely US reaction to further involvement by Moscow. It remains to be seen how the Kremlin assesses likely US reactions in a post-Vietnam setting.

The Duncan volume provides one more inconclusive round in the long-standing debate between those analysts who are concerned with military strategy and overall power balances and tend to attribute Soviet caution to fear of the American deterrent, and those who attribute Soviet behavior to the constraints of indigenous politics and development problems in Third World countries and the limitations of Soviet Russia's own resources. It would have been a relief to have this issue definitively settled, but perhaps that was too much to expect of this collection.

However, for those who would probe the future, the reviewer recommends Walter Clemens' concluding essay in the Duncan book. This study provides five different possible Soviet strategies, each with an ingenious and plausible scenario involving interactions among Moscow, Washington, and appropriate Third World countries. He also offers sensible advice to American policy-makers on how to cope with each of the possible Kremlin approaches to the Third World. The result is a thoroughly rewarding, disciplined speculation about the future course of Soviet policy.

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The Arms Race

By Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70.* New York, Humanities Press, 1970.

DO THE SOVIET and US military establishments "interact," or do they operate independently, running races with themselves? Is Moscow seeking military supremacy, or is it merely trying to keep up with the United States? What are the power realities behind the Kremlin's bid for a conference on European security and Brezhnev's invitation to begin negotiations on force reductions? How large a burden does the arms race place on the Soviet economy?

Solid answers to such questions obviously require a large quantity of reliable data on the Soviet and East European military establishments, presented in a manner that permits meaningful comparisons with Western military forces. Many analysts have been led astray by the paucity of the information available or by its presentation in contexts that favored the policy objectives of interested governments (or their separate branches). Not until Khrushchev's speech of January 14, 1960, was there an authoritative Soviet statement on the ups and downs of Soviet military manpower in the 1940's and 1950's. And no reliable breakdown of Soviet military budgets has been given since the 1920's.

Both Moscow and the West, however, came to realize in the late 1950's that mutual security depended in part on mutual awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of each side. To reduce the danger of surprise attack, the Kremlin proposed observation posts in East Central Europe, while Washington favored "open skies" reconnaissance. When Moscow proved cool to reconnaissance by agreement, the US began using U-2 planes to collect strategic information without agreement—a tendency which has since been sharply intensified by the development of spy satellites, now used by the USSR as well as by the US.

Other factors have helped to bring about a greater availability of arms information. On the Soviet side, some of the leaders appear to have come around to the view that Khrushchev's strategy of attempted concealment or bluff regarding Soviet arms strength had been counterproductive because it helped stimulate Western procurement policies based upon the assumption of the "worst possible case" (*e.g.*, the missile-gap myth). At the same time, as its own intelligence gathering became more efficient, the US Government began making public much more information on Soviet arms strength than it had in the past. In the 1950's, this policy had the effect of shocking the American public into a greater awareness of the Soviet military challenge; and later, when US leaders became convinced that they had a decisive lead in the missile race, it served to make this superiority known to the world.

Many of the US data on Soviet military procurement have been assimilated (and amplified) in the annual yearbooks published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London under the title *Military Balance*. Until recently, however, the IISS studies have been, for the most part, compilations of numbers, with little evaluation or comment. There was a conspicuous lack of analysis of the raw data for particular years, of analysis extended over time so that the dynamics of the arms race could be traced, and of parallel studies of East-West behavior in arms control negotiations.

The SIPRI yearbooks on world armaments and disarmament have taken a considerable step toward filling this gap. The first yearbook, published in 1969, focused on the years 1968-69 but included useful sections on nuclear-weapons testing programs in the period 1945-68, summary lists of conflicts since World War II, histories of disarmament efforts in the period 1945-67, and detailed studies of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and other measures being negotiated in 1968-69. The second yearbook, for 1969-70, released in late 1970, maintains the high standards of the first, and the series has become an almost indispensable source for the student of Soviet foreign policy and of relations between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

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The SIPRI volumes, however, do have their limitations. Though supposedly worldwide in scope, they focus very heavily on the US-Soviet confrontation—whether in nuclear-arms development and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in matters of European security, or in such other areas of concern as the militarization of the deep ocean and curbs on chemical and bacteriological warfare. Considerable attention is also given to developments in the Warsaw Pact countries other than the USSR. On the other hand, both the 1968-69 and 1969-70 yearbooks provide almost no information regarding the People's Republic of China, and very little concerning Asia in general.

The paucity of information relating to China and Asia points up a second general limitation of both SIPRI yearbooks published to date —namely, their excessive reliance upon Western sources of information. Thus, inasmuch as considerable data have been published in the West on military matters involving South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam (including US military assistance), the SIPRI volumes are able to present figures and charts covering these subjects. By contrast, however, the 1969-70 yearbook reports only one Soviet-North Vietnamese arms deal, and this only in general terms and citing *The New York Times* as the source. Even given the handicap of relying largely on Western data, it would seem that the compilers of the yearbook could have included more information on the Communist countries of Asia, particularly China.

In one of the compilers' few efforts to utilize Soviet data, the yearbook juxtaposes Soviet budget reports on expenditures for science in the 1960's with official US estimates of Soviet outlays for military and space research and development (R and D). Both official and unofficial US studies estimate the Soviet military R and D effort to be several orders of magnitude higher than the official Soviet figures indicate. The SIPRI analysis, however, represents the US estimates as being based on inferences from isolated data and on a patchwork of quotations from various Soviet sources and hence as inconclusive.

While the SIPRI yearbook repeatedly emphasizes the limited extent of our knowledge of Soviet military spending, it nevertheless asserts that the USSR lags significantly behind the US in most areas of military competition: in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and in their quality (hardening, accuracy, multiple warheads, etc.); in available megatonnage and deliverable nuclear and thermonuclear warheads; in numbers and quality of ships at sea and naval bases; in numbers of nuclear tests carried out before and after the 1963 Moscow Treaty; in arms shipments to other countries; and in defense spending. In addition to doubting the accuracy of the US estimates of Soviet military R and D outlays, the yearbook also questions Pentagon reports regarding the SS-9 threat, the suggested "footprint" pattern of Soviet multiple warhead dispersion against Minuteman targets, and the production rate of Soviet submarines. Even with regard to the balance of conventional forces in Europe, the yearbook introduces qualitative considerations that tend to undermine the simplistic images of Warsaw Pact superiority.

Though the yearbook suggests considerable exaggeration in American analyses of Soviet data, its own presentation of official Soviet defense appropriations over the years (pp. 266-67) shows that the Soviet outlays expanded at a much greater rate than those of the United States. Thus, total defense spending in the USSR, by the SIPRI estimates, almost doubled in 1960-69 and increased by almost one-third in 1965-69. US spending also went up about one-third in 1965-69 (including outlays for Vietnam), but increased only about 40 percent over the entire period 1960-69. The comparative figures point up quite clearly the interaction between the two powers' arms budgets: in 1964-65, the "spirit of Moscow" generated by the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty was reflected in reduced arms expenditures on both sides; and in 1966 and other years, increased US military spending spurred Moscow to follow suit.

In the main, however, the SIPRI analyses tend to deemphasize the magnitude of the Soviet military effort relative to that of the United States. Official US estimates of Soviet strength have indeed erred in the past, sometimes underestimating the Soviet strategic buildup (as occurred in the late years of Robert McNamara's tenure) but more often overestimating it.

Despite the shortcomings of the SIPRI yearbooks, they nevertheless provide the most comprehensive and balanced analyses thus far available of the arms race and arms control negotiations. Like other recent analyses by Western Sovietologists (*e.g.*, William Welch's *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy*[1]) these studies challenge Western scholars to view the subject of arms competition in a more comparative framework, especially in terms of a dyadic model including the other superpower.

[1] New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.

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Revolutionary Wars in Theory and Practice

By Dennis J. Duncanson

ERIC R. WOLF: *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. London, Faber & Faber, 1971.
HARVEY MEYERSON: *Vinh Long*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970.
PAUL F. LANGER and JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF: *North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.

PROFESSOR WOLF'S volume surveys six revolutionary struggles for power during the last sixty years—in Mexico, Russia, China, Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba—and tries to distill from them a general theory independent of the wide disparity between the histories and cultural backgrounds of the six countries. The generalization, however, entails a haziness in the use of some of his most central terms that makes his argument difficult to follow.

When *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* appeared in London, *The Economist* welcomed it as a "non-Marxist attempt at class analysis," and this purpose is confirmed by the author in his preface. Yet, the leaders in five of these six struggles certainly claimed to be acting on a Marxist analysis of society, and Professor Wolf, despite his stated purpose, does not satisfactorily explain away this contradiction though it would seem to be central to his book. He recognizes that in the peasant wars in Russia, China, and Vietnam—all countries with a tradition of secret-society politics congenial to revolution—Communist parties did provide middle-class leadership. However, even if there had been no such "outside agitators," he argues, the peasants would have embarked on their struggles anyway, for "peasants rise to redress wrong"—although it is not always the most aggrieved who "rise" first.

In support of this view, we are given a series of historical narratives, most of which continue the story after the war in question had been won and the revolution achieved. They make up the greater part of the book. We read that the Russian Revolution, though one of the six peasant wars studied, was not a peasant war at all. As for Cuba, we are told (1) that Castro's revolution was the work of a small and isolated pocket of peasants; (2) that the Cuban countryside was not a true peasant society because of its plantation structure; and (3) that even Castro's supporters were not real peasants but recent squatters who survived, for the most part, by growing hemp for the drug market of capitalist America.

What, then, does constitute a peasant war? Is it a war in which peasants take the initiative, or one in which they merely provide cannon fodder? And, as one cannot have a peasant war without peasants, we must know how they are to be defined. Professor Wolf is not very helpful here either. Peasants, he says, are "populations that are existentially [*sic*] involved in cultivation and make autonomous decisions regarding the processes of cultivation." Thus the Cuban plantation workers, lacking such decision-making power (not to mention "existential involvement"), are not peasants.

To classify such workers as "proletarians," not peasants, even when they are still leading a "peasant" life, is, of course, a feature of contemporary Marxist social analysis as well as of Professor Wolf's "non-Marxist class analysis": the Communist Party of Malaya, for example, thus labeled the Chinese peasant squatters who both grew rice and tapped rubber. Such classification is the fruit not of any search for scientific precision but of practical necessity. In a society in which there is no industrial proletariat, some other class must be mobilized to work for the proletarian revolution. Plantation workers generally are already organized by their employers (or, in capitalist Malaya, often by their own cooperatives), and it is more efficient to take over such existing organizations in the name of trade unionism than to seek adherents to the revolutionary cause by argument alone—it can even be more efficient than

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the "armed propaganda" practiced by many Far Eastern CPs.

Professor Wolf seems to attribute the "peasant wars" in Vietnam and Algeria largely to the *latifundium* of the French period, even though the cultivators there had little scope for making decisions. (Perhaps a more realistic analysis would fix on the plantation organization of food-growing as the key factor exposing *latifundium*-workers to recruitment for a Leninist revolution.) Moreover, he argues that all the six revolutions occurred because of the coming of capitalism from the alien West—more specifically, because of the consequent grievance of the peasants at having to pay for capital-formation through the medium of land rents (equals "surplus value"?). Are we then to suppose that it was simply lack of capacity to "make autonomous decisions" which prevented peasants wars from developing during the industrial revolutions in the West, when capital formation from agricultural surpluses was also taking place? And why have such struggles not erupted in recent times in the *kibbutzim* of Israel, the *kolkhozy* of the Soviet Union, or the *kung she* (communes) of the People's Republic of China?

Apart from these contradictions, which would have to be resolved if his thesis were to stand up, Professor Wolf draws his history uncritically from the polemics of journalists as much as from scholarly studies. Indeed, the fact that the book grew out of the Vietnam "teach-ins"—and shares the anti-intellectual confusion of these occasions—may explain why it appears to be less a dispassionate political analysis of the six revolutions for their own sakes than a specious restatement of general political determinism designed to play down the ruthlessness of Communist ambitions in the particular case of Vietnam.

Unlike Professor Wolf, Mr. Meyerson is a newspaperman, and he addresses himself only to the war in Vietnam. *Vinh Long* shows up the incompetences and misadventures of the US forces in the Mekong Delta just before and during the Tet offensive of 1968, when their fortunes were at their lowest point. We get a close-up view, authentically and vividly conveyed, which leads us to the immediate conclusion that American involvement in Vietnam was wrong, is bound to fail, and ought therefore to be terminated at once. In World War II, British forces were dogged by similar muddles in Norway in 1940 and in Burma in 1942; and if we were to follow the same logic, we would have to say that the British involvement in World War II was wrong, was bound to fail, and should have been terminated at its low point. Even more important, Meyerson does not raise the question "What instead?" He argues that his fragmentary view is superior to a more comprehensive understanding of the war because the latter would of necessity be more superficial. Making a virtue of the fact that he can describe the war only in microcosm is ingenious: not only does it enhance the value of the author's limited experience, but it renders everybody else's information, including an estimation of what the fighting is all about or what the other side is up to, irrelevant.

The question of what the other side has been up to in Laos for the last twenty-five years is examined rather more systematically by two Rand consultants in *North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao*. Unfortunately, their book went to press before the revelations of Tran Van Dinh, one of the organizers of the Pathet Lao (and later South Vietnamese ambassador to Washington under the Diem regime), regarding the formation of the Pathet Lao and the information provided by the flow of defectors from the Pathet Lao during 1971 became available. However, Langer and Zasloff establish beyond reasonable doubt the dependence of the Pathet Lao on North Vietnamese military support, aid and advice, and technical assistance (the military and non-military aid that the Pathet Lao receives includes some direct help from China as well); there is even a "commercial import program" in operation, it appears from this study. The dependence of the Pathet Lao on aid from North Vietnam is even greater than North Vietnam's own dependence on foreign aid, and the Rand study documents the intimacy with which everything is managed, and answered for, by North Vietnamese administrators. Equally significant, however, is the problem of the relationship between helpers and helped. North Vietnam's own propensity toward misappropriation, fulminated over so often by Ho Chi Minh, crops up in the aid relationship at Xieng Khouang much as the same phenomenon occurs in Saigon; and apparently the exasperations of American advisers and allies which impressed Mr. Meyerson so unfavorably at Vinh Long afflicts just as heavily their North Vietnamese counterparts who deal with the Pathet Lao. Again, were we to apply Mr. Meyerson's reasoning to the evidence collected by Messrs. Langer and Zasloff, we should be forced to conclude that the North Vietnamese involvement in Laos is wrong, is bound to fail, and therefore ought to be terminated at once.

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